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ABSTRACT 
 
This research report comparatively investigates labour‘s responses to work restructuring 
at the Volkswagen (VW) plants in Germany (Kassel) and South Africa (Uitenhage). 
Since the advent of industrial revolution, the automotive industry has experienced rapid 
changes in work organisation and production systems. This report discusses work 
restructuring in the industry from the 1970s to 2009, and examines labour‘s engagement 
with it at the two Volkswagen plants. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were 
conducted with Works Council members at the Kassel plant and shop stewards at the 
Uitenhage plant. The report concludes that VW workers at the Kassel plant are more 
proactive and effective in their engagement with workplace restructuring than their 
counterparts at the Uitenhage plant. The report proposes two factors to explain this 
variation.  
 
Firstly, the report argues that the German industrial relations system enables workers at 
the Kassel plant to influence and shape work restructuring through institutionalised 
participation. Secondly, the inability of workers at the Uitenhage plant to influence 
restructuring of work is worsened by the fact that their plant is controlled by VW 
headquarters in Germany. The concept of imperial restructuring is developed to highlight 
difficulties faced by labour at the Uitenhage plant to influence work restructuring 
processes. It is further argued that Marxist literature on worker participation ignores that 
workers are sometimes interested in participating in decision making when confronted by 
uncertainty about their jobs, just as employers are interested in worker participation when 
their authority and legitimacy is threatened.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
The consolidation of neo-liberal global capitalism has reconfigured the global political 
economy in significant ways—an uneven and unequal process referred to as neo-liberal 
globalisation. The changes in the global political economy have also affected the 
organisation of work in the workplace. Generally understood as ―a compression of time 
and space of social relations‖ (Harvey, 1989), neo-liberal globalisation has ushered in a 
new production regime characterised by flexible accumulation and new managerialism 
(Littler, 1992; Mapadimeng, 1995). Flexible accumulation refers to the growing 
internationalisation of production and global capital mobility, and by new managerialism 
we refer to worker participatory structures aimed at improving productivity and 
efficiency (Mapadimeng, 1995).  
 
Workplace restructuring normally poses threats to job security while, on the other hand, 
increased productivity not only benefits employers but ensures the economic viability of 
an enterprise. In the current period of neo-liberalism, an increase in productivity is 
necessary for economic growth and, according to exponents of the trickledown theory, 
economic development. There is a growing consensus among industrial sociologists that 
workplace restructuring has created space for precarious work, ergonomic problems and 
retrenchments. In order to improve productivity and performance in production, 
employers are continuously thrust into adopting not only new production systems but also 
innovative industrial relations strategies aimed at attaining greater co-operation and 
communication with workers (new managerialism) (Hirschman, 1970; Littler, 1992).  
 
The capitalist mode of production is characterised by the double crisis of profitability and 
legitimacy (Silver, 2003). Employers are increasingly becoming aware that improved 
efficiency and productivity in the workplace are unattainable in the absence of workers‘ 
co-operation and participation in decision making. The use of brute force to secure 
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compliance on the part of labour has only fuelled labour‘s organisational strength and 
shop-floor militancy (Mandel, 1973). To mitigate the recurrent capitalist crisis of 
profitability and legitimacy, employers cyclically involve workers in decision-making 
processes on issues related to the workplace (Ramsay, 1977). In the field of industrial 
sociology this phenomenon is known as ―worker/employee participation‖ or 
―participative management‖ (Burawoy, 1985; Maller, 1992). 
 
Since the invention of participative management, different companies and countries have 
put in place a variety of worker participatory structures, some performing similar tasks 
but with different names and powers. Companies in the automotive industry, such as 
Volkswagen (VW), continue to restructure work so as to remain competitive in the global 
automotive industry. The Marxist literature suggests that worker participation was 
introduced specifically as a result of, and to mitigate, labour‘s organisational strength and 
militancy (Mandel, 1973; Ramsay, 1977; Crouch, 1982; Burawoy, 1985). In other words 
worker participation has been propelled by, among other factors, the capitalists‘ interest 
in sustained productivity and profit maximisation. 
This research report has set out to investigate labour‘s responses to workplace 
restructuring at the VW Kassel (Germany) and Uitenhage (South Africa) plants. The 
report‘s main object was to comparatively examine worker participation in the two plants 
vis-à-vis restructuring of work. Put differently, the main object of this study was to 
comparatively examine labour‘s responses to restructuring of work at the two VW plants. 
The research sought to answer the question: How has the Volkswagen workforce in 
South Africa and Germany engaged management on changes in production systems and 
work organisation? It investigates workers‘ responses to restructuring of work in the two 
plants from 1970 until 2009. Worker participation and workplace restructuring are the 
two central concepts in this report.  
The main finding of this research is that Volkswagen workers at the Kassel plant were 
more proactive and effective in their engagement with workplace restructuring. They 
embarked upon a successful struggle against management‘s plan to shut down the plant 
and later to outsource the press shop. The workers were also central in boosting 
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productivity and performance of the plant at a time when it had lost its competitive edge 
in the global automotive industry. All these productive engagements were achieved 
through institutionalised worker participation as promulgated in the German industrial 
relations system. 
Quite conversely, the research found that workers at the VW Uitenhage plant were unable 
to influence work restructuring processes. VW has unilaterally installed new press, body 
and paint shops, and an assembly line at the Uitenhage plant without consulting the 
workers at all—this I describe as imperial restructuring of work. This refers to the power 
of multinational corporations (MNCs) to unilaterally restructure work in their plants 
located in developing countries. This concept is discussed together with Webster, 
Lambert and Bezuidenhout‘s (2008) theory on ―whipsawing strategy‖ and Grenier‘s 
(2006) theory on ―coercive comparisons‖.  
The report proposes two arguments to explain the variation in labour‘s responses at the 
two plants. Firstly, it argues that the German industrial relations system empowers the 
Works Council at the Kassel plant to be actively involved in and influence work 
restructuring processes. Institutionalised participation is a cornerstone in the labour‘s 
effective engagement with work restructuring at the Kassel plant. Secondly, the inability 
of VW Uitenhage workers to influence restructuring of work is further worsened by the 
fact that their plant is controlled from VW headquarters in Germany. 
In light of the 2008 global financial crisis and its impact on the automotive industry, the 
research found that workers are keen to participate in work restructuring processes when 
confronted by possible job losses. This poses a challenge to the Marxist analysis of 
worker participation on a theoretical level. The Marxist literature in the field of industrial 
sociology is generally pessimistic about worker participation—that is, worker 
participation is viewed not only as an illusion but as a capitalist-driven process directed at 
weakening trade unions and maximising the extraction of surplus value. 
Burawoy (1985) sees worker participation as a management tactic to ―manufacture 
consent‖; similarly Crouch (1982) sees it as a means through which worker leaders get 
co-opted into management, and Ramsay (1977) sees it as a tool used by management to 
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gain legitimacy when confronted by workers‘ power. Mandel (1973) regards it as an act 
of ―class collaboration‖ geared at defusing class contradictions inherent in the capitalist 
system. The theoretical point of departure in this report is that the Marxist literature on 
worker participation ignores the desire by employees to participate in decision making on 
work restructuring processes, particularly when confronted by job insecurity. Seeing 
worker participation solely as a means used by employers to solicit compliance on the 
part of workers ignores that workers are sometimes interested in worker participation, 
particularly when their jobs are endangered.  
 
1.2 Rationale 
The rationale for this study primarily lies in the fact that both plants have experienced 
similar work restructuring processes but are located in different countries with different 
industrial relations systems and institutional worker representational forms. The VW 
Kassel and Uitenhage plants were chosen because they share a common history of strong 
shop-floor unionisation, workplace restructuring and militant industrial actions over 
wages and better working conditions (Streeck, 1984; Kraft and Fitzroy, 1987; Maller, 
1992). However, the evolution of South African and German industrial relations systems 
is characterised by different dynamics and legislative frameworks. For example, the 
German labour legislative framework legally binds employers to inform or consult 
workers on their plans to restructure work (Streeck, 1984; Kaler, 1999). 
 
Much has been written about workplace restructuring at the two Volkswagen plants 
(Spiro, 1954; Kraft and Fitzroy, 1987; Maller, 1992; Black, 1993; Van Hook, 2002; 
Bolsmann, 2009), but there has not been an in-depth comparative study on how VW 
workers in different countries engage their local management on workplace restructuring. 
This study also draws its weight and rationale from the fact that there has not been a 
focused and detailed comparative study on how Volkswagen workers at its South African 
and German plants engage with work restructuring processes, with the an exception of 
Chris Bolsmann‘s (2006) study on the dynamics of trade union internationalism between 
IG Mettal and National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). Previous 
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comparative studies do not deal with workers‘ engagement with restructuring of work 
between VW plants in Germany and South Africa.  
 
The recurrent outcry and condemnation of what NUMSA calls ―management unilateral 
approach‖ to decision making is an expression of the deep-seated problem of governance 
in the South African metal sector in general. NUMSA is still grappling with the question 
of how to best engage employers on issues around workplace restructuring and changes 
in production systems in particular (NUMSA, 2009). On the other hand, some employers 
who introduced worker participatory structures accuse worker representatives of either 
not taking such structures seriously or lacking capacity to constructively engage 
management on a wide range of issues discussed in such forums (Adler, 2000). This 
study is of critical importance to the labour movement in the South African automotive 
industry, NUMSA in particular, in that it contributes to the development of a concrete 
strategy for the union to best respond to changes in work and production systems.  
 
As a result of the 2008 global economic meltdown, many workers in the auto industry 
have either lost their jobs or been placed on short time. There is no doubt that the current 
crisis has had an impact on work organisation in the auto industry. This makes the study 
even more interesting as it also seeks to establish if there is any correlation between the 
current global economic recession and workplace restructuring in the industry. 
 
1.3 Research methodology and methods  
Strauss and Corbin (1998) argue that the choice of whether to do qualitative or 
quantitative research depends on the nature of the research question. This research sought 
to uncover workers‘ views on workplace restructuring in their plants. It is on this basis 
that qualitative methods were employed in order to answer the research question.    
 
Qualitative research methods such as focus groups and interviews are generally suitable 
for uncovering detail which would not easily be established through quantitative research 
methods. Whereas the data collection methods were essentially qualitative, this report 
makes reference to some quantitative studies to illustrate particular points.  
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1.3.1 Case study research design  
The study adopted a case study method because this research design is well suited for the 
―how‖ and ―why‖ questions (Yin, 1989). Of course the case study approach was not 
adopted merely because of this. The case study research design also allows for critical 
and in-depth analysis of the issue under investigation.  
 
Burawoy (1979:9) argues that case studies ―are not chosen for their statistical 
representativeness but for theoretical relevance‖. De Vaus (2001:134) further states that 
case study research design ―can seek to explore a topic where there has been little prior 
knowledge or understanding‖. Part of the reasons for this study was a lack of previous 
comparative research on how labour has responded to work restructuring at the VW 
plants.  
 
1.3.2 Documentary analysis  
According to Skocpol (1996), documentary research is relevant in establishing detailed 
technical and historical information which one would not easily get through, for example, 
interviews or focus groups. Documentary analysis was useful in giving specific and 
relatively accurate details about some technical production issues—for example, how a 
particular piece of machinery works compared to others. I read relevant primary 
documents on, or related to, workplace restructuring produced by NUMSA, IG Mettal 
and Volkswagen.  
 
NUMSA has discussed workplace restructuring in many of its meetings, including its 
2008 Jobs Security Conference. I used documents produced from such meetings and 
workshops to contribute in answering the research question. IG Mettal also developed a 
guiding document—Active Response to the Crisis—which clearly spells out its response 
to the 2008 global economic meltdown. Documentary analysis was useful in collecting 
historical information on how the two unions have engaged workplace restructuring in 
the past. I also used archival material from both unions in the effort to understand their 
responses to workplace restructuring, particularly in the period 1970 to the 1990s.  
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1.3.3 In-depth semi-structured interviews and focus groups  
I conducted ten in-depth semi-structured interviews and one focus group with the shop 
stewards at VW Uitenhage plant. I also conducted eleven in-depth semi-structured 
interviewees and one focus group with the Works Council members at the VW Kassel 
plant.  
 
In-depth semi-structured interviews ―involve a clear list of issues to be addressed and 
questions to be answered but there is more flexibility around the sequence in which they 
are asked and the interviewer will allow the respondent to speak more broadly about the 
topics being discussed‖(Greenstein, 2003:56). I used in-depth semi-structured interviews 
because of their strength in giving detailed information on the issue being investigated.  
 
Focus group can be defined as ―a group discussion generally involving between eight and 
twelve participants from similar backgrounds or experiences to discuss a specific topic of 
interest‖ (Greenstein, 2003:60). With focus groups, participants are given time to 
critically engaged with the issue at hand and are at liberty to agree or disagree with each 
other on any issue. A researcher needs to be more cautious in analysing data from focus 
groups because this data collection technique has a tendency of painting a picture of 
―what is socially accepted in a community rather than what is really taking place or 
believed‖(Greenstein, 2006:73). This important advice was not ignored in the analysis of 
data from the two focus groups. 
 
1.3.4 Sampling  
The sampling method used to determine interviewees was based on purposive selection. 
According to Groenewald (1986:18), ―In a purposive selection, the sample is the result of 
a process of selection which is intentional or non-random‖. Sampling for this study had to 
be purposive because I intended to interview only shop stewards and Works Council 
members. This sampling method was appropriate in this research as it aimed to 
investigate responses from a particular social group.  
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1.3.5 Ethical issues  
Informed consent for participation in the study was secured from all participants, with 
some refusing to participate. Participation was strictly voluntary and confidential; no 
coercion was used on participants to partake in this study (see Appendix for the consent 
form). All participants were briefed about the purpose of the research. No harm was 
inflicted on any of the participants. This report uses pseudonyms to identify those who 
chose to remain anonymous.  
 
1.3.6 Role as an intern in SWOP and access to the workplaces  
I was a research intern at the Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP) at the 
University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) while registered for the MA. I assisted SWOP 
with research which sought to develop a workplace restructuring strategy for NUMSA. 
My participation in this project was also linked to my MA research report.  
 
My role as a research assistant to Professor Emeritus Edward Webster helped a great deal 
in sharpening my understanding on workplace restructuring and worker participation. 
Access to the workplaces was organised by NUMSA and IG Mettal (both strategic 
partners in the NUMSA research project). The NUMSA research project was funded by 
the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), South Africa.  
 
1.4 Shortcomings during field work  
During the course of data collection I encountered numerous challenges and problems. 
Firstly, I could not access the crucial productivity agreements signed between the VW 
Kassel Works Council and management because of their confidentiality. I relied entirely 
on the Works Council members for a verbal briefing on the main issues contained in the 
agreements. Some questions I asked during interviews were not answered because of the 
confidentiality of such information. Most respondents in Germany were interviewed in 
English, but I had to rely on translators for respondents who were not proficient in 
English or who preferred to respond in German. Translations were not always clear and I 
could not understand some parts of the translated information.  
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Shop stewards at Uitenhage plant were removed from office towards the end of the data 
collection process for this research. Some of the ousted shop stewards were reluctant to 
answer follow-up questions or provide information they had previously promised to give 
because they were no longer shop stewards.  
 
Attempts to interview management at the plants were unsuccessful. The many e-mails I 
sent to the VW Uitenhage plant management remained unanswered. I could not meet the 
VW Kassel plant management because of their tight schedule. However, this is not an 
issue because the main respondents for the research had originally been intended to be the 
shop stewards and Works Council members.  
 
1.5. The structure of the thesis 
This research report is divided into five chapters. Chapter One introduces the thesis and 
the research methodology and methods. This chapter indicates that qualitative research 
methods were employed. The rationale for the research is also explained.   
 
The first section of Chapter Two reviews the major work restructuring trends in the 
automotive industry. Using the Marxist labour process theory as its primary tool of 
analysis, this chapter discusses the history of work restructuring under the capitalist 
political economy. The chapter also discusses Bonachic‘s notion of logistics revolution 
and Gerreffi‘s theory of global commodity chains to highlight restructuring trends in the 
global automotive industry. The second section of Chapter Two discusses worker 
participation and the theories on labour‘s responses to work restructuring processes.   
 
Chapter Three delves into the responses of NUMSA and IG Mettal to workplace 
restructuring in the period 1970 to the late 1990s. In order to understand the different 
approaches adopted by the two unions in this period, the report makes an attempt to 
explain South African and German labour histories and their industrial relations systems.   
 
Chapter Four focuses on the period 2000 to 2009. Drawing from the data gathered from 
the in-depth semi-structured interviews and focus groups, this chapter concludes that 
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workers at the VW Kassel plant are more proactive and effective in their engagement 
with workplace restructuring than their South African counterparts. The chapter makes an 
attempt to explain the variation. Firstly, the report argues that the variation can be 
explained by looking into the differing industrial relations systems in South Africa and 
Germany. 
 
It argues that institutionalised participation at the Kassel plant empowers workers to 
influence and shape work restructuring. Secondly, the report develops the concept of 
imperial restructuring to highlight the challenges faced by workers at the VW Uitenhage 
plant in influencing work restructuring processes. The report further argues that NUMSA 
and IG Mettal‘s responses to the 2008 global economic downturn were both inward-
looking and protectionist.  
Chapter Five summarises the main findings and arguments of the research report. It also 
argues that workers desire participation in workplace restructuring when their jobs are 
risk of being lost. Marxist-leaning perspectives that regard worker participation solely as 
a means through which capitalists seek to resolve the crisis of profitability or to 
manufacture consent ignore that workers themselves desire greater participation when 
uncertain about job security. In conclusion, the chapter draws from the optimism found in 
Harvey‘s (2000) Spaces of Hope and Herrod‘s (2001) Labour Geographies to argue that 
a global labour strategy to challenge the exaggerated power of multinational co-
operations is possible.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Restructuring of work in the auto industry and 
theories of worker participation 
2.1. Introduction  
Workplace restructuring and worker participation have become buzzwords in the field of 
industrial sociology. Most workers in the automotive industry are becoming increasingly 
familiar with concepts such as downsizing, quality circles, team work, joint management, 
lean production, Just-In-Time (JIT), outsourcing, Kanban or Kaizen production systems. 
Jarvis (1999:18) argues that until the late 1990s these concepts ―had little meaning in the 
workplaces of South Africa‖; however, workers‘ acquaintance with them has improved 
since the advent of lean production systems. These developments are a clear indication of 
great transformation in the world of work. Employers are continuously restructuring the 
labour process in order to expand the economic horizons of their enterprises and to 
remain competitive.  
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. Marx‘s labour process theory is used as a basic 
theoretical tool to analyse the changes in the world of work. The first section draws from 
the literature on workplace restructuring and makes an attempt to discuss major 
restructuring trends in the automotive industry. The basic argument in this section is that 
the industry has generally experienced a transition from a Fordist labour process to post-
Fordist labour process based on the notion of flexible production. The section begins by 
outlining how the labour process has changed over time, and uses this to discuss 
transformation of work from the rise of the factory, and from Fordism to post-Fordism. It 
further discusses the concepts of logistics revolution and global commodity chains to 
highlight major restructuring trends in the global automotive industry.   
 
The second section of the chapter discusses theories of worker participation. This section 
begins by outlining and discussing different forms of worker participation as theorised by 
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scholars within the field of industrial sociology such as Pateman‘s (1970) typology of 
worker participation. It further delves into theories on labour‘s responses to the 
workplace restructuring process. The chapter demonstrates that there is no consensus 
around conceptualisation of union‘s responses to the restructuring of work. Drawing from 
the Marxist critique of worker participation under capitalism, this chapter argues that the 
establishment of worker participatory structures must be understood fundamentally as a 
manifestation of class contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production. 
 
2.2 Workplace restructuring 
2.2.1 The labour process theory 
Marxist labour process theory (LPT) is a useful theoretical tool of analysis that can help 
us best understand workplace restructuring in a capitalist political economy. The origins 
of the LPT can be traced back to Volume One of Marx‘s (1976) Capital: A Critical 
Analysis of Capitalist Production. According to Giddens (1982:38), the LPT is an 
important analytical tool in that it posses the capacity to explain how ―the rationality of 
technique in the modern industrial enterprise is not neutral in respect of class 
domination‖. This is probably the reason why much of the research into the sociology of 
work has been devoted to the analysis of the labour process.  
 
According to Thompson (1983:13) the labour process is about ―who owns, controls and 
designs work‖ and the ―consequences of these social relations on forms of technology 
and the division of labour‖. The fundamental premise underpinning the LPT is that 
production is a necessity for any society to live and reproduce itself (Marx, 1976). Work 
provides the most important means for people to fulfil their basic needs and for their 
survival. Marx defined labour process as a process through which raw materials are 
transformed by human labour into finished products with use value. This process 
combines human labour set to work as labour power, raw materials upon which labour 
works and the means through which labour acts, such as tools and machinery (Marx, 
1976). This concretely involves the organisation of work, interaction between workers 
and production systems, and methods at the point of production (Palloix, 2006:46).  
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This means that the labour process forms an integral part of any society, because every 
society ought to produce in order to reproduce itself. The LPT focuses on three main 
facets of work under the capitalist political economy: social relations of production, 
managerial control of the labour process and restructuring of work (Domagaski and 
Gaines, 1996). Labour process theorists argue that private ownership of the means of 
production and the sale of labour power has historically resulted in the unequal power 
relations between labour and capital. This is the reason why the LPT views the 
relationship between capital and labour as fundamentally antagonistic and adversarial. 
According to Marx (1976) the interests of labour and capital are irreconcilably opposed 
to each other.  
 
A leading theorist on the LPT, Thompson (1983), argues that the inherent adversarial 
relationship between labour and capital is at the centre of the capitalist labour process. In 
order to understand capitalist managerial control and its perpetual attempts to restructure 
work, it is important that we understand the relationship between capital and labour under 
the capitalist political economy. According to the LPT, the social relationship between 
capital and labour at the point of production is characterised by dependency and 
inequality. Capital owns the means of production, whereas labour sells its labour power 
to capitalists as a commodity. Drawing from Marx‘s writing on the labour process, 
Braverman (1974) argues that the capitalist labour process alienates and exploits workers, 
coercing them into servitude.   
 
2.2.2 Restructuring of work under capitalism  
As indicated in the beginning, this chapter deals with the restructuring of work under the 
capitalist political economy. The history of work under capitalism is characterised by the 
continual restructuring of work as employers seek improvement in productivity, 
performance and quality. In order to increase profit, employers can either get workers to 
work much harder and longer, or reorganise work (Marx, 1976). Consistent with the 
labour process theory, this chapter discerns three main phases in the restructuring of work 
since the dawn of capitalist industrialisation, namely the rise of the factory, the rise of 
Taylorism and Fordism, and the rise of post-Fordism labour process.  
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Workplace restructuring as a phenomenon encompasses changes in both production 
systems and work organisation. The former aspect involves changes in the technical 
aspects of production, such as automation or computerisation of production systems, 
whereas the latter refers to the changes in employment relationships—that is, whether 
workers are in a standard employment relationship or not (Wood, 1989; Deyo, 1997). In 
the current epoch of post-Fordism, the restructuring of work is centred on the notion of 
flexibility; this is evidenced by employers‘ quest for flexible production systems and 
work organisation (Maller, 1992).  
 
2.2.3 Rise of the factory system  
In the early stages of industrial capitalism there was the putting-out system or cottage 
system, whereby a merchant provided raw materials to the ―middle-man‖ who was in turn 
responsible for working such raw materials into finished products (Webster, 1985). The 
employer did not have full control over the labour process; this meant that workers had 
the autonomy to decide when and how they worked as long as they performed the task as 
agreed with the merchant. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the putting-out 
system was more dominant in the manufacturing sector such as metals, spinning and 
weaving of textiles.  
 
Concerned about their inability to control the labour process and the theft of raw 
materials, employers introduced the factory system as a means to secure control of the 
labour process and to lengthen the working time (Thompson, 1983). The establishment of 
the factory system was motivated by nothing more than employers‘ desire to increase 
their control of the labour process. The first ever factory to be established was the Boston 
Manufacturing Company, which opened in 1813 in Massachusetts.  
 
In their production of woven cloth in the factory, workers operated spinning and weaving 
machines under the supervision of employers or managers over a specific agreed working 
time. Under the factory system, workers were shifted from working in their homes to 
working in industrial factories (Webster, 1985). Time became the main issue under the 
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factory system; this is the reason why workers‘ first struggles were centred on the length 
of the working day (Webster, 1985).   
 
2.2.4 Fordist labour process  
Within the industrial sociology scholarship, the Fordist labour process is today referred to 
as an old labour process (Ngoasheng, 1992). In the 1950s and 1960s, the Fordist labour 
process dominated organisation of work in the automotive industry and was generally 
characterised by product standardisation and production rigidity. According to 
Braverman (1974), the driving force behind the Fordist labour process was employers‘ 
interest in tightening control over the labour process. Fordism has been subjected to 
different interpretations and analysis in the field of social sciences. For example, 
developmental sociology defines Fordism as a development trajectory underpinned by 
Keynesian economic policies (Keily, 1988). For purposes of explaining its relevance in 
the world of work, this report divides it into four main components, namely: division of 
labour, mechanisation, scientific management and assembly line.  
 
All these principles are fundamentally influenced by Taylor‘s organisational principles 
and Ford‘s technological innovations. Henry Ford developed a production system geared 
at mass production of standardised goods ―by highly repetitive mechanical methods‖ 
(Maller and Dwolatsky, 1993:70). The combination of Ford‘s and Taylor‘s contributions 
on how work should be organised culminated in the development of the Fordist labour 
process. In his seminal work titled Labour and Monopoly Capital, Harry Braverman 
(1974) comprehensively discusses the Fordist labour process and argues convincingly 
that the combination of Ford‘s mass production system and Taylor‘s scientific 
management coalesce into the Fordist labour process. This is the reason why I do not 
discuss Taylorism and Fordism as separate theories.    
 
The separation and specialisation of tasks—that is, division of labour—was among the 
key strategies used in the early years of capitalist production (Kaplinsky, 1990). Under 
the cottage or putting-out system, workers would perform a variety of tasks and handle 
different tools. However, the Fordist labour process rigidly prescribes that workers 
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perform specific tasks. Taylorism added more detail to the theory and practice of the 
division of labour. According to Taylor, effective work could be done only if there was a 
systematic separation of mental and manual labour (Braverman, 1974). According to 
Taylor‘s organisational principles on work organisation, ―brain work‖ had to be removed 
from the shop floor and centralised in management‘s planning departments (Altenburg, 
Griscom et al., 1999).  
 
Scientific management made a clear distinction between conception and execution. 
Taylor argued that management‘s role should be to reduce workers‘ production 
knowledge to rules, laws and formulae (Braverman, 1974). Part of management‘s role is 
to co-ordinate the workplace and give instructions to workers on how the work is to be 
done. On the shop floor, workers specialise in certain tasks and perform them over and 
over again. The rationale behind this organisational principle is that workers are more 
effective in their work when each repetitively performed a single task (Braverman, 1974).  
 
According to the Taylorist (or scientific management) production organisational 
principles, workers are supposed to execute instructions from management on how work 
is supposed to be performed (Braverman, 1974). In a desperate attempt to dichotomise 
execution in the workplace, Taylor recommended the establishment of the planning and 
laying-out department whose responsibility would be to develop and communicate rules 
to workers on the shop floor on how work should be done (Braverman, 1974). The end 
result of the Taylorist organisational principles is that ―skills were concentrated in a small 
number of workers as well as management‖ (Ngoasheng, 1992:2) 
 
Through Taylorism, managements have successfully removed control of the labour 
process from the shop floor into their hands. As Ngoasheng (1992:2) put it, ―Before 
Taylorism workers could still pace themselves and determine the work-flow within the 
factory floor. This means that workers had effective control over the labour process. To 
undermine this, Taylor designed a system through which they would absorb and codify 
workers‘ skills and reduce them to simple rules‖. Thus workers lost their skills, together 
with the organic knowledge acquired in the production process (Braverman, 1974). This 
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is the reason why Braverman (in Davies, 1986:37) argued that under the Fordist labour 
process ―labour power has become a commodity. Its uses are no longer organised 
according to the needs and desires of those who sell it, but rather according to the needs 
of its purchasers, who are, primarily, employers seeking to expand the values of their 
capital‖.   
 
Henry Ford adopted Taylorist organisational principles in his attempt to improve speed 
and efficiency in the assembly line at Ford Motor Company. Most of Ford‘s ideas on how 
to best organise work were adopted by other automotive companies. The Fordist labour 
process involves the use of the assembly line to produce standardised goods en masse for 
mass consumption (Braverman, 1974). Machinery was designed specifically to fit mass 
production of the standardised products. The Fordist assembly line ―also established a 
uniform pace of work and dictated the work rhythm‖ and produces standardised products 
(Maller, 1992:11). 
 
The following production techniques are generally associated with Ford‘s ideas and 
principles on production system (Ritzer, 1996:305): 
- mass production of homogeneous products; 
- mass consumption; 
- utilisation of inflexible technologies such as the assembly line; 
- repetitive tasks for each worker; and 
- adoption of standardised work routines. 
 
2.2.5 Rise of post-Fordist labour process 
The Fordist labour process had its own problems and shortcomings. Attempts to subject 
every production issue to managerial prerogatives gave rise to shop-floor resistance, since 
workers could not bear the prospect of performing a single repetitive task for the rest of 
their working lives (Ngoasheng, 1992). The rigid and systematic separation of conception 
and execution further alienated workers from the production process; as a result workers 
were negligent in their work and quality was compromised (Ngoasheng, 1992). Workers‘ 
creativity on the shop floor was equally severely constrained.  
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The Fordist division of labour and rigid managerial instructions restricted workers from 
performing to the best of their ability in their individual tasks. This dramatically reduced 
motivation and increased boredom and fatigue, and ultimately gave rise to absenteeism, 
and resistance (Braverman, 1974). Other shortcomings associated with the Fordist labour 
process include inflexibility of the system, limited product innovation, and soaring 
overhead costs (Ngoasheng, 1992). Because of its inflexibility, the process just could not 
respond to the growing consumer demand for more specialised products. The age of mass 
production and consumption was slowly losing its ground. 
 
These are but some of the shortcomings that precipitated the shift from the Fordist labour 
process to a post-Fordist process. This shift has been characterised as ―the transition from 
homogeneity to heterogeneity‖ (Ritzer, 1996:306). The emergence of the post-Fordist 
labour process has also been described in some circles within industrial sociology as a 
―Japanese Revolution‖ (Alternburg et al., 1999), ―flexible specialisation‖ (Poire, 1986) 
and Japanese Management Techniques (Hunter, 2000). This labour process is geared 
primarily at mitigating some of the severe challenges that confronted the Fordist labour 
process. It needs to be stated, however, that there is no clear-cut historical break between 
the two processes (Hall, 1988). This explains the uneven extent of adoption among 
different automotive companies. Furthermore, elements of the Fordist labour process 
have not been completely obliterated in the production systems of some automotive 
firms.  
 
In other words, Fordist and post-Fordist labour processes need not be looked into as 
mutually exclusive. Also referred to as lean production or Japanisation (Womack, Jones 
and Ross, 1990), the post-Fordist labour process is generally aimed at achieving three 
main objectives, namely: reduction of costs by eliminating waste, use of the minimum 
amount of equipment and working time, and full use of workers‘ abilities (Womack et 
al., 1990). According to Ngoasheng (1992), the three objectives concretely involve 
production and delivery of finished goods Just-In-Time.  
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According to Deyo (1997), production flexibility is one of the defining characteristics of 
the post-Fordist labour process. By production flexibility we refer to ―the ability [of 
enterprises] to quickly, efficiently, and continuously introduce changes in a product and 
process‖ (Deyo, 1997:6). In order to understand production flexibility, Deyo makes a 
useful distinction between static and dynamic forms of flexibilities in the post-Fordist 
labour process. Static flexibility involves re-organisation of employment relationships in 
order to cut costs and ensure short-term adaptability. It also entails the ―reliance on 
temporary and contract workers and on outsourcing to low-cost suppliers‖ (Deyo, 
1997:11). Employers resort to this type of flexibility because trade liberalisation ―places 
firms under extreme pressure to cut costs in the short term‖ (Deyo, 1997:11).  
 
Atypical forms of employment such as casualisation, subcontracting and contract labour 
represents static. Casualisation and externalization of labour constitute what is usually 
referred to as ―atypical‖ or ―contingent workforce‖ (Kenny, 2003). The main objective is 
to cut costs in the short term. However, some employers introduce static flexibility not 
because they want to cut costs, but to ―undercut unions or unionisation drives because 
these strategies have the known effect of creating an insecure, floating workforce and of 
encouraging a further dispersal of production to small contracted firms and households‖ 
(Deyo, 1997:6). Whereas static flexibility is more prevalent in labour-intensive 
industries, it has also been adopted in capital-intensive industries such as the automotive 
sector. Some workers in most automotive companies are in non-standard employment 
relationships such as contract or casual labour.  
 
While static flexibility affects employment relationships, dynamic flexibility involves 
reorganisation of production systems and methods. Poire (1986) refer to the same process 
as flexible specialisation which entails using new technology, such as computerisation, to 
make production more flexible and efficient. Many automotive companies have 
computer-controlled machines, which allow them to easily and quickly adjust their 
production systems to perform different tasks. According to Deyo (1997:12), dynamic 
flexibility strategies ―are pursued in product niches requiring high levels of quality, batch 
versus mass production, and continued adoption of improved process and product 
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technologies‖. It is a generally accepted reality that continuous improvement in 
production systems and introduction of new technologies is necessary for continued 
economic viability of any motor company. 
 
Deyo (1997) further argues that dynamic flexibility is more likely to be adopted in newly 
industrialising countries (NIC) with developmentally active states (such as South Korea 
and Singapore in the late 1990s). Research also suggests that dynamic flexibility is 
usually accompanied by increased worker participation in organisational decision-making 
processes ―because firms have sought both to increase worker commitment and loyalty 
and encourage workers to assume increased responsibility for enterprise success‖ (Deyo, 
1997:7). Most motor companies, such as Volkswagen, have put in place worker 
participatory structures such as suggestions schemes and quality circles in order to 
involve workers in quality and productivity improvements.  
 
In the auto industry, dynamic flexibility or the post-Fordist labour process is 
characterised largely by Just-in-Time (JIT) and Total Quality Management (TQM) 
production strategies. The two strategies are interdependent on each other—that is, in 
order to have effective JIT production system a TQM must be adopted (Alternburg et al., 
1999). The two productions strategies are best described by defining a lean production 
system—which essentially represents major work restructuring trends in the automotive 
industry. Lean production was developed in the Toyota motor company in Japan as a 
strategic production system aimed primarily at reducing costs and improving productivity 
and quality. 
 
In their seminal work titled The Machine that Changed the World, Womack et al (1990) 
coined the term lean to describe the nature of Toyota production systems and it 
deviations from the Fordist labour process. By lean production, Womack et al. (1990) 
sought to describe transformation in the world of work which saw the (partial) 
dislodgement of mass production and standardisation techniques as previously practised 
under the Fordist labour process. Lean production ―combines the best features of both 
craft production and mass production—the ability to reduce costs per unit and 
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dramatically improve quality while, at the same time, providing an even wider range of 
products and even more challenging work‖ (Womack et al., 1990:277).  
 
In the post-Fordist labour process, TQM is used as a key strategy for eliminating waste in 
all its forms in the production process (Alternburg et al., 1999). Lean production and 
TQM are grounded in a philosophy that calls for elimination of all sorts of waste in 
production and of unnecessary inventory. According to Beynon and Nichols (2006:160), 
waste is defined as ―anything which adds cost, but not value, to the product and includes 
substandard output, inventories of various kinds, and unproductive or wasteful elements 
of workers‘ labour such as waiting time, downtime, excessive set-up time or unnecessary 
quality inspection‖.  
 
In lean production, production of each car is based on specific customer requirements and 
preferences, immediate delivery and no intermediate storage of inventory (Wilkinson, 
Turnbull and Oliver 1992; Alternburg et al., 1999). Lean production enables companies 
to increase production flexibility in order to adapt quickly to consumer demand for 
variety in production outputs. All automotive companies are under constant pressure to 
produce cars according to customers‘ preferences and special needs. Immediate delivery 
of cars which meet these specific requirements ―called for very tight coordination 
between the progress of each car on the line and the arrival of the different parts from the 
corresponding supply chains‖ (Francisco and Hospitaler, 2004:4).  
 
Lean production—or flexible production—also implies frequent introduction of new 
production systems and technological innovation as companies try to meet specific 
consumer requirements (Poire, 1986). In lean production the main determining factor for 
a firm‘s continued economic sustainability lies in its ability to embark upon continuous 
improvement of productions systems and technology. The major force behind this is the 
specific consumer demand for better car performance and reliability. 
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2.2.6 Global commodity chains and the logistics revolution  
The changes discussed above are also linked to the changes taking place in the global 
automotive supply chain. Gerrefi (1999) argues that capital has fostered neo-liberal 
globalisation by establishing two forms international economic networks, namely 
―producer driven‖ and ―buyer driven‖ commodity chains. By commodity chain, Gerrefi 
(1999) refers to a set of activities and networks involved in the production of a particular 
product—for example, a car. The reality is that component suppliers increasingly play a 
significant role in the global automotive industry. Research by Freyssenet and Lung 
(2003:83), for example, estimates that purchasing of components ―accounts for between 
50 and 70% of the cost of price of an average car‖.  
 
The global commodity chain in the auto industry is producer-driven because all 
automotive firms play a significant role in determining and co-ordinating production 
networks (Gerrefi, 1999). In other words, manufacturers in the automotive sector still 
wield significant power with regard to production networks and the labour process at the 
point of production. Producer-driven commodity chains are contrasted to buyer-driven 
commodity chains which refers to ―those industries in which large retailers, marketers 
and branded manufacturers play pivotal roles in setting decentralised production 
networks in a variety of exporting countries, typically located in the third world‖ 
(Gerrefi, 1999:1).  
 
Unlike producer-driven commodity chains, in consumer-driven commodity chains 
product designs and product specifications are set by the large marketers or retailers that 
order the goods. Typical examples of consumer-driven commodity chains include Wal-
Mart, Nike and Reebok; these firms design and market the products but do not 
manufacture them themselves—they do not own any production factory (Gerreffi, 1999). 
In the automotive industry, this type of arrangement is absent because original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) are still responsible for designing and manufacturing cars. The 
suppliers must follow the prescriptions from OEMs in terms of design, quality and 
quantity of the components they supply.  
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Unlike retailers such as Wal-Mart and Nike, automotive firms such as BMW, Toyota and 
Volkswagen are ―manufacturers with factories‖ responsible for physical production of 
cars, marketing and distribution. These automotive companies wield significant power 
over backward and forward linkages in the industry‘s global commodity chain. In terms 
of backward linkages, automotive firms exert control over raw materials and component 
suppliers; they exert the same control over forward linkages in terms of distribution and 
retailing. The automotive industry has in the recent past experienced a tremendous 
increase in the number of suppliers for OEMs in the global automotive industry. 
 
OEMs continue to choose their suppliers on the basis of their own designs for cars, and 
suppliers must supply components as per the design and quality specifications given by 
an OEM. The chief considerations in choosing suppliers include price, quality and 
timelines for delivery. According to Veloso and Ramur (2002), ―demands by the OEMs 
for continuous price reductions from suppliers, year-on-year, have become a norm in the 
automobile industry‖. For example, Toyota demanded a 25% decrease in cost from its 
suppliers over a period of three years; Ford also demanded between 5% and 7% cost 
reduction from its suppliers each year. The continuous price reduction pressures from the 
OEM to first-tier components manufacturers get passed to other suppliers in the 
commodity chain.  
 
In Getting the Goods, Bonacich and Wilson (2008) examine global supply chains from a 
sociological perspective and conclude that a new dispensation of supply chain 
management has emerged. They develop the term logistics revolution to explain global 
flexible production techniques based on Just-In-Time principles. According to Bonacich 
and Wilson (2008), the world of work has witnessed a shift from mass production to 
flexible forms of work and production organisation. The notion of logistics revolution 
can also be applied in the analysis of the automotive global supply chain. 
 
The industry‘s supply chain is organised into different supply tiers. This is necessitated 
primarily by the common desire by automotive firms to respond quickly to the pressures 
from specific consumer requirements and growing global competition (ESRC, 2003). The 
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OEMs are normally responsible for designing and assembling cars. The first tiers of 
suppliers are generally responsible for manufacturing and supplying components to the 
OEMs. Most of the first-tier suppliers also have global presence in the same way 
automotive firms do—that is, they are found wherever auto companies have plants 
(ESRC, 2003). According to Wilkinson et al. (1992:160), the JIT principle ―is extended 
backwards to suppliers and also forward to the final consumer‖. 
 
In fact, most auto companies encourage their components suppliers to ―locate their plants 
as close as possible to the automobile assembly plants so that assembly lines can receive 
frequent deliveries of small lots of parts‖ (Alternburg et al., 1999:1). These suppliers are 
expected at all times to meet the OEM‘s requirements with regard to quality and quantity 
of their production. Simpler individual parts—for example, the housing of a fuel pump—
would be supplied by the second-tier suppliers to the first-tier suppliers (ESRC, 2003). 
The second-tier and third-tier suppliers would supply raw materials either to the first-tier 
or second-tier suppliers.  
 
Traditionally, a single company would be responsible for the production of all car parts 
and the final product itself, but some of these tasks have been outsourced to individual 
components companies. Because most automotive companies have outsourced most of 
their production activities, the auto components industry has gained momentum. 
According to Veloso and Ramur (2002), the global automotive supply chain has changed 
in that ―the new direct suppliers are becoming large global firms, which are either 
specialised in complex systems or integrators of several simpler subsystems‖. The 
leading automotive components firms include Lear Corporation, Bosal, Magna and so on. 
Most automotive assembly lines, such as the VW plant in Uitenhage, are surrounded by a 
number of components suppliers. Logistics parks have been set up next to most auto 
assembly lines.   
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2.3 Theories of worker participation 
2.3.1 What is worker participation?  
Worker participation refers to a corporate human resource strategy built on the principles 
of co-operation and co-responsibility in decision making between employers and 
employees (Maller, 1992). Maller (1992:96) argues that this strategy often seeks to 
―develop an approach to labour relations that stressed co-operation and generated high 
motivation levels amongst employees‖. The establishment of participatory structures in 
the workplace should be understood as a manifestation of the class contradictions 
inherent in the capitalist mode of production. Employers are engaged in a perpetual quest 
to control and dominate the labour process so as to maximise the extraction of excess—
that is, unpaid labour time (Mandel, 1973; Burawoy, 1979).  
 
Mandel (1973) argues that the structural crisis of late capitalism and the concomitant 
consolidation of labour‘s organisational presence are the primary driving forces that led 
to capitalist (re)invention of a ―more subtle means of domination‖—this being worker 
participation. For Mandel, worker participation is a capitalist tactic that seeks to associate 
workers with capital. Contrary to a traditional Marxist understanding of capitalist labour 
control as despotic or ―de-skilling‖ (Braverman, 1974), Burawoy suggests that capitalists 
(or employers) are increasingly using a more hegemonic methodology of co-optation and 
subtle coercion, thus manufacturing consent.  
 
For Burawoy (1979) the main question should be about why workers work as hard as 
they do, instead of the traditional Marxist preoccupation with why workers work at all. 
According to Burawoy (1979), employers use a variety of tactics (or strategies) to 
―manufacture consent‖; at the centre of these strategies is worker participation or 
participative management. A number of studies on worker participation that have hitherto 
been conducted—for example, in BMW (Masondo, 2003) and Anglo Platinum (Maller, 
1992)—confirm Burawoy‘s theory that worker participation represents employers‘ 
attempts to manufacture consent on the part of workers. In his study on trade 
liberalisation and work restructuring at the BMW plant in South Africa, Masondo (2003) 
developed the concept of ideological flexibility to describe management‘s attempts to 
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change the behaviour and attitudes of workers by introducing various worker 
participation structures.  
Following massive dismissals of mineworkers in 1987, the Anglo American Corporation 
introduced an employee share ownership scheme ―which was designed to enhance 
employees‘ identification with the company‖ (Maller, 1992:7). It is worth noting that not 
all employers adopted the strategies of consent because management by consent is 
pertinent in labour processes ―characterised by high rates of capital investment and have 
acquired relatively high levels of skill or specialised dexterities‖ (Maller, 1992:7). 
 
In her seminal work titled Participation and Democratic Theory, Pateman (1970) makes 
a useful distinction between real and pseudo participation, partial and full participation, 
and task-centred and power-centred participation. Task-centred participation can also be 
described as ―descending participation‖ in so far as ―management invariably initiates the 
development for its own purposes and, as part of the change, may transfer authority and 
responsibility from itself to the employees for a limited range of work related decisions‖ 
(Daitz and Rutstein, 1989:5). Task-centred pseudo participation involves employers‘ 
interactive ways of communicating decisions that have already been made, through 
briefing groups, quality circles and autonomous working groups (Maller, 1992). Put 
simply, these structures are task-centred primarily because they deal with shop-floor 
issues. Task-centred participation includes initiatives such as regular consultative 
meetings between workers and supervisors, briefing groups, quality circles, and so on 
(Pateman, 1970). Such communication schemes do not give workers any real power to 
influence decisions in a significant way (Pateman, 1970).  
 
Partial participation refers to participation structures that enable workers to partly 
influence decisions; because they ―are in the unequal position of permanent subordinates, 
the final prerogative of decision making rests with permanent superiors, with 
management‖ (Pateman, 1970:52). Unlike pseudo and partial participation, task-centred 
full participation entails workers‘ prerogative to decide how a department or an enterprise 
as a whole should be run, with reference to issues relating ―to production scheduling, 
time standards, investment, marketing, etc‖ (Pateman, 1970:78). Task-centred 
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participation has been criticised for being used by employers solely for the purpose of 
improving productivity without giving workers any real power to determine how the 
production should be done (Salamon, 1987).  
 
Table. 1 Typology of worker participation 
Participation  Pseudo  Partial  Full 
Task-centred Briefing groups  Quality circles  Autonomous working 
groups  
Power-centred Worker directors  Collective bargaining Worker self-management 
Source: Maller (1992:10). 
 
Power-centred participation is characterised by an equal balance of power between 
management and workers over strategic decision-making processes in a workplace 
(Pateman, 1970). Unlike task-centred participation, power-centred worker participation 
allows space for workers to influence decisions of strategic importance in a workplace. 
According to Pateman, power-centred worker participation focuses on the ―exercise of 
managerial prerogative and the balance of power between management and employees in 
the organisation‘s decision making process‖ (Pateman, 1970:11). Worker participation 
structures such as the establishment of work councils, the appointment of worker 
directors and so on are examples of power-centred worker participation. 
 
Power-centred worker participation enables workers to extend their collective power and 
voice at the highest decision-making structures in a workplace (Pateman, 1970). Because 
of their potential to tilt the balance of power between employers and employees, worker 
directors, collective bargaining and worker self-management structures are power-
centred. Power-centred participation often requires active state involvement through 
promulgation of structures and systems of joint decision making, but this needs to be 
complemented by strong mutual commitment from both employers and employees 
(Streeck, 1984; Mapadimeng, 1995). In other words, a legislative framework on its own 
is necessary, but not sufficient, for real joint decision making between workers and 
employers to take place.  
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The third form of worker participation can be described as financial participation 
(Salamon, 1987).Financial participation can be divided into two types: supplementary 
financial participation schemes and share ownership schemes. The former type involves 
rewarding workers on the basis of a company‘s financial performance; this can be 
measured ―in terms of profits, value added, and level of production or sales‖ (Salamon, 
1987:96). The share ownership scheme has to do with the distribution to workers of 
dividends from the shares they own in the company they work in. This distribution is 
either made directly to an individual worker or ―indirectly into a trust which holds the 
shares on behalf of all employees‖ (Daitz and Rutstein, 1989:6). It is worth noting that, 
unlike task-centred and power-centred forms of worker participation, financial 
participation is about money sharing, and not necessarily about power, authority or 
decision making in a workplace (Salamon, 1987).   
 
2.3.2 Theories on union responses to workplace restructuring  
As early as the 1980s worker participation was increasingly finding general acceptance 
among many trade unions across the world, although they were divided on how it should 
be implemented (ILO, 1988). In 1988, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
published a report titled World Labour Report which indicates that ―it is no exaggeration 
to say that participation is a concept that has aroused interest in all parts of the world....to 
put the point succinctly it is no longer a question of whether, but how‖ (ILO, 1988:16). 
However, it is worth mentioning that labour‘s response to worker participation is not 
homogeneous (Clegg, 1951; Cressey and MacInnes, 1980). In addition, literature 
suggests that worker participation is not necessarily a global trend in the motor industry, 
even in labour processes ―characterised by high rates of capital investment‖ (Maller, 
1992:7).  
 
Instead of seeing worker participation as a means to bolster their power to attain worker 
control, some unions dismiss the various types as ―gimmicks‖ aimed at speeding up 
production without boosting workers‘ pay and a capitalist strategy to incorporate labour 
(Clegg, 1951; Cressey and MacInnes, 1980; Daitz and Rutstein, 1989). This approach is 
known as the incoporationist approach (Macshane, 1992). In direct contrast to the 
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incoporationist approach is the advance labour approach which ―sees participation as a 
means whereby labour can gradually yet unequivocally erode capital‘s power and 
advance workers‘ control‖ (Maller, 1992:12). Indeed this debate has invariably shaped 
union strategies towards participation. The differences between the German and South 
African industrial relations must be understood in the context of this debate.  
Trade unions throughout the world have been confronted with challenges associated with 
workplace restructuring. However, their responses to it are not homogeneous. As Frost 
(2001:1) states, ―local union responses to management-initiated workplace change differ 
markedly‖. There is no consensus among industrial sociology scholars around the 
conceptualisation of labour‘s responses to workplace restructuring. In the beginning, 
conceptualisation of union responses was dichotomised into two categories, namely: 
opposition or co-operation, and which one of the two was effective.  
 
A union could either co-operate with or resist workplace change. Militant responses 
entailed refusal by a union to ―negotiate at all over workplace change‖ whereas a co-
operative response involved active union participation in workplace restructuring (Frost, 
2001:2). Kelly (1996, 2004) is among the leading industrial relations scholars who argue 
that the oppositionist response is effective in that it conserves the independence and 
survival of trade unions. Institutionalised industrial relations whereby employers and 
trade unions negotiate workplace restructuring carries with it possibilities for co-option of 
union officials into management-driven restructuring processes (Kelly, 1996). 
 
The other danger with the co-operation strategy is that employers can opportunistically 
take advantage ―of union moderation [or co-operation] to restructure work or 
employment at the expense of workers‘ terms and conditions, especially undermining job 
security‖ (Bacon and Blyton, 2004:74). Fairbrother (2000) describes the oppositionist 
response to workplace restructuring as ―participative unionism‖ through which a union 
can robustly challenge management on changes in the workplace.  
 
Fairbrother (2000:45) concurs with Kelly that the co-operative union response—what he 
terms ―bureaucratic unionism‖—is not effective because of its tendency to drift towards 
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―bureaucratisation, incorporation and economism‖, and that it involves accommodation 
of employers‘ interests to the detriment of workers. Quite conversely, others argue that 
co-operative response to workplace restructuring can lead to better working conditions 
for workers (Cooke, 1992; Eaton and Voos, 1992; Joffe, 1992).  
 
In their comparative study of trade union responses to workplace restructuring in the steel 
industry in the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany, Bacon and Blyton (2004) report 
that, through strategic co-operation with employers, German trade unions were able to 
safeguard workers‘ interests against management-led workplace restructuring. Cooke‘s 
(1992) research on American manufacturing companies also found that some trade 
unions were able to achieve significant improvements in product quality and working 
conditions for workers by strategically engaging with work restructuring processes. Joffe 
(1992:2) also argues that unions must be ―proactive in industrial restructuring processes 
to ensure that workers receive the benefits from the processes‖. 
 
Drawing from workplace restructuring experiences from three locals of the United 
Steelworkers (USW) in North America, Frost suggests that unions‘ responses to 
workplace restructuring can be summarised into four categories: interventionist, 
pragmatic, apathetic and obstructionist. The interventionist response means that a union 
ensures constant engagement with management throughout the entire restructuring 
process. In theory, the interventionist response is envisaged to meet ―the needs of all 
stakeholders: management, workers and the local union‖ (Frost, 2001:556). Bacon and 
Blyton (2004) refer to this approach as cooperative engagement whereby a union gets 
involved in the restructuring process from the beginning until the implementation phase, 
including continuous appraisal of agreed workplace changes.  
With the pragmatic response, a union generally allows an employer to restructure work 
but seek participation only in the event that such restructuring negatively affects working 
conditions. Unlike the interventionist approach, with the pragmatic approach a trade 
union gets involved after workplace restructuring decisions have already been taken by 
management. In the early 1960s Slichter (in Frost, 2001:557) characterised this approach 
as one in which ―the role of management was to act and that of the union was to grieve‖. 
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In both interventionist and pragmatic responses, the union is keen to negotiate and engage 
with changes in work and production systems. Workers take interest in the manner in 
which work is organised, and this ensures that working conditions are continuously 
improved.  
On the other hand, the apathetic and obstructionist responses are in direct contrast to the 
interventionist and pragmatic responses. The apathetic response is characterised by the 
―failure of a union to negotiate at all over management-initiated workplace change‖ 
(Frost, 2001:558). This is a laissez-faire type of an approach in which a union is 
completely unconcerned about management-driven workplace change. This is partly 
related to business unionism, whereby a union‘s role is confined to negotiating narrow 
worker economic interests at the expense of broader issues that might affect workers. 
This is more prevalent in a context characterised by organisationally weak trade unions. 
The obstructionist or militant opposition response entails a permanent and persistent 
refusal by a union to accept or negotiate any workplace change. Unions refuse to co-
operate with workplace restructuring and aim to defend the status quo (Bacon and Blyton, 
2004).  
Drawing from Crouch (1982), Bacon and Blyton (2004) argue that trade union responses 
to workplace restructuring cannot be understood through traditional Marxist studies 
which emphasise individual union ideologies. Traditional Marxist studies on trade union 
responses to workplace restructuring base their analyses primarily on a union‘s 
ideological orientation. Bacon and Blyton (2004:752) argue that any attempt to study 
unions‘ responses must consider trade unions and their members ―as rational social actors 
making choices to pursue certain courses of action during negotiations with 
managements‖.  
Whether or not unions choose to resist or negotiate workplace change does not 
necessarily represent their ideological orientation towards workplace change, but rather 
―a rational choice between actions following a calculation of how best to maximise their 
interests given the constraints of the situation‖ (Bacon and Blyton, 2004:753). 
Accordingly, unions‘ responses to workplace restructuring must be analysed not on the 
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basis of their ideological orientation alone, as traditional Marxist often do, but also in 
light of contextual constraints found in different situations. Bacon and Blyton (2004) 
further suggest a typology for union responses to workplace restructuring (Table 2.2). 
This typology comprises different options which can be adopted by labour depending not 
on their ideological orientation but on specific contextual peculiarities, namely: co-
operative engagement, militant opposition, moderate opposition and militant engagement.  
Through co-operative engagement, both trade unions and employers co-operate over 
workplace restructuring and try to reach consensus on a particular issue/s. Exponents of 
co-operative engagement argue that this strategy can be effective only if employers and 
unions negotiate in good faith. Militant opposition refers to a situation whereby a union 
refuses to engage in restructuring processes while defending the status quo. According to 
Bacon and Blyton (2004:174) the logical consistency of co-operative engagement and 
militant opposition ―suggests most unions will fall into one of these two categories‖. 
On the other side is moderate opposition whereby ―moderate union branches may at 
times refuse to cooperate and suddenly oppose change‖ (Bacon and Blyton, 2004:173). 
Radical and militant unions may be tactically involved in restructuring processes but 
retain their militant ideological orientation towards employers—this represents what 
Bacon and Blyton call militant engagement. Bacon and Blyton‘s (2004:196) argument 
that the ideological orientation of unions is not always consistent with their practical 
responses becomes clearer in their discussion on moderate opposition and militant 
engagement. They point out that the two responses ―involve tactical bargaining dilemmas 
because they break with the ideological tradition of the union branch‖ (Bacon and Blyton, 
2004:198). 
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Table.2  Bacon and Blyton’s typology of union responses to workplace restructuring 
Source: Bacon and Blyton (2004:753). 
 
Most industrial sociology scholars (e.g. Crouch, Burawoy, Mandel and Ramsay) present 
pessimistic accounts of worker participation. This chapter argues that these pessimistic 
and Marxist-leaning analyses fail to acknowledge that workers are interested in 
participating in decision making in the context of crisis. According to Ramsay (1977), 
employers are interested in workplace restructuring when faced with mounting employee 
alienation and labour unrest. He further argues that worker participation has appeared 
cyclically. Without invalidating Marxist analysis of worker participation, this report 
argues that worker participation cannot be explained only as an employer-initiated 
process, but that workers are also interested in participating when confronted by possible 
job losses. Traditional Marxist analyses on worker participation fail to take into account 
the question of whether or not workers desire participation in the workplace.  
 
Within the radical industrial sociology scholarship, worker participation is regarded as 
institutional capitalist machinery set to quell industrial unrest. This research report argues 
that, in the current age of neo-liberal globalisation, worker participation should not 
necessarily be seen as a process initiated and driven by employers alone—workers 
sometimes seek participation themselves. In other words, workers are keen to participate 
in workplace restructuring when job security is threatened.  
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2.3.3 Why worker participation?  
2.3.3.1 Pros and cons 
According to Mapadimeng (1995:9), worker participation has ―triggered a heated debate 
amongst various scholars who were battling to understand it‖.  This debate is ongoing 
and scholars continue the battle to understand it. There is hitherto no consensus among 
scholars and trade unionists on the conceptualisation and analysis of worker participation. 
Debates on worker participation have also looked into different participatory structures 
established in different workplaces (Applebuam and Batt, 1994), and their link to 
productivity and performance (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Maree and Godfrey, 2005).  
 
The question of whether worker participation is necessary for good performance of an 
enterprise is ongoing. In their comparative study of workplace and employment 
reorganisation at Sea Harvest and I&J in South Africa, Maree and Godfrey (2005) argue 
that there is no correlation between worker participation in decision making and the 
performance of an enterprise. The two companies have chosen different strategies aimed 
at improving performance and productivity in their plants. Sea Harvest introduced 
structures for worker participation in the company, such as a Stakeholders Representative 
Council (SRC) and a Strategic Planning Committee (Stratplan). I&J, on the other hand, 
invested in technology upgrades and ―introduced intensive surveillance of workers and in 
individualised productivity incentive scheme‖ (Maree and Godfrey, 2005:125).  
 
The study found that I&J performed far better than Sea Harvest. As Maree and Godfrey 
(2005:145) put it, ―the plant [I&J] was not only doing better financially, but workers were 
earning more each year‖. However, despite the poor financial and productive 
performance at Sea Harvest, the research found that workers at Sea Harvest had a more 
positive attitude towards work and the company than I&J workers (Maree and Godfrey, 
2005).  
 
There are two broad traditions in the field of industrial sociology which diverge in terms 
of whether or not workers desire participation in the workplace. One tradition argues that 
workers do not value or desire worker participation and the other argues that workers 
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desire great participation in the workplace. In the late 1960s some scholars argued that 
workers had a moral right to participate in decision making in their own workplaces 
(Blumberg, 1968; Pateman, 1970). There is a wide range of reasons why people support 
worker participation. 
 
Aronowitz (1973) argues that rank and file members are generally interested in 
participating in workplace issues even though their union leaders are concerned with 
traditional worker issues such as wages and benefits. Some scholars also argue that 
workers value participative management because it results in job satisfaction and 
improved productivity (Blumberg, 1968). Zipp, Leubke and Landerman (1984) 
emphasise that workers‘ desire to participate in workplace restructuring is influenced by 
the resultant benefits for workers, such as improved working conditions.   
 
Marxist scholars such as Gorz (1964) argue that workers are interested in worker 
participation because control of work forms an integral part of the struggle for socialism. 
This perspective is largely, with the exception of the Marxist variant, grounded in the 
unitarist philosophy in industrial relations which believes that capital and labour share 
common interests. This tradition has been criticised for ignoring the inherent 
contradictions between capital and labour (Klerck, 1999). The argument that worker 
participation schemes ―are only ever partially successful is rooted in the basic 
contradictions underlying employment relationships‖, and this shows that the interests of 
labour and capital are incompatible (Klerck, 1999:12).  
 
The other perspective also has its own exponents. According to Zipp et al. (1984), those 
who take the view that workers do not desire worker participation advance different 
reasons. Kohn (1969) argues that workers are naturally conformist and that they are 
generally not interested in the politics of work (re)organisation. Fein (1976) also argues 
that workers are not interested in participating in anything beyond ―bread and butter‖ 
issues such as wages and general working conditions. Dubin (1956) and Goldman (1973) 
argue that workers do not seek greater participation in work organisation because it is not 
a ―central life interest‖ for them.  
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Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars such as Burawoy (1979), Mandel (1973), Crouch 
(1982) and Ramsay (1977) base their analyses of worker participation on the unequal 
power relations between labour and capital in a capitalist society. They argue that worker 
participation is a management-driven initiative aimed at mitigating the recurrent capitalist 
crisis of profitability and legitimacy. According to the Marxist theoretical perspective, the 
establishment of worker participatory structures in the workplace should be understood as 
a manifestation of class contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production. 
 
According to the Marxist theories employers seek to control and dominate workers so as 
to maximise the extraction of excess—that is, unpaid labour time (Mandel, 1973; 
Burawoy, 1979). In his influential text titled Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective 
Action, Crouch (1982) argues that worker participation is used by employers to co-opt 
workers into management. The interests of labour and capital are irreconcilable and 
worker participation is viewed essentially as a tool used by employers to control and 
dominate workers.   
 
2.3.3.2 Subtle means of domination: Mandel  
Mandel (1973) argues that the structural crisis of late capitalism and the concomitant 
consolidation of labour‘s organisational strength are the main precipitants leading to the 
capitalists‘ invention of a ―more subtle means of domination‖—this is worker 
participation. When labour was weak and feeble, employers were not interested in worker 
participation and trade union demands for consultation were rejected with indignation as 
a ―usurpation‖ or ―confiscation‖ of employers‘ property—employers ―were able to rule 
by brute force‖ (Mandel, 1973:11). However, with the consolidation of trade unions‘ 
organisational presence and militancy employers‘ became interested in worker 
participation  
 
Employers have tried without success to sap the strength of trade unions and worker 
militancy through violence and repression, but they have not succeeded. Worker 
participation is viewed as a more diplomatic tactic aimed at achieving the same objective 
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that capitalists had intended to achieve through brute force—that is, workers‘ 
compliance. Mandel (1973:13) neatly states, ―But today the capitalist‘s arguments have 
become more flexible. From the arguments of divine right of employers, the bosses have 
prudently retreated to the argument of ‗defending the enterprise‘. Employers admit 
implicitly that workers should ‗have something to say‘ on what happens in their 
enterprise‖.  
 
For Mandel, worker participation is simply a capitalist tactic that seeks to associate 
workers with capital. He describes this phenomenon as an act of ―class collaboration‖ 
geared towards defusing class contradictions inherent in the capitalist system. Worker 
participation therefore reflects ―a tactical aim of the capitalists. This tactic seeks to 
involve trade-unions, or even representatives elected by the workers, in a ―daily practice 
of class collaboration” (Mandel, 1973:13). 
 
2.3.3.3 Manufacturing consent: Burawoy  
Contrary to the traditional Marxist‘s understanding of capitalist labour control as despotic 
or ―de-skilling‖ (Braverman, 1973), Burawoy suggests that employers are increasingly 
using a more hegemonic methodology of co-optation and subtle coercion, thus 
manufacturing consent. The main question for Burawoy (1979) is why workers work as 
hard as they do, instead of why they work at all. Employers use a variety of strategies to 
―manufacture consent‖, and at the centre of these strategies is worker participation. 
Employers‘ strategies to manufacture consent have significantly weakened labour‘s class 
consciousness to the extent that most workers embrace the exploitative capitalist system. 
The dwindling class consciousness among workers informs Burawoy‘s pessimism about 
the imminence of a socialist revolution.  
 
In his ethnographic study in a piece-rate machine shop, Burawoy observes that employers 
manufacture consent through a variety of ways to improve productivity and profitability 
without inviting resistance from workers. In the workplace where he conducted his study, 
production management in the machining shop ―created the illusion of labour as a game‖ 
in which workers had to compete with each other to produce more than expected. 
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According to Burawoy (1979) worker participatory structures, such as collective 
bargaining, do not give workers any real power but create an illusion of participation. A 
number of studies which have been conducted—for example, in BMW(Masondo, 2003) 
and Anglo Platinum (Maller, 1992)—confirm Burawoy‘s theory that capitalists attempt 
to manufacture consent through participative management.  
 
2.3.3.4 Cycle of control thesis: Ramsay 
In his ground-breaking article entitled Cycles of Control: Worker Participation in 
Sociological and Historical Perspective, Ramsay (1977) argues that worker participation 
must be analysed from a historical and sociological perspective. He discusses worker 
participation from a Marxist theoretical point of view. Since this publication, Ramsay‘s 
―cycle of control‖ thesis has had a tremendous influence in the field of industrial 
sociology, and worker participation in particular. Instead of answering the question of 
whether workers desire to participate in decision making in their workplaces, Ramsay 
discuses how participation has been reconfigured over time and its dynamics in light of 
the ever-changing balance of power between capital and labour.  
 
Ramsay (1977) adopted this approach in his analysis of the dynamics of employers‘ 
interest in worker participation since the late nineteenth century in Britain. He uses the 
―cycle of control thesis‖ to describe four broad cycles of employer interest in worker 
participation, namely: profit sharing schemes, introduction of Whitley Councils, joint 
consultation and productivity bargaining. These cycles of participation ought to be 
analysed in their historical and sociological context. In the late nineteenth century 
employers introduced financial participation in the form of profit sharing schemes which 
allowed workers to share in profits accumulated by their companies.  
 
The introduction of Whitley Councils, joint consultation and productivity surfaced as a 
result of worker opposition to work intensification and massive job losses owing to the 
introduction of new technology. The central argument in the cycle of control thesis is 
simply that worker participation is fundamentally a response by capital to threats to its 
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authority from labour during periods of full employment and labour militancy. Employers 
are more interested in worker participation when faced with a challenge from workers.  
 
Employer interest in worker participation grows in a wave-like way, depending on the 
balance of power between capital and labour. Based on the Marxist theoretical 
framework, Ramsay argues that employers‘ interest in worker participation fades once 
the threat from labour is minimised. In other words, worker participation is a tool used by 
employers to resolve capitalist legitimacy crises—a strategy to solicit compliance of 
labour. Employers have in the past introduced various worker participation schemes in 
order to regain legitimacy when confronted by workers‘ potential to mobilise. 
 
According to Ramsay (1977) worker participation should not be seen as representing 
employers‘ or governments‘ commitment to it, but must be understood as a temporary 
measure used by employers, sometime sin collaboration with the state, to manage the 
potential dangers posed by strong and militant trade unions. This is the reason why 
Ramsay (1977:220) characterises worker participation as ―a child of managerial crisis‖. 
As he clearly puts it, ―Worker participation has not evolved out of humanization of 
capitalism, but has appeared cyclically‖. Management interest in worker participation 
―corresponds to periods when management authority is felt to be facing a challenge‖ 
(Ramsay, 1977:225).  
 
2.4. Conclusion  
This chapter has attempted to highlight some of the major work restructuring trends in the 
automotive industry. Using Marxist labour process theory as its fundamental theoretical 
tool of analysis, this chapter has argued that the world of work has generally witnessed a 
transition from the Fordist labour process to a post-Fordist labour process. Although there 
is no clear-cut historical break between the two labour processes, this chapter suggests 
that the post-Fordist labour process in the automotive industry is increasingly becoming 
entrenched. The changes in the global automotive supply chain were also highlighted and 
discussed.  
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Theories on worker participation were also reviewed. It was indicated that worker 
participation takes different forms and characters. Not all forms of worker participation 
gives workers power to influence decision making in workplaces. Pateman‘s (1970) 
distinction between real and pseudo participation is useful for understanding the 
dynamics of worker participation as a practice in the world of work. Theories on labour‘s 
responses to work restructuring were also discussed. The chapter argued that worker 
participation under capitalism must be understood within the context of class struggle.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
The engagement of IG Mettal and NUMSA with 
workplace restructuring: a historical overview, 
1970-1990s 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter analyses the responses of IG Mettal and NUMSA to workplace restructuring 
from 1970 until the late 1990s. A comprehensive historical review will help us 
understand the background to IG Mettal and NUMSA‘s current responses to work 
restructuring. This will also allow us to draw lessons from past experiences as labour 
continues to grapple with the challenges associated with workplace restructuring. Since 
the Industrial Revolution, employers have been restructuring the labour process in order 
to improve productivity and maximise the extraction of surplus value (Allen, 1990). 
Workplace restructuring is not an alien phenomenon to either NUMSA or IG Mettal. This 
is the reason why this report undertakes a historical overview on the previous strategies 
adopted by the two unions in their response to workplace restructuring.  
 
The central argument in this chapter is that NUMSA‘s and IG Mettal‘s responses to 
workplace restructuring in the period 1970 to the late 1990s differ markedly. On the one 
hand, since the late 1970s IG Mettal has been proactive and effective in its engagement 
with workplace restructuring. On the other, NUMSA has been focused on the double 
struggle for freedom of association and organisational rights, and against the apartheid 
regime. The manner in which both NUMSA and IG Mettal engage with workplace 
restructuring today must be analysed from a historical and sociological perspective. 
German trade unions have enjoyed the benefits of institutionalised participation for some 
time, whereas their South African counterparts have suffered under the wrath of what 
Von Holdt (2003) calls the ―apartheid workplace regime‖. Both NUMSA‘s and IG 
Mettal‘s workplace restructuring strategies have historically been shaped by the changes 
 42 
in domestic macroeconomic and political contexts. Their strategies have been influenced 
largely by changes in the balance of power in the global political economy.  
 
3.2 Worker participation in Volkswagen: a historical background 
 
3.2.1 Uitenhage Plant  
In the South African context, worker participation finds its legislative foundation in the 
Native Labour Act of 1953. This legislation required the mandatory establishment of 
Works Committees which were responsible for representing workers‘ interests and 
concerns in the workplace. In practice, such structures could not work well because their 
negotiating scope was restricted and their field of action strictly limited (Davies and 
Lewis, 1976). The works committees were de facto ―advisory bodies to management on a 
range of highly specified issues‖ (Mapadimeng, 1995:39). In the first place, works 
committees were not successful because they were not originally intended to build real 
participative management in the workplace.  
 
The legislation was primarily motivated by the apartheid regime‘s interest in securing 
effective control over black African workers and their trade unions, and to safeguard 
Afrikaner (and white) nationalist economic interests (Webster, 1985; Mapadimeng, 
1995). The overarching political objective was to weaken and neutralise the 
organisational strength of African black trade union movement and the working class in 
general. The works committees‘ secret political mandate was ―to sideline the unions that 
primarily organised workers by setting alternative structures in order to ‗bleed these 
unions dry‘‖ (Mapadimeng, 1995). Worker participation in the apartheid regime at the 
time should be seen as part of apartheid‘s broader scheme of demobilising, dividing and 
weakening the working class.  
 
The strong wave of industrial actions by black trade unions in the late 1970s exposed the 
shaky foundations and legitimacy crisis underpinning the establishment works 
committees (Webster, 1985). Concerned about the vulnerability of the situation at the 
time, the apartheid regime suggested minor amendments to the labour legislative 
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framework by introducing the Bantu Labour Regulation Act in 1973. This Act called for 
the establishment of plant-based liaison committees where works committees were absent 
(Webster, 1985). The liaison committees were ―declared as consultative rather than 
negotiating bodies and were thus designed to look at matters of common concern to both 
the employers and employees‖ (Horner, 1976). Worse still, these committees buckled 
down because they were viewed as illegitimate in the eyes of militant black trade unions, 
in particular the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) (Webster, 1985). MAWU 
dismissed these committees as management‘s attempt to divert it from real issues that 
could only be addressed by abolishing the apartheid regime.  
 
At the VW Uitenhage plant, worker participation was put in place in 1979 when 
management conceded to the union‘s demand for full-time shop stewards (Maller, 1992). 
The introduction of the full-time shopstewards system at the plant was largely motivated 
by VW‘s quest for effective and constructive industrial relations system so as to maintain 
industrial quiescence (Maller, 1992). According to Maller (1992:112), this ―indicated a 
possible basis for a new kind of relationship developing, based on co-operative, mutually 
beneficial industrial relations‖. However, it was only in 1988 that VW established formal 
employee-employer joint committee structures at the plant. According to Maller 
(1992:129), the driving idea was to ―facilitate communication in the workplace and to 
prefigure a system of co-determination based on the German model of the VWSA‘s 
[Volkswagen South Africa] principals‖. The full-time shop stewards had regular 
meetings with management to discuss strategic shop-floor issues such as working 
conditions, working time, and so on.  
 
According to Barling (1986), ―The essence of a pluralist ideology is that within a system 
there exist several different interest groups, each with their own leaders, loyalties and 
objectives‖. In the late 1980s a senior manager at the Uitenhage plant indicated that 
―VWSA [Uitenhage plant] … acknowledges that management and workers will pursue 
different interests. Although a certain amount of conflict is inherent in the system, it can 
be resolved by a system of collective bargaining that will allow some sort of balance of 
power or equilibrium to be reached‖ (Maller, 1992;129). This was a clear indication that 
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Uitenhage plant management supported the pluralist industrial system. This support 
culminated in the establishment of worker participatory structures to facilitate joint 
decision making and negotiation on shop-floor issues. 
 
NUMSA was not completely enthusiastic about participative management, and those 
within the union who displayed outright support were at risk of being labelled sell-outs 
(Maller, 1992). It supported these structures but at the same time feared for the 
weakening of its power and incorporation into the apartheid capitalist system. The union 
feared what Macshane (1992) termed the Japanese model based on full incorporation of 
workers into the capitalist logic. Whether VW‘s pragmatic support for pluralist industrial 
relations and its commitment to ―increasing workers‘ participation in corporate decision 
making‖ was influenced by German practices of co-determination (Maller, 1992) or to 
quell the general labour unrest at the time (Webster, 1985) remains debatable. 
 
The VW Uitenhage plant has attempted to put in place both task-centred and power-
centred forms of worker participation, as discussed in Chapter Two. As a major union at 
the plant, NUMSA was an active party in participative management in the plant, 
notwithstanding its ambivalence. Participative management at the plant was structurally 
divided into four categories, namely: joint committees, labour director, safety committees 
and achievement groups. The most influential of these committees was the Joint Union-
Management Executive Committee (JUMEC), which comprised senior management and 
full-time shop stewards (Maller, 1992).  
 
JUMEC only dealt with issues of strategic importance to the company, such as ―changes 
in production strategy on new car models, changes in the local content programme or 
build plans‖, financial reports and community-based projects (Maller, 1992:16). 
Consistent with the German model of co-determination, JUMEC‘s emphasis on joint 
decision making was reminiscent of the supervisory boards as conceptualised in the 
German industrial relations system. However, this does mean that JUMEC was an 
equivalent of the supervisory board in terms of power and the scope for decision making. 
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Strategic decisions, such as major work restructuring plans in the plant, had to be taken 
by the company‘s supervisory board.  
 
Even though NUMSA was cautious about being brought into a situation of co-
management, it viewed JUMEC as centre for influencing ―company policy by virtue of 
its participation‖ (Maller, 1992:130). In addition to JUMEC, the company had other 
participative management structures such as a human resources committee, departmental 
committees and ―build meetings‖. Another important aspect of participative management 
in at the VW Uitenhage plant was the appointment of a labour director who would 
ordinarily be a member of senior management.  
 
A set of task-centred structures, some legislated through the apartheid labour law, 
complemented worker participation in the joint committees discussed above. These 
included the safety committees and quality circles. As task-centred worker participation, 
the quality circles were responsible for shop-floor issues such as performance 
improvements and involved ―six to ten employees from a common department who 
identified problems in their work area and proposed solutions‖ (Maller, 1992:137).  
 
3.2.2 Kassel Plant  
The establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in May 1949 was 
accompanied by the promulgation of labour laws that fostered co-operation and stability 
between organised labour and employers. The 1949 April Collective Agreement Act 
legally bound employer associations and trade unions to work together in setting 
standards, wages and working conditions. The 1972 amendment of the Works 
Constitution Act of 1952 and the subsequent enactment of the 1976 Co-Determination 
Act heralded an expansion of workers‘ rights to co-determination, information and 
consultation. Co-determination (Mitbestimmung) has since its inauguration been touted as 
an appropriate industrial relations model for enhancing co-operation between capital and 
labour. The German co-determination laws give workers a legal right to participate in the 
regulation of working conditions as well as in economic planning and decision making 
(Page, 2006:10).  
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This system was introduced through the 1952 Works Constitution Act, and it involves 
―joint and integrated decision making processes between workers and employers on 
workplace issues‖ (Streeck, 1984), but also extended beyond the workplace to ―all areas 
of economic and decision-making‖ (Macshane, 1992:53). The overarching principle 
driving co-determination is that employers must consult and seek consensus with workers 
in decision making. This industrial relations system involves an interrelated set of 
institutions which can be categorised in three levels, namely: Works Councils 
(Betriebsrat), Supervisory Boards (Aifsichtsrat) and Management Boards—all these are 
institutional structures for worker participation. IG Mettal negotiates at the industry level 
with employers on issues related to wages and standard working conditions. Co-
determination at the plant level involves the representation of workers in the Works 
Councils. The VW Kassel plant Works Council comprised representatives elected by all 
workers in the plant (Juergens and Brumlop, 1986).  
 
VW company management has a legal obligation to provide any information required by 
the Works Council in the execution of its duties, and they can hire experts at the 
company‘s expense. The main tasks of Works Council include working together with 
management ―on matters relating to labour management relations‖ and any other shop-
floor matters (Streeck, 1984:45). The work of the Works Council can be divided into 
three levels, namely: economic matters, social matters and personnel matters. Economic 
matters normally include decisions which have long-term economic implications, such as 
investments, marketing or production.  
 
In terms of social matters, the Works Council deals with issues around social implications 
of major economic decisions which a company might be planning to pursue, for example, 
a closure of a company or a plant. According to German labour law, employers must 
consult and negotiate with Works Councils before they can shut down a plant; a social 
plan must also be put in place in the event that a company shuts down. It is worth noting 
that before the promulgation of the 1972 Works Constitution Act, management had the 
prerogative to embark upon unilateral restructuring of work (Streeck, 1984). 
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Since the establishment of the Works Council at the VW Kassel plant, the councillors 
have dealt with personnel matters such as ―vocational training, hiring and dismissals‖, 
and issues such as retrenchments, hours, time and form of payment (Page, 2006:10). 
Among the committees of the Kassel Works Council which dealt with issues of 
rationalisation and restructuring were the Planning Committee (Planungsausschuss) and 
the System Committee (Sytemausschuss). The former was responsible for providing 
advice and information to the Works Council on all issues related to planning of plant 
layout and introduction of new facilities and machines (Juergens and Brumlop, 1986).   
 
The System Committee, formed at the peak of robot installations and rationalisation, 
maintained continuous negotiations with management on issues associated with 
introduction and control of data processing systems (Juergens and Brumlop, 1986). To 
accomplish its duties, the Works Council and its committees had a legal right to enter into 
agreements with individual employers. In the event that both management and Works 
Councils fail to reach a consensus, the Works Constitution Act allows for mediation and 
arbitration. According to Streeck (1984:12), the use of mediation and arbitration has 
―helped eliminate industrial conflicts in workplaces‖. The centralisation of collective 
bargaining over wages and working conditions also contributed towards industrial 
quiescence (Streeck, 1984).  
 
Co-determination also provides for the representation of workers in the Supervisory 
Board (Aufsichstrat) and Management Board of companies (Streeck, 1984). Whereas 
each VW plant in Germany has its own local Works Council, there is only one 
Supervisory Board responsible for making strategic decisions on behalf of all plants, 
including other plants outside Germany. The Board is mainly responsible for appointing 
the Management Board, including a worker director, overseeing its activities and 
determining the strategic goals of the company. A worker director is a worker 
representative elected by workers, but he or she is expected by law to act in the interest of 
the company. Some decisions of the Management Board have to be ratified by the 
Supervisory Board before they are implemented. 
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3.3  NUMSA’s experiences with workplace restructuring in the 
auto industry 
3.3.1 Introduction 
NUMSA is among the leading and most influential trade unions in South Africa. Its 
historical and contemporary importance cannot be under-estimated or ignored because it 
played an important role in the struggle against the apartheid regime, and continues to 
make a significant contribution in the shaping of a new South Africa. NUMSA was not 
only a ―leading protagonist in the evolution of COSATU‘s strategy of reconstruction‖ but 
it also ―developed policies for engaging with restructuring in the metal industry‖ (Von 
Holdt, 2003:186). In fact, the short-lived Keynesian-oriented Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) macroeconomic policy adopted by the first democratic 
government in South Africa, also a campaign programme for the ANC in the historic 
1994 democratic elections, was NUMSA‘s brainchild which was later adopted and 
promoted by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).  
3.3.2 Apartheid workplace regime  
In the 1970s and 1980s NUMSA did not have a coherent strategy to respond and engage 
with workplace restructuring. The union‘s agenda was focused largely on fighting for 
freedom of association and organisational rights, and against the apartheid regime as a 
system of political domination. According to Von Holdt (2003:287), ―Apartheid 
oppression was not something found outside the factory: it was also internal to the 
workplace and indeed structured management relations with black workers‖.  
Apartheid in the workplace took the form of racial despotic authoritarianism 
characterised by racial division of labour, racial segregation of facilities in the workplace, 
and racial structure of power in the workplace (Von Holdt, 2003). Apartheid labour laws 
such as the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act (legalised and facilitated job reservation), the 
1918 Factories Act (legalised segregation of facilities in workplaces but formally 
repealed in 1983), and the Labour Relations Act gave the legal ground  for the emergence 
 49 
apartheid workplace regime. Under apartheid ―the racial structure of power in the 
workplace constituted the factory as a place of white power and black powerless, 
ensuring that black workers understood they were working in a ‗white man‘s 
factory‖‘(Von Holdt, 2003:30).  
It was only in 1981 that the apartheid regime began to make some reformist concessions 
by granting black workers the right to freedom of association and organisational rights. 
The unprecedented domestic and international opposition against apartheid impelled its 
political elite to consider labour law reforms (Von Holdt, 2003). As part of its efforts to 
quell the growing and uncontrollable political instability in the country, the Wiehahn 
Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation was established in 1977. 
The Commission‘s remit was to make recommendation on how apartheid labour laws 
could be reformed. Its recommendations resulted in the amendment of the Labour 
Relations Act in 1981 to include African workers‘ right to freedom of association and 
organisational rights, albeit under stringent conditions. The apartheid regime had yet 
again aimed at controlling militant African trade unions, but these reforms improved 
workers‘ organisational presence and their demand for citizenship rights beyond the 
workplace. 
According to Von Holdt (2003:61), employers and the apartheid state had no choice but 
to accept that ―[African] trade unions could no longer be suppressed and [that] a more 
fruitful strategy would be to incorporate them into the industrial relations system, and to 
encourage a controlled form of trade unionism that could be insulated from the political 
struggle for liberation‖. Despite these reforms African trade unions, such as NUMSA, 
continued to view employers and the apartheid state with deep suspicion as they 
continued to suffer in a ―white man‘s country‖ (Von Holdt, 2003:62). The reforms of the 
1981 Labour Relations Act did little to eliminate the legacy of the apartheid workplace 
regime such as low trust, low levels of skills, a reluctance to identify with the goals of the 
enterprise, and the racial division of labour (Von Holdt, 2003). 
NUMSA did not have any coherent strategy in the 1970s and 1980s to respond to the 
restructuring of work. The lack of a coherent workplace restructuring strategy is due 
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largely to NUMSA‘s struggle for the right to unionise and represent its members, and 
against the apartheid system. With the changes in the domestic political and economic 
context in the early 1990s, NUMSA became more interested in industrial and workplace 
restructuring. The 1990s marked a historic departure from resistance to reconstruction 
and co-operation within NUMSA (Von Holdt, 2003; Forrest, 2005). It was only in the 
1990s that NUMSA developed a coherent and comprehensible strategy to engage 
industrial and workplace restructuring. 
In 1990 Nelson Mandela and many other political prisoners were released, and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP), African National Congress (ANC), Pan African 
Congress (PAC) and other political movements opposed to the apartheid system were un-
banned (Von Holdt, 2003). This was followed by the first-ever non-racial democratic 
elections in 1994 and the inauguration of an ANC-led government. The political changes 
impelled the trade union movement, including NUMSA, to develop ―a new strategy of 
reconstruction in order to contest and shape incorporation and the broader transition from 
apartheid‖ (Von Holdt, 2003:182). This was the beginning of NUMSA‘s attempt to 
engage more seriously with workplace restructuring. It is important that we understand 
the nature and character of the South African transition to non-racial democracy before I 
delve into NUMSA‘s strategy on industrial and workplace restructuring in the 1990‘s. 
The triple transition theoretical framework is a useful tool for analysing the South 
African transition from the racist apartheid regime to a non-racial democracy.  
3.3.3 The triple transition 
South Africa‘s transition from apartheid to a non-racial democracy has been characterised 
and conceptualised as a triple transition with three dimensions: political, economic and 
social (Webster and Von Holdt, 2005). This conceptualisation of the South African 
transition is useful in setting the ground for our understanding of NUMSA‘s engagement 
with workplace restructuring and work reorganisation in the 1990s. The triple transition 
theory is premised on the argument that South African transition is complex and 
contradictory.  
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The demise of the apartheid regime (the political transition) as a system of political 
domination was accompanied by promulgation of non-racial ―democratic and social 
rights for workers, trade unions and citizens [the social transition] and generated at the 
same time an intense contestation over realisation of these rights‖ (complex and 
contradictory) (Webster and Von Holdt, 2005:2). According to Webster and Von Holdt 
(2005:12), this transition has ―impelled profound processes of redistribution of power and 
access to resources, occupations and skills, together with intense struggles over these‖.  
 
Due to the increased internationalisation of production and trade liberalisation (the 
economic transition); the South African metal sector was thrust into embarking on 
workplace restructuring and reorganisation of work in order to respond to the 
increasingly changing economic and political environment. These changes manifested 
themselves through the introduction of new technologies, production systems and work 
methods, reorganisation of work, outsourcing and retrenchments. Indeed, the apartheid 
economy thrived through protectionist economic policies such as the import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) strategy, and the disenfranchisement of black workers from 
industrial citizenship, what Von Holdt (2003) terms the apartheid workplace regime. 
However, these protectionist policies were abandoned as the ANC government adopted 
neo-liberal economic policies as instructed by the Washington Institutions—the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  
 
3.3.4 NUMSA and workplace restructuring in the 1990s 
Overview 
This section traces the origins of NUMSA‘s response to restructuring in the 1990s. The 
purpose is to provide a background to the union‘s current engagement with workplace 
restructuring and work reorganisation. It then goes on to discuss in detail five challenges 
that confronted NUMSA strategy on workplace restructuring in the 1990s, namely:  
 failure to implement the strategy because of contestation over the shift within 
NUMSA; 
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 deteriorating organisational capacity and leadership drain; 
 the failure by leadership to transmit knowledge and skill on workplace restructuring; 
 the gradual eclipse of the Research and Development Groups (RDG‘s); and 
 a low-trust environment between NUMSA and employers. 
 
NUMSA can and must learn from its past experiences in dealing with workplace 
restructuring and work reorganisation on the shop floor. It can draw on its rich history as 
it strives to resolve the many dilemmas facing labour in the current situation.  
Factors leading to restructuring 
Drawing from Lipietz‘s (1987) concept of ―peripheral Fordism‖, Gelb (1991) presents 
―racial Fordism‖ to explain peculiarities of the Fordist labour process under the apartheid 
regime in South Africa. As indicated earlier, the Fordist labour process has always been 
associated with mass production and mass consumption. However, ―racial Fordism‖ in 
South Africa was not characterised by mass consumption norms as theorised by most 
social scientists (Gelb, 1991).  
 
During the apartheid regime, consumer goods were largely consumed by the wealthy 
white minority community. Through its import-substitution strategy, the apartheid regime 
was able to create employment opportunities for its citizens, albeit through a racial labour 
market policy (Gelb, 1991). Well-paying jobs, such as supervisors, engineers and 
accountants, were reserved for the white working class. This was a social group which 
was able to participate in mass consumption of durable consumer goods. This shows that 
Fordism in the apartheid South Africa had its own peculiarities.  
 
The restructuring of work in the South African metal industry had made significant 
inroads by the 1990s. This involved adoption of production systems such as the Japanese 
Just-in-Time system and accelerated automation of the production process—there was a 
general transition from the Fordist labour process to the post-Fordist labour process. The 
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JIT production method placed significant pressure on the work process ―to ensure that 
orders are met in the required time once they have been placed‖ (Ngoasheng, 1992:4). 
As discussed in Chapter Two of this report, the Fordist labour process was characterised 
by rigid separation of tasks among workers, repetition of tasks, mechanisation, removal 
of control of the labour process from the shop floor to management (Taylorism), and 
mass production of standardised products on an assembly line (Ngoasheng, 1992:3). 
Retrenchments, rapid introduction of new technologies, precarious work, intensification 
of work and the reorganisation of production are some of the common outcomes 
associated with this phase of workplace restructuring. 
In March 1992, NUMSA published a document titled NUMSA Restructuring Booklet in 
which major changes in production are identified and discussed. This booklet is 
important because it highlights some of the characteristics of what today is known as the 
post-Fordist labour process. According to Webster (1985), the crisis of the Fordist labour 
process could not be sustained because of the continuous shop-floor resistance triggered 
by the growing sense of alienation, decreasing worker motivation, boredom and fatigue. 
The NUMSA (1992:6) booklet further notes the following ―major changes that have 
begun to take place‖:  
 New technology: The use of computers at various stages of production has made 
it possible to improve the integration, quality, speed and accuracy of the 
processes. This includes Computer Aided Design (CAD) and Computer Aided 
Manufacture (CAM). In some cases the whole manufacturing process is 
integrated through Computer Integrated Manufacture (CIM).  
 New work practices: A much greater emphasis has been placed on producing to 
order and on keeping stocks low through the use of Just-in-Time and Total 
Quality Management. 
 Plant layout: The focus has been to develop logical, smooth, uninterrupted 
production flows through the use of systems such as Cellular Layout and Kanban. 
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The reality is that production techniques and methods seldom remain static. Instead they 
change with the times as employers search for innovative tactics to cut production costs 
and improve their competitiveness (Thompson, 1983). The introduction of new 
production technologies, automation, the reorganisation of work and work orientation are 
directly linked to the debate around the changing nature of work in the current period. It 
is useful to distinguish between static and dynamic flexible production strategies.  
With static flexible production strategies, employers reorganise work without necessarily 
changing production systems and methods (Deyo, 1997). The main objective of a static 
flexible production strategy is to reduce production costs through precarious forms of 
employment such as part-time workers, short-term contracts and outsourcing—in other 
words, the casualisation and externalisation of labour (Deyo, 1997). Dynamic flexibility, 
on the other hand, involves employers‘ attempts to multi-skill their workforce and 
encourage worker participation in production on the shop floor (Deyo, 1997). However, 
these two forms of flexible production strategies are not mutually exclusive: ―The 
dynamic and static flexibility regimes can co-exist, particularly in workplaces that are in 
transition‖ (Masondo, 2003:16). NUMSA‘s (1992) Restructuring Booklet indicates that 
the union‘s response to these changes is important in determining its control of the labour 
process.  
At its Second National Congress in 1989, it was evident that NUMSA (1989) was 
increasingly bothered by ―the crisis of accumulation and greed causing managements to 
try many strategies to cut costs in the workplace and to weaken the union‖. Deregulation, 
flexible production, rationalisation, forced increases in productivity, co-optation and 
retrenchments were among the factors that employers used in order to maximise profits. 
The 1989 Congress made bold commitments to fight employers‘ quest for production 
flexibility and changing work practices without negotiations.  
These were among the factors that thrust NUMSA into developing a strategy aimed at 
guiding the union‘s engagement with workplace restructuring and the reorganisation of 
work. Noting the adverse effect that workplace restructuring had on workers, NUMSA 
not only became extraordinarily vocal in condemning management‘s unilateral approach 
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to workplace restructuring, it also resolved to actively take part in the discussions around 
workplace restructuring at both workplace and industry levels (Forrest, 2005).  
The union indicated its understanding that ―metalworkers are under threat, as employers 
engage in unilateral restructuring of the industries‖ (Ntuli, 2001:2). The union then saw 
the need for a strategy that would guide its engagement with employers on workplace 
restructuring and work reorganisation. NUMSA‘s Fourth National Congress in 1993 
resolved that ―the bottom line to us as the working class is that any restructuring must 
have as its primary objectives the empowerment of working people through higher skills, 
job security, creation of new job opportunities, technological innovation appropriate to 
our needs, and a sustainable environment‖ (NUMSA, 1993:14). To achieve this, the 
union had to change its strategic approach to workplace restructuring.  
NUMSA‘s workplace strategy in the 1990s derives its philosophical existence from the 
process that was to lead to the Reconstruction and Development Programme which 
emphasised the central place labour should occupy in building new institutions and 
transforming the workplace (Von Holdt, 2002). This implied a ―new form of radical 
democracy which would extend worker power within the company, devolve 
responsibility and decision making to the shop-floor, replace authoritarian supervision 
with collective control of production by workers, and enhance workers‘ skills, and career 
prospects and pay‖ (Von Holdt, 2002:14). Achieving these objectives required the union 
to develop and embrace new organisational cultures and practices in its engagement with 
employers. This approach is known as ―strategic unionism‖.  
NUMSA embraces strategic unionism  
In the 1970s and 1980s NUMSA was unable, and unwilling, to engage managements on 
workplace restructuring, but in the late 1980s it was ―beginning to wield sufficient power 
to engage employers on broad economic issues and industry restructuring‖ in the auto 
and engineering sectors (Forrest, 2005:203). In a policy workshop in 1990, NUMSA 
resolved to reject the defensive approach towards initiatives by the state and employers. 
This meant that the union needed to constructively engage the state and employers on 
issues around restructuring of the economy, industry and the workplace with a strategic 
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objective to safe guard job security and create more jobs, ensure a living wage and meet 
the basic needs of the mass of South Africans (Forrest, 2005:253). Some NUMSA shop 
steward in the 1990‘s seemed determined to be ―involved in everything that is taking 
place in our country … [and] also be involved in deciding what we want to see our 
company doing. We do not want to live in the past, where management had to think and 
decide for us‖ (Von Holdt, 2003:193). 
With the looming new democratic dispensation, ―the union became increasingly 
convinced of the need for a new strategy aimed at circumventing and combating the 
adverse impact trade liberalisation had had on workers and on the working class in 
general‖ (Maree, 2007:26). It was after these thorough considerations and deliberations 
that in the early 1990‘s the union made an in-principle commitment to restructure the 
union‘s approach on issues in a ―move from resistance to reconstruction‖ (Maree, 
2007:18). This was a transition in the union‘s history to ‗strategic unionism‘. According 
to Joffe (1992:7), strategic unionism in essence ―means unions moving from being 
reactive to events, to becoming pro-active, take initiatives, and set the agenda‖.  
At its Third National Congress in 1991, NUMSA (1991:9) resolved to initiate 
negotiations with employers around restructuring at company and plant level. NUMSA‘s 
(1992) Restructuring Booklet sees workplace restructuring as an inevitable process that 
the union had to accept. However, workers (and unions) have a choice—to be victims of 
restructuring or to lead the process. Determined to engage employers on workplace 
restructuring, the Fourth (1993) NUMSA National Congress resolved to embark on a 
massive capacity-building programme for shop stewards and organisers to be able to 
meet these challenges.  
The 1996 Fifth National Congress took further resolutions regarding the nature of the 
collective bargaining agenda: ―All changes to work organisation, including negotiation of 
technological innovation not unilateral implementation, must engender productivity not 
competition amongst workers‖ (NUMSA, 1996:15). To allow for effective engagement 
on these issues, the union was expected to develop clear and feasible guidelines for shop 
stewards and officials to ensure that they could deal efficiently with restructuring issues. 
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Improvement in productivity was no longer seen as ―an issue left solely to the consulting 
industry or individual plants to sort out‖, but rather the union should engage employers 
on such issues (NUMSA, 1996:15). 
In 1997 union policy stated clearly that ―as a union we must demand the following issues 
to be negotiated with the unions: introduction of new technology, use of machine and line 
speed, work organisation and processes, new work methods and work reorganisation, 
working time and patterns, productivity and performance assessment, benchmarks, 
targets and production schedules, etc.‖(NUMSA, 1997:30). 
NUMSA‘s workplace restructuring strategy in the 1990s can best be described as 
―strategic unionism‖, as it involved a more co-operative yet critical engagement with 
employers on workplace issues, including work restructuring (Forrest, 2005). It is worth 
noting that NUMSA‘s workplace restructuring strategy has always been driven by its 
political commitment to socialism. Scandinavian and Australian trade unions developed 
this form of unionism—that is, strategic unionism—in response to neo-liberal 
globalisation and workplace restructuring in general. According to Von Holdt 
(2003:188), strategic unionism has four main defining characteristics (also see Ewer, 
Hampson et al., 1991; Joffe, Maller and Webster, 1995): 
 union involvement in wealth creation, not just redistribution; 
 proactive rather than reactive unionism; 
 participation through bipartite and tripartite institutions; and 
 a high level of union capacity in education and research. 
This shift in the type of engagement of the union leadership was captured by one of 
NUMSA‘s shop-floor leaders in 1994 when he argued that ―the culture definitely has to 
change from a culture of resistance and un-governability to a culture of productivity‖ 
(Von Holdt, 2003:181). This was not just rhetoric. NUMSA shop stewards in some 
workplaces, such as Highveld Steel, agreed on a strategic vision to deepen workplace 
democracy. They did this by demanding more participation on production issues, 
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company competitiveness, training and pay for workers, and other issues related to 
workplace restructuring (Von Holdt, 2003:192). 
A NUMSA policy workshop in 1990 resolved to proactively engage in economic policy 
formulation and workplace restructuring, instead of reacting to and mechanically 
resisting managements‘ initiatives (Forrest, 2005:253). Assisted by an Australian trade 
unionist highly experienced in the development of strategic unionism, in 1992 NUMSA 
adopted a negotiation strategy known as ―the three-year programme‖. According to Von 
Holdt (2003), the three-year programme was premised on the union‘s assessment that 
employers were generally adopting ―lean production‖ to mitigate the chilling effects of 
global economic competition. The overarching aim of the programme was to  
transform the apartheid workplace regime and construct a new non-racial 
order in the workplace based on workplace democracy, with the focus on 
‗intelligent production‘ rather than ‗lean production‘. Intelligent jobs 
meant an establishment of a ‗new framework linking grading, training, 
skills development, pay and work organisation in the industry‘ (Von 
Holdt, 2003:187).  
The programme also stated that discussions with employers on workplace restructuring 
must be grounded on the principles of job security and job creation (Forrest, 2005:290). 
Through this programme, the union demanded significant levels of control on issues of 
industry and workplace restructuring. Through this strategy, the union leadership aimed 
―to augment shop-floor worker control, create sustainable jobs for workers and to arrest 
employers‘ growing tendency to restructure unilaterally‖ (Forrest: 2005:242). 
This approach to the workplace can best be described as a form of negotiated 
restructuring which may produce elements of the so-called high-performance work 
organisation, with its emphasis on improved working conditions, the incorporation of 
workers in decision making, new forms of skill and so on. This approach to production 
performance also appears to be intimately linked to a negotiated and strategic approach to 
overcoming the legacy of apartheid in the workplace through employment equity.  
It could also be described as a form of ―bargained corporatism‖ in which a trade union 
proactively discusses and negotiates policy formulation. Through bargained corporatism, 
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NUMSA‘s strategic approach to workplace restructuring was ―to replace the racially 
segregated, authoritarian workplace with a democratic alternative where worker power 
would come through the development of skills and the devolution of decision-making to 
the shop floor‖ (Forrest, 2005:287). Employers and labour were expected to work 
together on workplace restructuring processes. 
According to Webster, Macun and Joffe (1995:22), there are some lessons that can be 
learned from unions‘ engagement with changes in the workplace. Firstly, any change in 
the workplace needs to be clearly defined and its consequences identified in advance. 
Secondly, exclusion or refusal of unions to engage in these changes has proven 
counterproductive in that employers normally embark on restructuring that impact 
negatively on labour. Thirdly, participation thrives well in an environment of trust and 
information disclosure. And more importantly, ―strong trade union capacity is central to 
effective organisational change‖ (Webster et al, 1995:22).  
Challenges to the restructuring strategy  
NUMSA has faced a number of challenges to its restructuring strategy including 
opposition from within, deteriorating organisational capacity, failure to transmit 
information about workplace restructuring to members, the gradual decline of the union‘s 
Research and Development Groups, and lack of trust between employers and unions. 
Each of these types of challenges is discussed below. 
 Opposition from certain sections of NUMSA 
The new strategy was not without controversy inside the union. The leadership tried to 
convince their constituency about the importance of engaging ―employers in fruitful and 
creative discussions around restructuring of the industry‖. However, as expected from 
any union with a rich militant history such as NUMSA, this did not appeal to some 
militant sections of the membership who rejected the strategy as they viewed it as a 
betrayal to their struggle for increased wages, and better living and working conditions—
the struggle for socialism (Maree, 2007:18).  
Influenced by a visit by Sam Gindin, a leading left labour intellectual from the Canadian 
Auto Workers Union, the more sophisticated opponents of strategic unionism began to 
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describe NUMSA‗s position as a shift to the concept of ―progressive competitiveness‖, in 
which labour adapts to global competition by developing new skills, enterprise 
bargaining and the discourse of post-Fordism (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 
2008:187).  
It was not easy for the union leadership to pursue its new approach because of the 
unrelenting pressure from below not to depart from its traditional militant tactics. The 
union leadership argued that the shift did not imply an erosion of radicalism and 
militancy, but many members viewed this consensual approach with deep suspicion and 
regarded it as selling out to employers (Forrest, 2005). Some NUMSA members authored 
an internal discussion document that strongly rejected strategic unionism as not only 
being imposed on the union but as a betrayal of the struggle for socialism (NUMSA, 
1990).  
The document notes that NUMSA was confronted by a number of pressures from global 
capitalism, employers, the apartheid regime and its (regime) allies. It argues that these 
pressures ―are from the enemy‖ and ―have led to some fundamental shifts in our political 
line‖ (NUMSA, 1990). This document accuses the union leadership of failing to consult 
union members on its restructuring strategy, and that it its formulation transgressed the 
union‘s principle of worker control. This strategy, they argue, seemed to be driven by a 
―new politics‖ of ―restructuring for reconstruction‖, ―New Realism‖ and ―Social 
Contract‖, which does not come from NUMSA members but rather demonstrates that 
NUMSA had succumbed to political pressures from employers and the capitalist system. 
As the document indicates:  
Nowhere do we hear locals speaking this language. No, this politics starts 
with the bosses. And then there are people who take this politics into our 
movement … there are caucus meetings at the top, where new policies are 
formulated above the heads of workers. Then these policies are simply 
presented inside our organisation as finished proposals. We are then given 
the chance to discuss these proposals in our structures, before they are 
adopted as policy in the CC [Central Committee]. Comrades, you can see 
that this politics starts at the leadership level. Our members are reduced to 
the role of spectators (NUMSA, 1990:2).  
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Despite this widespread internal resistance, the union national leadership seemed 
determined to pursue strategic unionism on workplace restructuring (Forrest, 2005). The 
leadership was genuinely committed to a ―more consensual style in the industrial council 
in the hope of engaging employers on industry restructuring‖ (Forrest, 2005). The failed 
NUMSA metal engineering industry strike in 1992 was an important lesson for the union, 
and it later changed its engagement approach with employers. The strike demands were 
largely on wage increases, but they were badly timed because of the major economic 
recession at the time. 
Following this 1992 failed strike, the union leadership came to accept that they ―could 
not continue on a course which threatened members‘ job security especially as emerging 
global competition further threatened jobs‖ (Forrest, 2005:266). The fear was that 
embarking on strikes would ultimately destroy the industry through factory closures and 
massive job losses, thus frustrating the union‘s desire for economic growth and 
development. The union leadership was caught between engaging employers more 
proactively while at the same time trying to balance this with the demands for adversarial 
bargaining from the militant membership.  
Strategic unionism did not work well because some members within the union saw it as 
incompatible with NUMSA‘s socialist political programme.  
 Deteriorating organisational capacity and leadership drain  
It is quite ironic that at the time when NUMSA was adopting a new strategy there was a 
general deterioration of organisational capacity to comprehensively deal with issues 
outside negotiations on wages and working conditions; this was evidenced by the 
organisational weaknesses of most COSATU affiliates at the plant and regional levels 
(Buhlungu, 1999). In 1992, the then organising secretary and now general secretary of 
COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi, was quite frank about the organisational challenges at the 
time. He made it clear that the trade union movement in South Africa was confronted by 
―deteriorating organisational capacity‖ (Buhlungu, 1999). The 1992 report on the 
investigation into the issues in the National Bargaining Forum also shows that ―NUMSA 
leadership is weak in the regions, strong at the centre‖ (NUMSA, 1992:4).  
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This sentiment would later find resonance in COSATU‘s (1997:168) September 
Commission Report on the future of trade unions, which frankly noted that shop stewards 
found most of the issues they confronted to be too complex and difficult to deal with. In 
1997 the September Commission had organised a two-day seminar with thirty shop 
stewards from COSATU‘s manufacturing and mining affiliates to discuss their 
experiences with workplace change. The seminar identified a number of weaknesses in 
union responses to restructuring: 
 Unions lack policy and direction on workplace restructuring. 
 As a result, the unions are reactive rather than proactive. 
 Shop stewards develop their own initiatives without support from union 
officials. 
 Sometimes the union is left on the sidelines as workers respond directly and 
accept voluntary retrenchments, promotion, etc. 
 The unions lack capacity to engage effectively and to support shop stewards 
(COSATU, 1997: 110-111). 
 
 Failure of the leadership to transmit knowledge and skill on workplace 
restructuring to ordinary members  
It is clear that workers battled to engage with complex issues, such as those related to the 
changes in production methods and systems, and the general re-organisation of work. 
Union leaders with skills and experience on these issues were often ―over-stretched and 
thus unable to find time to share their knowledge with workers and shop stewards‖ 
(Buhlungu, 1999:119). This was a serious problem, as workplace restructuring issues 
became the responsibility of a select few leaders in the union.  
Some stewards had difficulty engaging employers on strategic issues and were often 
cornered and misled by management to agree to certain changes without due 
consideration for the long-term implications of such agreements. The Human Resources 
Director at Volkswagen South Africa in Uitenhage elaborated on the difficulty faced by 
shop stewards in adapting to participatory management: ―The shop stewards are unsure of 
themselves a lot of the time…. Quite frankly these guys don‘t really know what the hell 
we are talking about. And a lot of them feel inadequate…. they are masters in the art of 
resistance politics‖ (Maller, 1992:36).  
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In one of the September Commission workshops in 1997, some NUMSA shop stewards 
were adamant that ―lack of capacity was the biggest problem facing the unions in their 
struggles to democratise workplace relations‖ (Buhlungu, 1999:110). A NUMSA shop 
steward from Witbank, Lesley Nhlapho, was quite frank about the need for capacity 
building: ―If we want to participate, the union must empower factory structures to take 
decisions on the spot, otherwise management will take decisions alone‖ (Buhlungu, 
1999:112). Some shop stewards complained about the lack of a clear strategic vision in 
the union on issues related to workplace restructuring and work reorganisation.  
There were concerns that some shop stewards and organisers did not fully understand the 
union‘s three-year programme. According to Forrest (2005:291), ―The union tried to 
address these fears by urging shop stewards to put a restructuring item on the agenda of 
every workplace general meeting‖. The growing distance between the leadership and 
union members contributed to the lack of transmission of knowledge and skill on 
workplace restructuring. In the early 1990s, some union members raised serious concerns 
over ―a big distance between our leadership and the mass of our members‖ (NUMSA, 
1990:6). These members were also unhappy because top union leadership neither 
attended local meetings nor listened to workers in the factories and communities. When 
workers demanded to be involved in restructuring, they ―were often told that we must be 
realistic and see what is possible‖ (NUMSA, 1990:3). 
 Gradual eclipse of Research and Development Groups  
Determined to give workers the capacity to engage in production issues, NUMSA 
established Research and Development Group (RDGs). These were established so as to 
―tap into workers detailed knowledge of operations, problems, and possible resolutions to 
such problems‖ (Forrest, 2005:366). The aim of the RDGs was to empower workers with 
skills and knowledge to take charge of their workplaces. The union‘s National Executive 
Committee (NEC) introduced union-based research groups which also discussed shop-
floor issues and made recommendations to the union‘s constitutional structures for 
ratification (Forrest, 2005).  
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These groups were not only important for policy recommendations; ―the aim was to 
nurture worker researchers who would acquire a detailed knowledge of their industries‖ 
(Forrest, 2005:246). NUMSA had a number of RDGs dealing with a variety of issues in 
areas such as housing, political economy, training and grading, health, collective 
bargaining, land, industrial restructuring and shelter. The industrial restructuring RDG 
formulated recommendations that later served as a basis for engagement with employers 
on workplace restructuring.  
Established in 1988, the RDGs were defunct in less than half a decade and without any 
formal resolution to close them. There are various explanations for their demise (Forrest, 
2005:248). One was that the research carried out by the RDGs was not communicated to 
ordinary members, and so many of their recommendations failed to gain support on the 
ground. The communication of information by RDGs to ordinary members was 
compromised by a high level of complexity of the issues: ―Leaders themselves were 
grappling with new concepts, so that even when they tried to communicate them to 
members, they often failed‖. Another reason had to do with the mandate to develop 
policies. Since the groups were not constitutional structures, their work sparked serious 
tension between RDGs and the constitutional structures. There was a lack of co-
ordination between the two types of structures. 
The demise of the RDGs can also be attributed to NUMSA‘s failure to ensure active 
participation by members in the implementation of RDG ideas. However, Alec Erwin, 
then education secretary, downplayed these criticisms; he argued that ―RDGs were a very 
successful approach … there were problems because as leadership we often ran ahead of 
rank and file. But I think that‘s a tension that you must live with‖ (Forrest, 2005:249).  
 Lack of trust between employers and unions  
The other challenge for NUMSA‘s strategic unionism in the 1990s was the lack of trust 
between workers and management. In its 1997 policy NUMSA demanded that 
―Employers negotiate with unions on work-reorganisation by giving information and 
discussing their strategic plans with unions‖ (NUMSA, 1997:31). Instead of giving 
workers full information, employers often negotiated in bad faith. This only reinforced 
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workers‘ conviction that ―only militant resistance delivered gains‖ (Forrest, 2005:286). 
Strategic unionism cannot exist in an environment characterised by low trust between a 
union and an employer. According to Webster et al. (1995:21), ―any commitment to 
participatory practices is unlikely to be effective if it is not associated with the open and 
free exchange of information concerning, in particular, proposals and production 
conditions‖. 
The intensity of global economic competition put pressure on employers; as a result they 
became more receptive to the union‘s support for consensus-oriented industrial relations 
(Forrest, 2005). In 1992 the union adopted a new and coherent bargaining strategy 
heavily inspired by the dilemmas confronting both the union and employers at the time. 
Workers were haunted by the spectre of possible job losses while, on the other hand, 
employers feared low productivity and the possible demise of industry in South Africa 
(Forrest, 2005). Both parties began to agree to some consensus-seeking arrangements.  
In the 1980s the union rejected management‘s attempts to introduce worker participation 
schemes; by 1993, however, the union ―viewed such innovations as a way of winning 
more control on the factory floor‖ (Forrest, 2005:326). This was the beginning of the shift 
towards strategic unionism. Concerned over the expansion of ―productive output‖ and 
wishing to put an end to ―unrelenting job losses‖ due to trade liberalisation and associated 
consequences (Forrest, 2005:203), NUMSA adopted a ―strategic engagement‖ approach 
towards economic and workplace restructuring (Masondo, 2003:28). The basic idea was 
that the union should actively participate in the restructuring process as a way to defend 
workers‘ ―interests through democratisation of the workplace, gaining access to skills, 
and improving wages and working conditions‖ (Masondo, 2003:28).  
The union agreed to accept the workplace changes necessitated by the broader global 
economic restructuring but expected a trade-off from employers in terms of their 
commitment to providing training, improved wages and conditions of employment, and 
more consultation on workplace issues. In 1992 the union actively participated in the 
Electronics Sector Standing Committee in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). It 
was also an active participant in the 1992 Motor Task Group appointed by the Ministry of 
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Trade and Industry; Les Ketelldas and Alec Erwin were the NUMSA representatives in 
the task team (Forrest, 2005). The Motor Industry Authority was viewed as a formidable 
vehicle for engaging employers on workplace restructuring, albeit at an industry level.  
In the early 1990s economic recession deepened and ―mass unemployment became a 
permanent feature‖ (Forrest, 2005:203). NUMSA members were among the main 
casualties of trade liberalisation in the early 1990s. Many of its members were 
retrenched, and precarious forms of employment were introduced in some companies. 
This deepened the mistrust of members towards employers. 
3.4  IG Mettal’s experiences with workplace restructuring 
3.4.1 The „coalition for industrial modernisation‟ and IG Mettal‟s complacency in the 
1970s  
In the early 1960s IG Mettal established the Department of Technology and Atomic 
Power. This department was responsible for developing and co-ordinating IG Mettal‘s 
responses to work restructuring, and to technological change in particular. In the 1960s 
and up to the mid-1970s IG Mettal was generally receptive to workplace restructuring as 
long as it did not tamper with the social contract. Some scholars have described this 
period in Germany as one characterised by a ―coalition for industrial modernisation‖ 
between labour (including IG Mettal) and capital (Thelen, 1991:184). 
 
This coalition was strengthened by the spectacular economic growth and development in 
West Germany at the time. During the heydays of the social partnership between German 
capital, labour and the state, IG Mettal adopted an apathetic response to workplace 
restructuring. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s IG Mettal‘s strategy towards 
workplace restructuring was characterised as ―sanguine, even generally enthusiastic‖ 
(Thelen, 1991:184). In other words, the union did not pay particular attention to 
workplace restructuring because of the social consensus established between labour, 
capital and the state.   
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The social contract resulted in IG Mettal being complacent about work restructuring. At 
the heart of the coalition for industrial modernisation was a normative trade-off between 
capital and labour in which IG Mettal agreed to work restructuring in order to 
simultaneously support the government‘s export-oriented development strategy and 
capital‘s quest for profit maximisation. In turn IG Mettal expected spill-off benefits from 
the resultant productivity gains ―through increased benefits, shorter working times, and 
better working conditions‖ (Thelen, 1991:147).  
 
Consistent with the principles driving the coalition, IG Mettal resolved at its 1965 
National Congress that restructuring of work was a necessary precondition for national 
economic growth and development (Thelen, 1991). If labour needed increased benefits, 
higher wages and shorter working time, production systems had to be restructured on a 
regular basis. The congress resolved that workplace restructuring was acceptable as long 
as it did not compromise workers‘ job security and conditions of employment. The 
congress also noted that ―if companies do not adapt in time to the technological standards 
in their sectors they will lose their competitiveness and be out of business‖ (IG Mettal, 
1965:61).  
 
Up until the late 1960s IG Mettal was so complacent about workplace restructuring such 
that it optimistically characterised it as ―technological progress‖ (Thelen, 1991). The 
short-lived post-war national economic recession in the period 1966 to 1967 did not have 
much negative impact on workers because of the Rationalisation Protection Agreement 
signed between IG Mettal and employers at the national level (Thelen, 1991). The main 
thrust of this agreement was protection of workers against any negative consequences of 
workplace restructuring. The 1966 national economic recession was a breakpoint in that 
for the first time IG Mettal begun shifting from the complacency that characterised its 
engagement with workplace restructuring in the better part of the 1960s.  
 
3.4.2 Late 1970s: IG Mettal‟s complacency wanes 
In the late 1970s IG Mettal begun to adopt an interventionist approach in its engagement 
with work restructuring. In its efforts to ensure more meaningful worker participation in 
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workplace restructuring, the union embarked on an intense political lobbying process 
aimed at securing co-determination rights on work restructuring. The union failed in its 
bid at that time. However, its efforts culminated in the amendment of the 1972 Works 
Constitution Act to include the right for workers to be informed and consulted on 
employers‘ plans to restructure work (Thelen, 1991). This was a great achievement 
because the revised law mandates a legal obligation on employers to inform and consult 
workers about their plans to introduce new production systems and methods or ―other 
significant alterations in plant or equipment and ... on questions relating to certain aspects 
of structure and organisation of work, working conditions, and job design‖ (Works 
Constitution, 1972:90). 
 
In the 1970s IG Mettal also initiated a programme, the humanisation of working life, 
whose main objective was to safeguard the interests of the workers during work 
restructuring processes. As part of its this programme, IG Mettal successfully lobbied the 
government of the time, in particular the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology 
and the Ministry of Labour, to initiate a research project called Humanisation of Working 
Life (Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens, HdA). The common driving principle behind the 
programmes developed by IG Mettal and the government was that change in work should 
not be to the detriment of workers‘ working conditions and job security (Thelen, 1991). 
According to Thelen (1991:188) and Pohler (1979:9), the Humanisation of Working Life 
research programme had four main goals, namely: 
 to develop worker protection measures and establish minimum standards for 
machines, systems and plants; 
 to develop ‗humane‘ production technologies; 
 to devise and test new modes of work organisation and job structures for 
subsequent diffusion; and 
 to disseminate and apply ―humanisation‖ findings, and plant findings and 
experiences. 
 
One of main findings of the Humanisation of Working Life research was that workplace 
restructuring was not at odds with the objectives set forth in IG Mettal‘s humanisation of 
work programme. As the then Minister of Research and Development, Hans Matthofer, 
puts it:  
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A more humane organisation of work (menschengerechtere)… need not at 
all be at odds with economic necessities and goals. On the contrary: 
whoever thinks they can ensure their long-term competitiveness in 
international markets by striving for cost advantage at the expense of 
humane working conditions cannot reap lasting success (Thelen, 
1991:188).  
 
The VW Wolfsburg plant was among the companies in which the Humanisation of 
Working Life research programme was undertaken. The programme bore some fruit at 
the plant: the traditional assembly line techniques were abandoned and ―a production 
system that gave individual workers maximum autonomy in performing their jobs, which 
could be accomplished either individually or in works groups‖ was installed (Thelen, 
1991). In turn, this improved working conditions for workers. This shows clearly that IG 
Mettal has not only relied on collective bargaining, but also on co-operation with 
government in its workplace restructuring agenda from the late 1960s throughout the 
1970s.  
 
3.4.3 The 1980s economic crisis and increased interest in the Gestaltungspolitik   
In the late 1970s and mid 1980s, Germany was confronted with a crisis of mass 
unemployment, rapid technological changes and the intensification of global competition. 
IG Mettal‘s ―humanisation‖ project was at odds with the growing economic crisis and the 
rising unemployment in Germany. There was a general consensus in West Germany at 
the time that these challenges could be overcome partly through intensive restructuring of 
work and production, both at the micro and macro levels.  
 
IG Mettal was not an observer during these difficult times; it ―developed the most 
comprehensive vision of the future of work‖ (Silvia, 1988:168). The union became 
increasingly and more seriously involved in the politics of production organisation 
(Gestaltungspolitik) and its approach to workplace restructuring ―became more guarded 
and critical‖ (Thelen, 1991:183). As was argued in the beginning, IG Mettal‘s strategy on 
workplace change has historically been influenced by the dynamics in the domestic and 
global balance of power. As Thelen (1991:182) indicates, the economic crisis of the late 
1970s has ―driven broad changes in the union‘s views and objectives on technology‖. 
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Whereas IG Mettal has generally accepted and co-operated with work restructuring, it has 
since the late 1970s been steadfast in its demand that restructuring not undermine 
workers‘ employment, skill and income (Thelen, 1991). The Works Councils became 
very important implementing machinery for IG Mettal‘s interventionist approach to 
workplace restructuring. Government and employers argued that part of the strategy to 
survive the crisis was to restructure work so as to improve productivity and 
competitiveness. However, this needed to be done within the government‘s Modell 
Deutschland (German Model) framework, whose original objective was to recuperate the 
German economy from the 1970s economic crisis (Beck, Klobes and Scherrer, 2005). 
Modell Deutschland was introduced by then Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who was 
elected in the 1976 German general elections.  
 
According to Beck et al. (2005:2), the German Model is normally associated with ―the 
successful marriage between international competitiveness and social consensus‖. 
Through the Modell Deutschland, Helmut Schmidt aimed to sustain the corporatist 
political structures inherited from the National Socialist Germany and at the same time 
sustain the social contract between the market, society and the state. The partnership 
between labour and capital ensured the industrial and social peace necessary for recovery 
from the 1970s economic crisis. In turn the government performed its role as ―social 
insurance against the risk of joblessness, financed solidaristically and equitably by capital 
and labour‖ (Beck et al., 2005:4). 
 
During the hey-days of Modell Deutschland, labour and capital had to work together in 
their common goal to achieve higher wages, quality, performance and productivity 
increases (Beck et al, 2005). Nevertheless, Modell Deutschland did not protect all the 
workers‘ interests: industrial restructuring culminated in the proliferation of atypical 
forms of employment, and technological changes negatively affected workers—such as 
ergonomic problems, lay-offs and even retrenchments. In 1978, IG Mettal embarked on a 
strike in the Nord Wurttemberg/Nord Baden region in demand of ―protection for workers 
adversely affected by technological change‖ (Thelen, 1991:192).  
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As usual, the union entered into an agreement with employers in which it is stated that 
workers must be protected against ―downgrading through an eighteen-month income 
guarantee for workers transferred to lower paying jobs as a result of rationalisation‖ 
(Thelen, 1991:192). Even though the union did not come out empty-handed from the 
1978 strike, this served as a confirmation to labour that the political economic context 
was no longer favourable for the advancement of its strategies and interests. The 1978 
strike was not only an expression of the growing frustration of the negative impact 
workplace restructuring had on workers, but also a clear signal that the balance of power 
was tilting in favour of capital. 
 
As the Modell Deutschland was finding it difficult to yield the intended positive results 
for workers, IG Mettal gradually abandoned government as its tactical ally through which 
to advance its workplace restructuring strategy. The changes in the German political 
economy landscape which saw the inauguration of the conservative government in 1982 
and the 1980s economic recession necessitated a change in IG Mettal‘s approach to work 
restructuring. According to Thelen (1991:183), IG Mettal resorted to industrial action and 
collective bargaining ―as the primary arena for pushing its technology [workplace 
restructuring] policy‖. 
 
The coalition for industrial modernisation between IG Mettal and the Social Democratic 
Party led government buckled down under the economic stagnation in the late 1970s. In 
1979 IG Mettal‘s head of the Automation and Technology Department, Karl-Heinz 
Janzen, condemned the government for supporting unilateral ―job-destroying 
rationalisation measures‖ (Thelen, 1991:190). The confrontation between IG Mettal, and 
employers and government became more profound and sharp. As Silvia (2005:155) 
nicely puts it: ―A bitter clash between the unions and Helmut Kohl‘s coalition 
government dominated West German politics from the fall of 1985 until well into 1986‖.  
 
IG Mettal harshly criticised and dismissed the once celebrated government–driven 
Humanisation Programme as no longer useful in addressing the chilling effects of 
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workplace restructuring in the 1980s. Thelen (1991:191) points out that ―IG Mettal 
increasingly charged employers with using HdA [Humanisation Programme] funding as 
a ruse and vehicle for state-subsidised rationalisation projects‖. In 1984 IG Mettal 
embarked on a very effective strike in the metal processing industry of West Germany in 
demand for a shorter workweek (Silvia, 1988). It also rejected the government‘s plan to 
scrap unemployment benefits for workers in the event that work was disrupted owing to a 
strike in another region in Germany. The supply logistics in the metal processing industry 
had intensified the interdependence between original equipment manufacturers and 
suppliers. In light of this government tried to revise Paragraph 116 of the Works 
Promotion Act to exclude payment for lost working time to workers indirectly affected 
by strikes in other regions in Germany.  
 
For example, if supplier A in Hessen region embarks on a strike that halts production in a 
BWM assembly line in Bavaria, indirectly affected workers at the BMW in Bavaria 
would not receive any compensation whatsoever for the lost time due to the strike by 
workers in Hessen. IG Mettal demanded that government suspend its problematic plan to 
revise Paragraph 116 as it stood against ―the inviolable social entitlements that the major 
West German parties commonly accepted as part of the modern welfare state‖ (Silvia, 
1988:165). Surprisingly the president of the government‘s Federal Labour Office, 
Heinrich Franke, reiterated the government decision to scrap unemployment benefits to 
workers indirectly affected by strikes in other German regions.  
 
By shortening the workweek, IG Mettal had aimed to lower the rampant unemployment 
of the time, stimulate demand and ultimately contribute to economic growth. Employers 
had already pronounced as early as 1979 that they would not succumb to any pressure to 
lower the workweek below forty hours. In the same year, that is 1979, the Confederation 
of German Employers (Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbietgeberverbande) called 
upon all its affiliates not to lower the length of workweek below forty hours. The then 
deputy president of IG Mettal, Franz Steinkuhler, announced that the union had a strike 
strategy—called ―minimax‖— that would ensure that employers conceded to workers‘ 
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demands for a shorter workweek and the payment of unemployment benefits to workers 
indirectly affected by strikes in other regions.  
 
According to Silvia (1988:164), the minimax strategy involved ―a minimal deployment of 
strikers and union funds to bring maximum pressure on the employers‖. Central to the 
minimax strategy during the 1984 IG Mettal strike was what Webster et al. (2008) refers 
to as ―logistical power‖. This strike was highly concentrated and directed at a few key 
supplier firms in the North Baden-North Wurttemberg and Hessen regions. The intention 
was to disrupt the automotive industry‘s supply logistics chain strategically to bring the 
entire German auto industry to a standstill. 
 
Indeed, ten days into the strike the German auto industry was terminally paralysed, and 
production was brought to a halt (Silvia, 1988). Despite their continued arrogance and 
resistance, the employers and government could not pretend that everything was fine 
while production had stopped in one of the most strategic industries in Germany. In the 
end IG Mettal achieved some victories: it gained a work week of thirty-eight and one-half 
hours, but the issue of indirectly affected workers remained unresolved in the courts 
(Silvia, 1988).   
 
For the first time in the history of IG Mettal, the union took the agenda on workplace 
restructuring more seriously because of the government‘s half-hearted commitment to the 
humanisation of work agenda. Government could no longer provide the social security 
which workers had enjoyed for many years. As Silvia (1988:156) puts it: ―IG Mettal 
officials have found that labour‘s traditional task of defending workers from the arbitrary 
decisions of employers does little to combat rising unemployment or the adverse affects 
of new technologies‖. This was a clear indication to the union that the erstwhile 
―coalition for industrial modernisation‖ and Kohl‘s Modell Deutschland had been 
severely weakened and effectively redundant. These were the conditions which 
necessitated a change in the union‘s approach to work restructuring.  
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Concerned about losing the hard-won information rights and influence over workplace 
restructuring, IG Mettal was determined to ―actively expand its ability to influence the 
structure of work itself‖ (Silvia, 1988:156). At its 1980 National Congress, IG Mettal 
mandated its national leadership to draw up a concrete and realisable workplace 
restructuring strategy in view of the apparent collapse of the coalition for industrial 
modernisation between labour and capital (Thelen, 1991). In order to ground its strategy 
on workers‘ concrete shop-floor lived experiences and to understand realities around 
workplace restructuring, the union undertook a survey involving 100 workplaces from 
1982-1983.  
 
An important outcome of this survey was that workplace restructuring, and technological 
change in particular erodes employment and job security, wages, skills and health. The 
survey results culminated in the drafting and adoption of a workplace restructuring 
strategy called Action Program on Work and Production in 1984. This strategy 
emphasises the dialectical relationship between workplace restructuring and the global 
political economy. It goes on to oppose the traditional ―Tayloristic work structure‖ 
because of its emphasis on maximum division of labour that, according to the union, 
alienates workers and instigates a ―low staffed, automatic, centrally controlled production 
process‖ (Silvia, 1988:156).  
 
The union‘s vehement opposition to Taylorism was further fuelled by the fact that the 
majority of the companies in the German metal sector had planned to intensify the Fordist 
labour process, with particular emphasis on automation and division of labour. The union 
goes on to make realistic tactical consideration on how this anti-Tayloristic agenda must 
be taken forward: all metalworkers have a responsibility to change ―the decision making 
structures in plants, in the economy, and in society, so as to extend worker and union 
influence over the organisation of new technologies‖ (Silvia, 1988:156). 
 
In light of the change in the domestic political balance of power, the only hope for the 
success of this strategy would lie in shop-floor mobilisation and collective action (Silvia, 
1988). This was in contrast to the 1970s where the coalition for industrial modernisation 
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was a primary source of power in the union‘s workplace restructuring strategy. IG Mettal 
members serving in the Works Councils were mandated the task of actively 
implementing the strategy in the workplaces. IG Mettal would negotiate only on wages 
and general work standards, whereas Works Councils would deal with shop-floor issues 
such as working time, changes in work organisation and other shop-floor production-
related matters (Thelen, 1991).  
 
The union‘s shop-steward committees in workplaces worked together with IG Mettal‘s 
members in Works Councils in their quest to optimise and improve work standards. This 
was a strategy through which the union leadership envisaged a ―mass movement of 
mobilized and technologically sophisticated workers in 1 000 or more plants (Silvia, 
1988:157). The union‘s national and regional structures had to work with shop-floor 
union committees through providing constant advice, resources and technical expertise 
on issues related to workplace restructuring (Silvia, 1988). IG Mettal viewed changes to 
work organisation (Gestaltung) and the production system as an important issue that 
could not be left to management alone.  
 
3.4.4 Neo-liberalism, restructuring and IG Mettal in the 1990s  
Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, neo-liberal globalisation has intensified 
competition among firms, thus accelerating pressures for new models of production and 
work (Amoore, 2000). The advent of neo-liberal globalisation has led IG Mettal into 
signing agreements on work restructuring issues such as working time flexibility, work 
organisation and wages with either individual firms or employer association bodies 
(Hancke, 2000).  
 
The union‘s workplace restructuring strategy in the 1990s was becoming increasingly 
more confined to signing agreements with individual employers, and increasingly driven 
by the union‘s fear for capital flight. Hancke (2000) refers to this approach as ―new style 
agreements‖, which in Germany are referred to as Standortsicherungs-vereinbarungen 
(agreements to secure production location). It is worth noting that most of these 
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agreements are signed between management and Works Councils, not necessarily with 
the union.  
 
The first grand agreement to secure jobs was signed in 1993 at Volkswagen, wherein IG 
Mettal agreed on short time in order to save 30 000 threatened jobs in the company 
(Hancke, 2000). According to Hancke (2000:56), ―This was followed in 1995 by the 
acceptance of flexible production schedules that adapted working time more closely to 
fluctuations in demand‖. This gradually gave birth to an unofficial strategy that involved 
a trade-off between trade union demands for job security and employers‘ demands for 
restructuring of work and production. 
 
Initially, this was an unofficial strategy in that it was not adopted by any union structure. 
In other words, IG Mettal‘s restructuring strategy in the 1990s initially emerged not as a 
union policy, but as practice by union officials. To this date, Germany is regarded as the 
first country in the post-Cold War era where employers and trade unions entered into 
formal agreements guaranteeing both workplace restructuring and job security (Hancke, 
2000). Implicit in these agreements is the nationalist-protectionist tendency based on IG 
Mettal‘s fear for possible capital flight into cheap-labour zones. In the 1990s the German 
government was actively involved in the debates and negotiations on work restructuring. 
 
For example, in 1996 the government took a controversial decision to cut employer 
contributions to employee sick leave by 20%. This was an outcome of employers‘ 
concern that they were unable to sustain the 100% sick pay because of the changes in the 
global political economy (Hancke, 2000). This decision was met with strong opposition 
from the trade unions, including IG Mettal, and subsequently resulted in an agreement 
between employer associations and trade unions. The unions were successful in reversing 
the government‘s decision to cut the sick pay, but they had to agree to a wage restraint in 
the 1997/1998 bargaining period (Hancke, 2000).  
 
The industrial and workplace restructuring wave of the 1990s exerted pressure on the 
German industrial relations system to the extent that it threatened to undermine ―the 
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Works Council‘s bargaining autonomy and traditional role as a protector of workers‘ 
rights, as it is now more involved in company restructuring processes than ever before‖ 
(Beck et al., 2005:6). According to Beck et al. (2005), about one-third of jobs in 
companies employing more than 1 000 workers were lost in the period between 1989 and 
1996.  
 
Reliance on the Works Councils to implement the strategy was one of the major 
challenges for IG Mettal in the late 1980s and 1990s. According to German labour law, 
trade unions are responsible for collective bargaining on (quantitative) issues related to 
wages and work standards, while Works Councils deal with qualitative shop-floor issues 
such as working time, payment methods or organisation of work (Thelen, 1991). Whereas 
IG Mettal has its shop-stewards committees in different workplaces, the law only 
recognises the Works Council as a legitimate worker representative structure. In the 
1980s and 1990s this proved difficult as the union was becoming reliant on the Works 
Councils to implement its strategy on workplace restructuring.  
 
Thelen (1991) argue that IG Mettal could not achieve its workplace restructuring goals 
through central bargaining due to the peculiarities of individual companies. Some of IG 
Mettal‘s workplace restructuring goals such as job rotation and group work could be 
provided for in the central bargaining framework but Works Councils had to push for the 
realisation of such goals in individual plants (Thelen, 1991). Some Works Councils could 
not effectively advance the union‘s workplace restructuring agenda, and this created 
problems for its strategy.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has made an attempt to outline and discuss IG Mettal and NUMSA‘s 
responses to work restructuring from 1970 to the late 1990‘s. IG Mettal has enjoyed the 
benefits of institutionalised participation whereas NUMSA has suffered under the wrath 
of what Karl von Holdt (2003) calls apartheid workplace regime. It was argued that since 
the late 1970‘s, IG Mettal has adopted a proactive stance in its engagement with work re-
organisation. On the other hand, NUMSA‘s primary focus was on the struggle for 
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freedom of association and organisational rights, and against the apartheid regime as a 
system of racial domination. It was only in the 1990‘s that NUMSA developed a strategy 
to respond to the major industrial and workplace restructuring in the metal sector. The 
chapter also discussed challenges faced by the two unions in their responses to work 
restructuring in this period.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The pressure to restructure 
4.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the responses of IG Mettal and NUMSA to workplace 
restructuring from 1970 to the late 1990s. Using Volkswagen‘s Uitenhage and Kassel 
plants as case studies, this chapter comparatively studies their responses to workplace 
restructuring from the period 2000 to 2009. The key finding of this research is that Works 
Council members at the VW Kassel plant are more proactive and effective in their 
engagement with work restructuring processes than the shop stewards at the Uitenhage 
plant. The chapter proposes two arguments to explain the variation, namely: different 
industrial relations systems, and the position of labour in the global division of labour.  
 
The German industrial relations system empowers Works Council members at the plant 
to influence and shape work restructuring. Examples are given to illustrate the ability of 
Works Council to shape workplace restructuring at the VW Kassel plant through 
institutionalised participation. On the other hand, shop stewards at VW Uitenhage plant 
have little institutional space to influence workplace restructuring processes. This is not 
because they lack the will or capacity to engage or are ideologically opposed to 
workplace restructuring.  
 
The research report argues that this is because decisions on work restructuring are taken 
unilaterally at VW headquarters in Germany—this I term imperial restructuring. This 
refers to the power of multinational corporations (MNCs) to unilaterally restructure work 
in their plants located in developing countries. The VW (Group) AG has installed new 
press, body and paint shops, and an assembly line at the Uitenhage plant without 
consulting the workers at all. The research report therefore argues that South Africa‘s 
position in the global division of labour and the current neo-liberal global development 
trajectory makes it easy for multinational corporations such as VW to embark on imperial 
restructuring of work.  
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Most shop stewards at the Uitenhage plant view the existing worker participation 
structures as not only bogus but also as a tactic employed by management to gain 
legitimacy in whatever they seek to do. In other words, for these workers, worker 
participation in the plant is not real but pseudo. Workers in this plant are not opposed to 
workplace restructuring per se. They view it as a necessary process and condition for 
sustained economic viability of the plant and securing their jobs.  
 
In response to the 2008 global economic meltdown, management at the two plants 
introduced short-time work in order to avoid retrenchments. In Germany the social 
security system is strong and workers do not lose all the payment for the lost time owing 
to short-time work. Some of the lost time is compensated by the government-
administered unemployment insurance fund. Whereas there have not been retrenchments 
in the Kassel plant as a result of the global recession, 400 workers in the Uitenhage plant 
were given voluntary severance packages (VSPs) during the crisis. The management at 
the Uitenhage plant also warned that unless the economic situation improves, the plant 
might be forced to shut down. The research also found that workers are more interested in 
participating in work restructuring when faced with uncertainty about job security.  
 
4.2 Restructuring of work at the Kassel plant 
4.2.1 Overview of the Volkswagen Kassel plant  
Volkswagen was established in the era of fascism in Germany. At that time trade unions 
were banned, their leaders detained and taken to concentration camps, and their assets, 
among those of other civil society formations, were seized and used to establish 
Volkswagen—the people‟s car (Streeck, 1984). When fascism was defeated, trade unions 
claimed that VW was established from their assets and demanded their fair share. 
 
This resulted in the emergence of stronger co-determination rights at VW (Juergens and 
Brumlop, 1986). The state of Lower Saxony owns 20% of VW and it is represented on 
the company‘s supervisory board. The influence of the state has its origin in the Nazi 
period in which VW was used as government‘s strategic machinery for advancing the 
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―project of National Socialist economic and social policy‖ (Juergens and Brumlop, 
1986:74). 
 
IG Mettal and the state of Lower Saxony have historically formed a coalition in the VW 
supervisory board, through which they wield significant influence over ―the composition 
and policies of the firm‘s management‖ (Juergens and Brumlop, 1986:74). It is worth 
mentioning that collective bargaining in the German VW plants differs slightly from 
other companies in that country. Whereas other companies are legally mandated to 
bargain regionally, collective bargaining in VW is company-based—that is, the company 
negotiates directly with the majority union, IG Mettal, on wages and working conditions.  
 
Located in the Nordhessen region, the VW Kassel plant was established in 1959 to 
produce and supply gearboxes for the VW Group assembly plants (VW, 2009a). The 
Kassel plant is the second-largest VW plant in Germany and is the leading component 
supplier to most VW assembly plants across the globe. In 2009 the plant employed 13 
195 workers including 704 apprentices (VW, 2009a). Ninety per cent of the workers and 
98% of the members of the Works Council in the plant are members of IG Mettal. There 
is an agreement in place between the Works Council and management that there shall be 
no industrial action or retrenchment in the plant until 2011. Works councils do not have 
co-determination rights on workplace restructuring; they only have information and 
consultation rights.  
 
The production of gearboxes in the plant was initially done in the foundry and heat 
treatment shops. In subsequent years production extended to automobile engine parts, car 
spare parts and bodywork parts (Interviewee 1). Today the plant comprises six divisions, 
namely: the exchange programme, gear box manufacture, press shop and body shop, 
exhaust systems, foundry and CNC machining, and genuine parts division. The foundry 
supplies pre-processed raw materials to component production lines. The production 
system at the foundry includes instruments of such as Computer Numerical Control 
(CNC) machines in which material shaping (cutting, drilling, trimming to designs) takes 
place for supply to ―points of consumption‖ (components assembly lines) (Interviewee 
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1). The foundry produces about 43 600 aluminium and 4 750 magnesium materials per 
year. 
 
The gear box manufacture division produces both manual and automatic gear boxes. 
Under normal conditions, the division produces about 10 930 gear boxes and 650 rear 
axle gearboxes per day (VW, 2009a). The exchange programme division recycles and 
repairs car engines, cylinder heads and gear boxes, and its overall annual production 
volume is about 281 800 (Interviewee 2). The press shop produces about 1 100 metal 
sheets per day while the body manufacture section produces 60 000 units per day 
(Interviewee 2). The genuine parts division is responsible for the storage and distribution 
of final products to approximately 64 million group vehicles in more than 170 countries, 
including the VW plant in Uitenhage (Interviewee 1). Production at the plant resembles 
full beneficiation; it consists of a foundry (beneficiation of the raw materials), which is a 
department that initiates the production process from metal forming.  
 
4.2.2 Workplace restructuring and labour’s response at the Kassel plant  
 
The crisis and labour‟s interventionist response  
From the period 1993 to the early 2000s the VW Kassel plant experienced a crisis of 
overproduction—that is, the plant produced more than the market could absorb 
(Interviewee 6). The crisis was so serious that at the time management initially proposed 
retrenchment as a strategy to deal with the situation. This was indeed the most turbulent 
period for the plant. Management at the plant seldom resort to retrenchments as a strategy 
for resolving crisis, but this time they did (Interviewee 9). A member of Works Council 
members described the situation: 
 
These were difficult times…. management wanted to retrench but we 
refused it, our jobs had to be secure. We signed an agreement with 
management.... we both committed ourselves to work together [to improve 
the situation] (Interviewee 9).  
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Through negotiations with management, the Works Council successfully persuaded 
management to reduce working hours for each worker instead of retrenchments. One of 
the members of the Works Council recalls:  
 
We just could not agree with that crazy idea, working hours were reduced 
by 20 percent from the 35-hour working week to a 28-hour working week 
for each worker. This was the best strategy we could implement instead of 
losing jobs (Interviewee 6).  
 
The shortfall in wages was offset by the German labour department‘s unemployment 
insurance fund. During the recovery period from 2001 until 2006 there was an increase in 
sales and profitability was restored (Focus Group 1). Had it not been for the Works 
Council‘s interventionist response to the issue, many jobs would have been lost. The 
philosophy behind the interventionist approach to workplace restructuring is clear:  
 
We need to shape processes in this company … because workers must not 
be left out … the consequences of any change must be seen in advance 
(Interviewee 4).  
 
Failed attempts to shut down the plant and outsource the press shop 
The chairperson of the Works Council at the Kassel plant argues that the growing 
competition in the global auto component industry in the period 2001-2006 exerted 
enormous pressure on the plant, to the extent that management proposed to shut down the 
plant. After the failure to close it down, they proposed outsourcing of the press shop 
(Interviewee 2). With the consolidation of international trade liberalisation, the plant was 
set in competition with other external suppliers of new-generation components to the 
OEM‘s. These external component firms supplied similar products at a relatively lower 
price and high quality. The situation was so dire that the then managing director of the 
plant, Dr Barnate, proposed a shutdown of the plant (Focus Group 1). 
 
Following the Works Council‘s successful opposition to management‘s plan to shut down 
the plant, there was also an attempt by management to outsource the press shop. In regard 
to the plant shut-down proposal, Dr Barnate argued that the plant was no longer 
economically viable and at the verge of bankruptcy. He further argued that other 
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automotive companies had done away with manufacturing components in-house as it was 
an extremely expensive practice. 
 
In terms of the press shop, the argument was that in the age of just-in-time production, 
press shops do not belong in components plants but in assembly plants. The press shop at 
the Kassel plant presses metal sheets and produces simple metal car parts such as roofs, 
doors, boots, and so on (Focus Group 1). Dr Barnate‘s argument was that, consistent with 
the restructuring trends in the global automotive industry, pressing metal sheets should be 
done in OEM. 
 
Labour and the shut-down proposal 
The Works Council successfully resisted management‘s attempts to shut down the plant 
(Focus Group 1). Following intense and lengthy negotiations over these issues, the Works 
Council entered into an agreement with VW which committed both parties to improving 
the plant‘s competitiveness in view of the growing competition from other components 
suppliers. The agreement states that both the company and the Works Council are 
committed to securing employment and improving the plant‘s competitiveness through 
optimising production processes (Interviewee 3).  
 
This ultimately led to the restructuring of the production systems. New technologies and 
work methods were introduced in the quest to improve performance and competitiveness. 
The Works Council maintained its interventionist approach throughout the restructuring 
process so as not to allow management any space to repeat its proposal to shut down the 
plant. The agreement entered into between the Works Council and management not only 
commits the workers to strive for improvements in productivity but also in quality, cost 
reduction, meeting production schedule and flexibility—this also involves the 
reconfiguration of hours of work in order to respond to fluctuations in demand. 
Management also committed itself to guaranteeing workers job security (Focus Group 1).  
 
The trade-off is clear and simple. Workers co-operate in ensuring that productivity is 
improved on the condition that there shall be no job losses during work restructuring 
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processes. One of the Works Council members, Carstens, stated that central to their 
success in halting management‘s plan to shut down the plant was that ―we try not to be 
confrontational towards management‖, but they had to be careful as to how they co-
operated because ―there are always dangers that IG Mettal might be incorporated into the 
capitalist system‖ (Interviewee 7). According to Carsten the agreement carries with it 
potential risks such as an ―increase in pressure and intensification of work‖ and 
―reduction of wages in the interest of company‘s economic stability‖ (Interviewee 7).  
 
Despite the risks, the Works Council proved that productivity improvement was possible 
and that it was serious about the commitments made in the agreement. Production figures 
in the plant show a 30% increase in productivity from 2003 until 2008 (see Graph 4.1). In 
2003 a worker produced 257 gear boxes per annum and in 2008 this had increased to 378 
gear boxes per worker per annum.  
 
The company did not have to increase working hours or reduce wages in order to 
improve productivity; instead it actively participated in workplace restructuring that 
involved automation of the assembly lines and production process optimisation 
(Interview 7). A Works Council member argued that it was their responsibility to 
improve productivity because ―without this we lose out … the company can also close if 
there is no productivity. You see, we must fight for productivity so that we have jobs‖ 
(Interviewee 2). It is clear that Works Council members regard improvement in 
productivity as a prerequisite for job security guarantee. 
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Graph. 1 Productivity improvements in the VW Kassel plant  
 
Another member of the Works Council argued that since the establishment of the Kassel 
plant, the Works Councils has been confronted by specific challenges in different 
historical epochs (Interviewee 5). In the 1950s the agenda of the plant‘s Works Council 
was focused more on fighting for higher wages; during the 1970s economic crisis the 
focus was on working hours; the focus shifted to workplace restructuring in the 1980s 
and now they are trying to influence the production process in a manner that empowers 
the Council to productively engage management on any issues affecting the plant 
(Interviewee 7). In the current period the main goal of Kassel‘s Works Council is ―to 
secure long term job security‖ (Interviewee 7). 
 
The Works Council is constantly asking questions such as which products are to be 
manufactured, what quantity, whether a new production system increases productivity, 
which technologies are to be used and whether job security will be compromised as a 
result of work restructuring (Focus Group 1). The Works Council strongly believes that it 
is only through strategic engagement that they can be able to influence the production 
process to ensure that workers are not compromised. As one of the Council members 
neatly puts it: ―As long as there are negotiations, there is no need for a strike. What we 
need is our jobs to be safe‖ (Interviewee 2).  
 
A key challenge for the Works Council‘s strategic engagement on workplace 
restructuring is that not all workers (even Works Council members) have advanced 
knowledge on production systems and workplace restructuring in general (Interviewee 5). 
Asked about ability of Works Council members to effectively deal with workplace 
restructuring, one of the members indicated that: 
If you have at all worker representatives [members of the Works Council] 
who have real knowledge about this you will be lucky to get more than ten 
workers. There are those who would state that ‗we do not care, what we 
care about is wages and issues affecting workers on the shop floor‘. 
Automation is a hot potato when it causes problems (Interviewee 5).  
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The lack of advanced knowledge on the part of Works Council members is not 
necessarily a major disadvantage because ―we can approach scientists … to improve our 
capacity and knowledge on production systems‖ (Interviewee 5). Quite understandably, it 
is difficult for members of the Works Council to know every detail of workplace 
restructuring because it takes different forms in different work stations: ―The technical 
part of it has to be different in the assembly line compared to … say, for example, the 
press shop‖ (Focus Group 1). German labour law allows for Works Councils to 
commission external experts for technical expertise on workplace restructuring or any 
other issue. At the request of the Works Council members, management at the plant 
employed five experts to train workers on continuous improvement strategies (KVP) of 
the production systems (Focus Group 1).  
 
Failed attempt to outsource the press shop 
In 2009 the VW management in Kassel embarked on a failed attempt to close down the 
press shop on the grounds that it was not economically viable and inconsistent with just-
in-time production principles. The ―existence of the press shop has been questioned since 
2005‖ but the question about its relevance in the plant only became more apparent in 
mid-2008 (Focus Group 1). Similarly to how Dr Barnate‘s attempt to close the plant was 
defeated, the Works Council thwarted the plan to close down the press shop, arguing that 
strategies to improve productivity must be sought first. The Works Council argued that if 
they succeeded in halting Dr Barnate‘s ill-considered plan to close down the entire plant, 
improving productivity and efficiency at the press shop would be relatively simple.  
 
This time the Works Council used the 2006 agreement, which expires in 2011, as the 
basis for its objection to the management plan to close the press shop. The 2006 
agreement clearly states that management ought to seek alternatives to increasing 
productivity and performance before considering the closure of a department. A Works 
Council member indicated that ―some managers want to close the press shop but this 
can‘t be done since the [2006] agreement will not allow that to happen‖ (Interviewee 4). 
In August 2009 Works Council members claimed that ―the press shop is now in a good 
position‖ (Focus Group 1).  
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The Works Council did not only resist management plans to outsource the press shop, but 
also used its institutional power to persuade the company to invest in new technology. 
Central to this is the hot-metal (up to 900
o
C) forming/pressing and hardening machinery 
and automation systems. This new technology was instrumental in improving quality and 
productivity. In 2009 the plant, with active participation of the Works Council, adopted 
new work processes and production systems that involved a variety of elements. These 
include continuous improvement strategies, use of methods time measurements (MTM) 
and restructuring of production lines for improved productivity and optimised 
processes—all these are elements of the post-Fordist labour process.  
 
Continuous improvement strategies aim to eliminate waste, even on non-value adding 
processes and motions in the labour process. The methods time measurements are used in 
the labour process, particularly on production lines, to measure work process cycle time. 
MTM is intertwined with ergonomic designs of the workstation and work processes. A 
stopwatch is used only where the principles of MTM are not applicable such as on the old 
production lines. The gearbox production lines at the plant are among the new production 
lines. Compared to the old production lines, the new lines produce more output in the 
same time range. The new lines were introduced as part of continuous improvement of 
the production process.  
 
Elimination or reduction of inventory between processes and work stations happens 
through what is called a supermarket, which supplies the production lines with required 
components in response to a signal. Through the work teams at the shop floor, workers in 
the plant are also actively involved in the improvement of work processes, such as 
logistics and production cost reduction (Focus Group 1). Following the introduction of 
new work processes and production systems the plant was able to improve productivity, 
and turned around from the negative situation widely publicised in the press during 2005 
as that of an uncompetitive facility on the verge of collapse (Interviewee 8).  
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The restructuring of work also led to the reduction of the workforce in production 
processes. Some workers were retrained and redeployed to new areas in which volumes 
increased, but there was still a proportion that could not be redeployed. The improvement 
in productivity as a result of labour‘s intervention motivated the Works Council to 
demand in-sourcing of production of other components. In their collective efforts to 
strengthen the plant‘s competitiveness in the global auto components industry, the Works 
Council and management at the plant jointly agreed to automate the assembly line for the 
gear boxes in 2008 (Focus Group 1).  
 
Works Council members were involved throughout the process of automating the 
gearbox assembly line and the final changes were also informed by their contributions in 
the restructuring process. The main difference between the old and new assembly lines is 
that the latter is smaller, optimises production, is ergonomically friendly and produces 
30% higher than the old assembly line. Workers in the assembly line have now been 
reduced from eight to three. The other five workers have been redeployed to other 
departments. This was a direct outcome of the Works Council‘s intervention because it is 
not ―prepared to compromise on job security‖ (Focus Group 1). Another Works Council 
member indicated that ―other workplaces have rights to retrench but the VW has a special 
arrangement‖ (Focus Group 1). By this, he was referring to the agreement between the 
company and the Works Council which discourages retrenchments as a strategy for 
resolving financial problems at the plant.  
 
Restructuring of work and more hopes  
The Works Council members in the VW Kassel plant are determinedly committed to 
improving productivity in the company because in the absence of their efforts the plant 
might collapse (Focus Group 1). All this evidence coalesces to one conclusion: workers 
at the VW Kassel plant are proactive and interventionist in their engagement with 
workplace restructuring. They envisaged that soon we will be having electric cars, and 
they were already assessing what impact this would have in terms of work organisation 
and job security. In principle ―the Works Council has agreed to the development of 
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electric cars. But we must first understand what this means for workers ... how it will 
affect our company‖ (Focus Group 1).  
 
By September 2009 the Works Council was already working with university experts and 
technology institutes to help them understand the implications of producing electric cars 
on the company‘s competitiveness and job security. The Centre for Metal Forming 
Technology at Kassel University in Germany is among the institutes which the VW 
Kassel Works Council worked with to enrich its understanding on the idea of electric cars 
and technical aspects of work restructuring.  
 
A Works Council member remarked: ―It is our position that the collaboration between the 
university and research institutes might be very useful for us‖ (Interviewee 6). According 
to former IG Mettal official and former Works Council member at John Diehl, Konrad 
Seigel, this proactive approach to workplace restructuring is motivated by a philosophy 
that ―management is too important a task to be left to management alone‖ (Interview, 
Siegel, 2009).  
 
Structures for worker participation at the VW Kassel plant 
The success of the Works Councils in shaping workplace restructuring in the Kassel plant 
can be explained in different ways. It is important to take cognisance of the existing 
institutional structures through which the Works Council (which consists largely of 
members of IG Mettal) advances its workplace restructuring agenda in the plant. VW 
Kassel has a variety of power-centred and task-centred structures for worker participation 
that deal directly with workplace restructuring. This includes work teams; monthly 
meetings between Works Council and management, location symposium, a weekly 
meeting between SOK and Works Councils make or buy committees (MOB), an ideas 
management committee and the planning committees of the Works Council.  
 
These committees must be understood within the context of institutionalised participation 
as codified in the German industrial relations legal framework, such as the Works 
Constitution Act and the Co-Determination Act. None of these laws gives the Works 
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Council or the union any right to co-determine workplace restructuring—―it is not law 
that changes in production processes must be co-determined‖ (Interviewee 11). However, 
in practice, the VW Kassel plant Works Council co-determines workplace restructuring. 
This is because of the history of Volkswagen as a company that was established by 
workers‘ money.  
 
Some members of the Works Council strongly believe that these worker participatory 
structures assist them to influence work restructuring processes: 
 
Yes, I can say we have influence in these committees. We present our 
views on what must be done to improve the company‘s economic 
performance. When we say this, yes the company listens to us and we feel 
good about this. The company wanted to close [the plant] in 2005 and the 
press shop, but we resisted these plans … because of our active 
involvement [in the committees] (Interviewee 4). 
 
Work teams  
The work team is an example of what Pateman (1970) conceptualised as task-centred 
worker participation. The work teams in the plant are aimed at soliciting workers‘ inputs 
on how productivity and quality can be improved, and production costs reduced. Each 
work station in the plant has a work team that consists of no more than twelve workers. 
All members of the work teams are elected by workers in a specific work station and 
team leaders are elected by the elected team. Team leaders are responsible for convening 
briefing meetings and consulting management on any issue related to the workplace, 
particular shop-floor production issues. The idea is that workers should have regular 
meetings to assess their progress with regard to eliminating waste and improving 
productivity and quality.  
 
According to IG Metall‘s head of the Department of Work and Innovation, Dr Dietlief 
Gerst, the union policy on teamwork is that it must be supported and strongly 
encouraged:  
For IG Mettal it is important to have work teams. Research shows that 
work teams are effective. IG Mettal believes that work teams are very 
important and must be supported. [Without] the use of political strength 
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[you cannot] develop your own vision on economic and social policy 
(Interview, Gerst, August 2009).  
 
Dr Gerst mentioned the 1996 and 2005 Studie von Ray by Preher and the 2002 research 
titled Benchmarking Study done by the Institute for Applied Ergonomics to back the 
union‘s argument that work teams are effective. He further indicated that IG Mettal 
advocates for ―semi-autonomous work teams‖ because ―workers must take control of the 
politics of production‖ (Interview, Gerst, August 2009). Whereas the work teams remain 
organisationally intact in the VW Kassel plant, some companies in Germany are phasing 
out these teams because ―employers want us to believe that work teams are not 
functioning well. They are trying to change the teams‖ (Interview, Gerst, August 2009).  
 
The phasing out of work teams in some companies is not motivated by any sound 
economic or logical reasoning; instead this is ―about ideology and political power … it is 
about class struggle‖ (Interview, Gerst, August 2009). It appeared to me that the VW 
Kassel Works Council regards the work teams as a means through which workers can 
acquire organic knowledge about production systems so as to improve the union‘s 
knowledge and expertise on work organisation and production systems. Almost all of the 
Works Council members I interviewed indicated, implicitly or explicitly, that it was 
important that workers understand the production process.  
 
IG Mettal shop steward committee members in different workplaces, including the VW 
Kassel plant, are instructed by the union to play an active role in these work teams so that 
there is synergy with the work done by the union‘s deployees in the Works Council and 
to ensure that the teams remain relevant and that they are not abused or manipulated by 
management (Interview, Gerst, August 2009). As a Works Council member argued: 
 
Team work is our initiative that seeks to eliminate waste and reduce 
unnecessary movements. We cannot allow the company to tell us what the 
work team must do because they wanted to shut down this plant in 2005. 
This is our company; we will fight for its survival … without it we do not 
have jobs (Focus Group 1).  
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The Works Council also demanded training of team leaders in problem-solving 
techniques. The motivation is that this will capacitate them to respond to any issue on the 
shop floor without having to constantly consult supervisors.  
 
Planning committee and ideas management committee  
The planning committee is among the strategic committees of the Works Council 
responsible for dealing with workplace restructuring. This committee played an 
influential role in the Works Council‘s battle against the failed management attempt to 
close down the plant and outsource the press shop (Focus Group 1). The planning 
committee discusses management‘s plans on strategic issues such as investments and 
their impact on employment and location security.  
 
It also monitors agreements related to, and advises the Works Council on, workplace 
restructuring. It seemed to me that this committee acts as a work restructuring advisory 
body to the Works Council. The committee in the VW Kassel plant sometimes invites IG 
Mettal representatives and experts to assist in dealing with complicated and highly 
technical problems.    
 
The ideas management committee works closely with the work teams in making 
recommendations on how work processes and quality can be improved. One of the Works 
Council‘s booklets states fairly clearly that one of the chief tasks of the ideas 
management committee is ―to activate existing potential in the form of ideas related to all 
areas of the company‘s activities and use these to the benefit of the company and 
workplace‖ (VW, 2006:12). These ideas are expected to enhance working conditions, 
reduce costs, and improve the quality of products and services.   
 
Works Council members are rather less enthusiastic about the ideas management 
committee; one of the members stated that workers are discouraged from sharing their 
ideas because they are not remunerated for their ideas on how to best improve 
production: 
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BMW, Daimler-Mercedes Benz pay their workers for their ideas … here 
workers feel cheated because VW does not give them any reward for their 
ideas. But if there is a deadly problem everyone fears for their jobs … it is 
only when there is crisis that workers are prepared to give their ideas 
(Interviewee 8). 
 
Some of the work done by the planning, ideas management and other committees of the 
Works Council is discussed during the regular monthly meetings between the Works 
Council and management. The introduction of the new automatic gearbox assembly line 
at the plant was discussed in a series of monthly meetings with management. Sometimes 
special meetings are called to discuss urgent issues.  
 
It is worth noting that some major workplace restructuring decisions can only be made by 
the company‘s supervisory board. Even if this is the case, the VW Kassel plant has two 
advantages in terms of influencing decisions in the supervisory board. Workers are 
normally guaranteed the support of the Lower Saxony state, which not only owns 20% of 
the company‘s shares but also has veto power on the board (Focus Group 1). 
 
The state of Lower Saxony is usually reluctant to agree to workplace restructuring plans 
that would adversely affect the working condition for workers or threaten job security 
(Interviewee 11). This is largely influenced by the fact that VW is of strategic importance 
for the Lower Saxony state in terms of employment and economic growth in the region. 
Political parties fear that any mistake might result in them being voted out of government 
by the electorate, whose well-being depends on the existence and success of the plant. A 
member of the Works Council in the plant indicated that even though the plant employs 
about 13 000 workers, about ―63 000 people are dependent on VW [Kassel plant alone] 
for living‖ (Interviewee 7).  
 
The other advantage is that the chairperson of the Works Council in the plant, Jurgen 
Stumpf, is also a member of the VW supervisory board (Interviewee 7). He fully 
understands issues facing workers in the plant and he can lobby their interests with 
firsthand experience (Interviewee 8). In my interview with him, he demonstrated 
exceptional understanding of the workplace restructuring challenges confronting the VW 
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Kassel plant, such as outsourcing of production and global commodity chains in the 
automotive industry.  
 
4.3 Restructuring of work at the Uitenhage plant  
4.3.1 Overview of the VW Uitenhage plant  
The VW Uitenhage plant is essentially an assembly plant for VW passenger cars. The 
plant originally begun in 1948 as the South African Motor Assemblers and Distributors 
(SAMAD), but was bought by Volkswagen Germany in the early 1950s following its 
successful licence application to assemble and market its cars in South Africa (Maller, 
1992). Volkswagen‘s decision to establish the plant in South Africa was part of West 
Germany‘s reconstruction efforts from the devastating and destructive effects of the 
World War II.  
 
The plant is situated in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa in a small and busy 
industrial town called Uitenhage. The plant was strategically located in the Eastern Cape 
because of its proximity to the harbour; this was an important economic consideration as 
most of the production parts had to be shipped from Germany (Maller, 1992). Being next 
to the harbour meant that the company would save transport costs. By 1957 the company 
employed about 900 workers and assembled 45 Beetle models per day. With the growing 
domestic demand, introduction of local content legislation and contracts from 
Volkswagen Germany, the plant substantially expanded its production capacity in the late 
1980s to 350 cars per day and a workforce of about 8 500 workers (Maller, 1992). In 
1966 the company was renamed Volkswagen South Africa (VWSA), and even to this 
date it is called by this name.  
 
The VW Uitenhage plant prides itself as one of the first companies in South Africa to 
grant black African workers the right to freedom of association and organisational rights, 
in 1970. Indeed, VW is the first company in South Africa ―to appoint full time shop 
stewards even though African trade unions were not recognised at the time‖ (VWSA, 
2009:1). Workplace restructuring became profound in the late 1970s when the plant 
started to assemble the Golf model (VWSA, 2009). The company changed almost all its 
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production divisions, from the press shop to the assembly line, in order to accommodate 
the new model. 
 
In 1989 the company introduced the Volkswagen Community Trust whose main 
responsibility was corporate social responsibility in the surrounding communities. In 
1990 NUMSA signed a recognition agreement with VWSA management in which the 
company committed itself to affirmative action and employment equity (VWSA, 2009). 
In the early 2000s VWSA was regarded as a leader in the South African passenger 
market and was declared the passenger market leader in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In 2009 
the plant was wholly owned by Volkswagen Aktiengessellschaft (VW AG), and its 
position in the South African economy was of strategic importance. It is one of the 
leading contributors to the South African economy in terms of foreign direct investment, 
skills development and technology transfer.  
 
The production of cars at the plant is divided into four divisions, namely: press, body, 
paint and assembly. Restructuring of work in the plant takes place in these shops. The 
press shop bends and presses a variety of metal sheets (such as car roofs and door 
frames). The body shop constructs the shape or body of cars—it brings together all the 
parts from the press shop and puts them together on a platform to form a car shape. All 
material from the body shop is sent for painting to the paint shop (a car body is painted 
before it goes to the assembly line). Once all these processes are done, the painted body 
of the car is sent into the assembly line where a final product is produced. Cars are then 
sent to an open yard next to the plant for domestic and international distribution.  
 
The Uitenhage plant gets some of its components from the Volkswagen Kassel plant, but 
it also relies on other components suppliers in the surrounding areas such as Johnson 
Controls (supplies seats), Good Year (supplies tyres), Faurecia Interior Systems (supplies 
interior plastic), Flextech (supplies side mirrors and cables), Bloxwich Industries 
(supplies metal pressing parts), Rehau Polymer (supplies bumper systems), Grupo 
Antolin (supplies headliner and door panels), and Schenelleke (supplies smaller technical 
parts). 
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The survival of these components supply companies primarily depends on the Uitenhage 
plant, without it there is no business. Its problems are spilled over to all these component 
suppliers. Adjacent to the VW Uitenhage plant is the newly established Nelson Mandela 
Bay Logistics Park (NMBLP) whose main purpose is to store and distribute components 
to the automotive assembly plants. A strike in one of the supplier companies has the 
potential to terminally disrupt production in the VW plant, and a strike in the VW 
Uitenhage plant itself can result in temporary layoffs of workers employed in most of 
these components supplier companies. In 2009 NUMSA was the major union 
 
4.3.2 Workplace restructuring and the response by NUMSA shopstewards in VWSA 
Background 
At its Sixth National Congress in 2000, NUMSA argued that workers in the South 
African metal sector had encountered many attacks from employers as a result of work 
restructuring. It noted that concepts such as outsourcing, new technology, productivity, 
realignment, restructuring, right-sizing and down-sizing had became common place in the 
sector (NUMSA, 2000). At the Seventh National Congress in 2004 the union resolved 
that it had to be proactive in its engagement with restructuring because workers had lost 
jobs as a result of it. This was a clear indication of work reorganisation in the sector, and 
the automotive sector in particular. These were the issues which the union had to grapple 
with more seriously in the period 2000 to 2009, and beyond.  
 
Volkswagen 2000 strike  
The heated contestation over workplace restructuring between management and workers 
became more profound in 2000 when the shop-stewards committee at the Uitenhage plant 
signed an agreement with management on production targets and schedules. This 
agreement, known as VW Golf A4, was partly linked to the reorganisation of work 
because it included the need to ―restructure production to meet targets of a massive order 
of vehicles by overseas customers‖ (Buhlungu, 2009:103). This agreement sparked 
heated debates amongst workers because the shop stewards did not consult workers in 
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signing the Golf A4 agreement. The tension arising out of the strike became so huge to 
the extent that some workers embarked upon an illegal strike (Buhlungu, 2009).  
Among other things, the agreement included no overtime pay for weekends, a reduction 
of the break time, and compulsory overtime with no notice. These were the issues that did 
not go well with most workers at the plant. However, there is no consensus amongst 
scholars and within NUMSA on what actually caused the strike. According to then 
NUMSA General Secretary Silumko Nondwangu, the strike was merely an expression of 
―ultra-left‖ tendencies within the union. Mtutuzeli Tom, NUMSA President at the time, 
argued that this was an expression of the old guard that was opposed to change, and that 
the ―A4 Agreement [was] a sell-out as it changed the whole culture of doing things‖ 
(Bolsmann, 2009:16).  
This strike is relevant for this research because it illustrates one of the dilemmas facing 
the union in its engagement with work reorganisation and restructuring at the workplace. 
From the outset, it was evident that the strike was directed at the union leadership, not at 
Volkswagen management per se. As one worker put it, ―It is exactly against NUMSA 
that we are striking‖ (Rachleff, 2000:6). The strikers felt betrayed by their own union 
which, in their view, was deviating from the historical tradition of worker control and 
internal democracy. Some of the strikers complained that they had not been consulted 
about the VW Golf A4 agreement before it was signed, and that they only heard about its 
signing in the media (Rachleff, 2000).  
The 2000 VWSA strike demonstrates the way in which the role of worker representatives 
can be undermined by globalisation and the dilemma confronting NUMSA in the face of 
workplace restructuring. Worker representatives are being pulled, like pieces of elastic, 
between two positions. On the one hand, they face demands by management for workers 
to go on short time and to cut their wages. On the other hand, they are accused by their 
members of being co-opted because they have not succeeded in blocking management‘s 
restructuring strategy. The result has been a vote of no-confidence in their representatives 
and a destabilisation of South Africa‘s largest and strongest organised workplace. 
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Changes in production systems  
In the early 2000s the VW Uitenhage plant introduced new production systems in order 
to improve its production output and quality (Interviewee 13). What is clear here is that 
restructuring of work in this plant is geared primarily at consolidating flexible production 
system as a principle underpinning the post-Fordist labour process. In 2006 the company 
introduced a highly automated paint shop—which cost the company R750 million. The 
plant‘s managing director, Andreas Totsmann, hailed the investment as an indication that 
VW AG has confidence in its South African plant (Czernowalow, 2005). 
 
The main difference between the old and new paint shop is that the latter is highly 
automated and can adjust the temperature much easier (Interviewee 13). The new paint 
shop uses water-based paint materials, thereby reducing solvents and improving 
treatment of wastewater. At the time of its installation Totsmann indicated that: 
 
The new facility will give us substantially improved flexibility. This 
means that we will be able to paint and, thereby, manufacture a greater 
variety of car shapes and sizes - ranging from the ultra small car segment 
up to the B or medium class segment. This flexibility gives us confidence 
going into the future to accommodate changes in a very dynamic industry 
(quoted in Czernowalow, 2005:1). 
 
In January and February of 2006 the company retrenched 76 workers owing to this 
expensive investment in the plant (Interviewee 13). The dispute between the plant 
management and NUMSA over the retrenchment became so contentious such that the 
Department of Labour had to intervene in the matter.  
 
In 2008 the company also installed a new body shop, press shop and assembly line as part 
of its efforts to improve its capacity to produce quality cars at greater speed. According to 
the VW global head of production, Dr Jochem Heizmann, the introduction of new 
technologies in the plant was a necessary investment for the plant‘s ability to speedily 
meet both the domestic and global demand for VW cars (Department of Trade and 
Industry, SA).  
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One of the shopstewards describes the changes in plant in January 2009:  
 
Upon opening of the plant this year [2009] we saw a totally new plant. 
There are still a lot new systems that are being introduced … it was a 
completely new plant with new technological stuff (Interviewee 16).  
 
The new press shop is 80% automated compared to the previous press shop, which had 
45% automation (Interviewee 13). The old press shop was largely manually operated but 
the company has now installed a new technologically advanced system in the new press 
shop. The new body shop is about 80% automated and has about 250-300 robots that do 
much of the work (Interviewee 13).  
 
The plant had announced its intention to stop the production of the A1 Golf, Jetta A5 and 
Polo 240/1 by the end of 2009. From 2010 the plant will be assembling the new Metro 
and Polo 250 models. By mid 2009 the plant was already beginning with a process of 
reducing the four platforms to three platforms. The ultimate goal in restructuring the 
platforms was to have two platforms at the beginning of 2010 ready to assemble the Polo 
250 and Metro models. The company normally restructures its production systems when 
they are planning to introduce new car models. This is the case with any other automotive 
assembly plant. Assembling of new car models involves massive changes in production 
systems and methods.  
 
Responses by the Uitenhage plant‟s shop stewards to workplace restructuring 
How has labour at the VW Uitenhage plant responded to the introduction of new 
production systems outlined earlier? This research found that shop stewards in the plant 
somewhat felt disempowered and discouraged from participating meaningfully in 
management-driven workplace change. The installation of new production systems did 
not involve meaningful participation of workers.  
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It further shows that the existing worker participation structures do not give workers any 
real power over workplace restructuring. The shop stewards in the plant are quite aware 
of the pressures exerted upon the company by neo-liberal globalisation and its attendant 
trade liberalisation. Most of them are not keen on obstructing restructuring of work. For 
the shop stewards, workplace restructuring is increasingly becoming a serious concern 
that the workers must proactively engage with:  
 
The vast automation that has engulfed our plant sort of adds as a problem. 
Productions systems which are now being introduced are new to us 
because … they have been developed for the developed countries; here we 
are still struggling even to interact with these because they are not talking 
directly to us as workers (Interviewee 14). 
 
Shop stewards argue that obstructing workplace restructuring might compromise the 
competitiveness of the plant, thus endangering their jobs. Without workplace 
restructuring and continuous improvement of production system, the company might lose 
its competitive edge under the current harsh conditions of the capitalist global political 
economy. As one shop steward neatly puts it: 
 
We are not saying that we must work using the old methods ... but what 
we want is the company to protect the jobs of the people. You will 
understand that we are competing with other countries which are using the 
new methods to manufacture cars. We are not saying that they must get rid 
of new systems, but they must make sure that they protect our jobs 
(Interviewee 18). 
 
Another shop steward concurred:  
 
You will have a challenge if you move off the new productions system 
because of the competition in the market itself … if you do not meet that 
particular standard in terms of making sure you reach a particular quality 
there will be problems. Within the space of a year we have seen an 
immense transformation in VW—they started with the state of the art paint 
shop that has got capacity that doubles the capacity of the old paint shop. 
We need a balance between these new production systems and job security 
(Interviewee 15).  
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Worker participation structures on workplace restructuring  
The Uitenhage plant has numerous worker participatory structures which in theory are 
supposed to ensure that workers have a say in decision making on a variety of issues in 
the plant, including workplace restructuring. These structures include the Joint Strategic 
Workshop (JSW), the plant committee, the negotiation committee, unit head meetings and 
weekly meetings between supervisors and briefing groups. The JSW is a predecessor to 
the joint union-management executive council (JUMEC) and its mandate, in theory, is to 
deal with any strategic matters affecting the plant. Decision on strategic issues such as the 
installation of new machinery and changes in work should ideally be discussed at the 
JSW. The plant committee meets every first Friday of each month and comprises heads 
of departments (including the head of production) and all shop stewards (Focus Group 2).  
 
Through the plant committee all stakeholders share information and attempt to seek 
mutually acceptable solutions to any problem. Many of the plant committee‘s decisions 
remain recommendations until they are ratified by management. The negotiating team 
deals with a whole range of company issues such as banking of hours, work time and 
other important shop-floor issues (Focus Group 2). It consists of the heads of the plant‘s 
human resources department and the human resources director, all full-time shop 
stewards, NUMSA office bearers at the plant and an official from the union‘s regional 
executive committee, and industrial relations specialists or any specialists depending on 
the issue being discussed. Such specialists, unlike in the VW Kassel plant, are invited by 
the plant management to participate.    
 
One of the shop stewards in the plant regards the negotiating committee as ―the most 
important committee. It is an important forum ... if we disagree on anything we launch a 
dispute‖ (Interviewee 16). Unit heads meetings are departmental-based and are geared at 
allowing managers and shop stewards in different departments to discuss ―strictly 
production issues‖ (Interviewee 13). Weekly meetings between supervisors and briefing 
groups—also called team talks—are convened before the start of weekly work shifts to 
discuss issues related to quality standards (Interviewee 13). These team talks are not 
 103 
taken seriously by most shop stewards because they are not powerful when it comes to 
decision making:  
 
We meet before the shift begins just to say the same things we have been 
saying for ages. Look, it is frustrating to make the same suggestions every 
day but the supervisors do nothing (Interviewee 18).  
 
The shop stewards do not believe that these structures give them any power whatsoever 
over workplace restructuring in the plant. As the former chairperson of the shop-stewards 
committee indicated: ―No, these committees do not give us any power in decision 
making. We just share information most of the time‖ (Interviewee 11). Most of the shop 
stewards regard most of these committees as nothing but a desperate attempt by 
management to gain legitimacy on whatever they seek to do.  
 
The JSW has historically been viewed as the most important and strategic platform for 
workers to advance their interests in regard to qualitative shop-floor matters such as 
working conditions, introduction of new production systems and shifts. However, shop 
stewards in the plant accuse the management of not taking the JSW seriously and of 
using it just to inform shop stewards about their plans to restructure work. According to 
one of the shop stewards: 
 
JSW is only there to sort of cement a position whereby management can at 
a later stage state that ‗what we are doing now we have told your union‘. 
JSW is a tool which management use to inform workers about changes in 
production systems and claim that they consulted us. We were informed 
about the new technologies for the press shops and other departments … 
but we do not engage there, we just get informed (Focus Group 2).  
 
A shop steward indicated that the scope for engagement in the JSW is very limited and 
that this can at times be demoralising:  
 
‗In fact what is happening in this JSW is that we are given broad principles 
not in details and at times we do not know what informs these broad 
principles. The information that we get there is limited because that 
structure is only to share information and not to engage. If you want to 
 104 
engage they will send you elsewhere and when you get there you do not 
engage on the issue. JSW is sort of a formal consultation forum that does 
not give workers any power to influence decisions (Focus Group 2).  
 
Other shopstewards view the JSW in the same light and some go to the extent of 
dismissing it as a talk show:  
 
To me it is like a talk show that JSW ... it is a talk show, when you speak 
of joint decision making you are speaking of more than one, but when we 
come with our input there they do not care about our strategic input ... so 
to me this JSW does not make sense (Interviewee 15).  
 
However, not all shop stewards dismiss the JSW as an absolutely useless structure; one of 
the shop stewards stated that: 
 
JSW taught us a lot of things because today we are able to raise issues in 
different platforms because of the information we get at JSW. But one 
thing we cannot get out from the JSW is that they are saying is about joint 
decision making platform but there is little in truth in this. We cannot 
abandon the JSW because by doing that we will be suppressing an 
opportunity to get information (Focus Group 2). 
 
Limited access to information and lack of trust  
Management seldom makes attempts to brief shop stewards about their plans to 
restructure work or furnish them with all the information about their plans to restructure 
work. This explains why shop stewards believe that management does not negotiate 
workplace change with them in good faith. This was indicated by one of the shop 
stewards who complained: 
 
There is a deliberate attempt by management to hide information from us. 
I do not know why… (Interviewee 16).  
 
In the same vein another shop steward echoed the same complaint: ―The Company is not 
always transparent when they introduce new production systems‖ (Focus Group 2). When 
asked why they do not request the information from management, one of the shop 
stewards replied, ‗‗Not unless you want to resign on that particular day‖ (Focus Group 2). 
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The feeling by workers that management negotiates workplace change in bad faith fuels 
the lack of trust between the shop stewards and management. ―To me what is happening 
here is that management is not transparent ... maybe they do not trust us‖ (Focus Group 
2). Asked whether they trust management, one shop steward said, ―How can we trust 
them? They are not transparent to us ... we do not want to be trusted by them‖ (Focus 
Group 2). 
 
Some shop stewards seem sympathetic to the plant management‘s half-hearted 
commitment to negotiate workplace restructuring with them because they (management) 
get orders from VW headquarters in Germany. They argue that the fundamental 
constraint to real worker participation lies in the foreign ownership of the plant. 
 
To some it seems rather impractical to have real worker participation in a foreign 
company as the decision making process is centralised in the company‘s headquarters:  
 
We do have capacity to engage management on these issues but the 
challenge is that management tell us that ‗this is not our call but it is the 
mother company‘s call from Germany‘. There are some agreements which 
are signed in Germany but they are not in our favour. The problem of 
capacity is not there ... we are trained extensively within the progressive 
trade union movement to understand issues that talk to macro and micro 
economic issues. We know what we want (Focus Group 2). 
 
At the NUMSA Central Executive Committee meeting, one of the committee 
members argued that it is not possible to have ―full participation‖ in a foreign 
company: ―We cannot have full participation in a company which is foreign 
owned‖ (SWOP, 2009a).  
 
They also argue that co-determination law as it is practised in Germany is not an 
appropriate industrial relations system because: 
 
As NUMSA we do not believe in co-determination because it is opposed 
to our ideological school of thought. We do not need co-determination 
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because if a mistake is made by management it should remain 
management‘s mistake alone; it should not be a mistake of the union and 
management (Focus Group 2). 
 
NUMSA General Secretary Irvin Jim concurs: 
 
The union is not in partnership with employers; thus workers cannot co-
determine decisions with management. A workplace belongs to the 
employer, not workers (SWOP, 2009a). 
 
In 2009, NUMSA commissioned the Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP) 
at the University of the Witwatersrand to undertake a study aimed at identifying changes 
in work organisation and production systems in the metal sector, and to assist the union in 
developing a strategy on these issues. The union noted that it was unfortunate that it 
lacked a coherent strategy on how to respond to workplace restructuring and how to 
influence it to benefit workers. This is why it was important that a study be conducted to 
better inform the union‘s strategy on restructuring of work. As part of the study, a survey 
was conducted in a number of workplaces, including the VWSA Uitenhage plant, to 
establish workers‘ attitudes towards work, production and participation.  
 
The responses of the twenty shop stewards at the Uitenhage plant to questions about 
workplace restructuring and worker participation are summarised in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
Table.3 Responses to the statement “Management knows best and should 
make all the company decisions about changes to the production system”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SWOP (2009: 57). 
 
 
 Number of 
Responses 
% 
Strongly agree 0 0 
Agree 1 5 
Neutral/ do not know 0 0 
Disagree 5 25 
Strongly disagree 14 70 
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Table.4 Responses to the statement “Workers should participate more in 
making company decisions about changes to the production systems”. 
 Number of 
Responses 
% 
Strongly agree 17 85 
Agree 3 15 
Neutral/ do not know 0 0 
Disagree 0 0 
Strongly disagree 0 0 
Source: SWOP (2009:58). 
 
Table 4.1 clearly shows that the shop stewards do not approve of management‘s 
unilateral approach to workplace restructuring. Table 4.2 shows that shop stewards would 
like to be involved in decision making on changes in production system. The central 
point here is that shop stewards in the Uitenhage plant want to be consulted when VW 
restructures work in the plant.  
 
4.4 Possibilities and limits to worker participation in a foreign plant.  
The Uitenhage VW plant is a typical example of foreign direct investment (FDI). In neo-
liberal economic terms, multinational corporations are considered important entities that 
are necessary for economic growth and development in host countries, particularly in 
developing countries. Most countries have introduced economic policies aimed at 
attracting FDI from MNCs. These policies provide a variety of investment imperatives to 
encourage MNCs to invest in their countries. The growing influence of MNCs has 
affected labour relations policies and practices in various countries. Most MNC 
headquarters have absolute power in terms of work reorganisation in subsidiary plants 
located in the global South. Owing to the fear of capital flight, many governments in 
developing countries have to accept unilateral restructuring of work by the MNCs.   
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In an attempt to understand the inability of the shop stewards at the Uitenhage plant to 
influence and shape workplace restructuring, this report asks an important question: is it 
possible to have real worker participation in a foreign-owned plant? Drawing from the 
data presented here, this report argues that workers in foreign-owned plants located in 
developing countries are unlikely to secure real worker participation in workplace 
restructuring. However, this does not mean that workers in the home countries of 
multinational corporations automatically have a better chance of securing real worker 
participation in their workplaces.  
 
The tendency by multinational corporations, such as Volkswagen, to embark on unilateral 
restructuring in their overseas plants located in developing countries can best be 
described as imperial restructuring. This argument is related to Webster et al.‘s (2008) 
argument that space gives leverage to MNCs to impose work restructuring in their 
plants—a strategy they refer as ―whipsawing‖ and Greiner‘s theory on ‗coercive 
comparisons‘. The whipsawing strategy enables MNCs to impose work restructuring 
strategies such as work intensification, downsizing and casualisation by threatening 
closure of a factory (Webster et al., 2008). 
 
MNCs are able to embark on unilateral restructuring because of the power they wield in 
influencing government policies. The current neo-liberal economic development 
trajectory has not only weakened the power of nation-states to promulgate or enforce 
policies on industrial democracy. It has also led these nation-states to believe that part of 
the role of multinational corporations is to modernise production systems and their 
countries in general. In the workplace, MNCs use ―coercive comparison‖ (Grenier, 2006) 
and the ―whipsawing strategy‖ (Webster et al., 2008) to neutralise workers and their 
unions‘ opposition to the restructuring of work.  
 
Imperial restructuring must be understood as an outcome of the current global neo-liberal 
development trajectory. Most countries have now liberalised their economies in order to 
attract direct investment from MNCs. The role of FDI is normally viewed as that of 
bringing capital and introducing new technology into subsidiary plants located in host 
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countries, with the overarching strategic goal to bring about development. As Ozler and 
Taymaz (2004:1) put it: ―FDI has been considered by many development economists as 
an important channel for transfer of technology to developing countries , and an 
important tool to generate jobs in those countries‖.  
 
MNCs, therefore, are not concerned at all about informing and consulting workers about 
their plans to restructure work. They often do this without carefully assessing the impact 
such a decision will have on workers and on society in general. MNCs are convinced that 
they have a divine right to restructure work as they wish irrespective of the obvious social 
consequences. This vindicates Bakan‘s argument that MNCs ―are globally blind‖ and that 
they act with a ―reckless disregard for consequences‖ (cited in Webster et al., 2008:48). 
Decisions on restructuring of work are made in the parent plant of a particular MNC 
without engaging in any meaningful consultative process with workers.  
 
The reorganisation of work is done in line with the MNC‘s requirements, while the views 
of local actors are utterly ignored. Worker participatory structures are sometimes 
established, but these structures do not give workers any real power to influence decision 
making in their workplaces. This is exactly the case in the VW Uitenhage plant. The 
company‘s headquarters in Germany installed a new body, press, paint shops and 
assembly lines in the Uitenhage plant without consulting local workers. The management 
justifies unilateral restructuring of work in the name of competitiveness and matching the 
standards set by the VW best performing plants elsewhere.  
 
In his study on the influence of MNCs in the reorganisation of work at two subsidiary 
plants of an MNC in Canada, Grenier (2006) argues that local plants (either labour or 
local managers) can sometimes resist workplace restructuring imposed by the 
headquarters of an MNC. He then asks a question: do MNCs have influence over the 
behaviour of workers and unions? In an attempt to answer the question, Grenier finds that 
MNCs use ―coercive comparisons‖ to persuade workers to accept and co-operate with 
management-driven workplace restructuring. The term coercive comparison refers to ―the 
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use of performance comparisons to which are attached rewards and sanctions of 
individual units [plants]‖ (Grenier, 2006:66).   
 
With coercive comparisons, MNCs compare plants with indicators such as labour 
productivity, profits, production costs, quality of products, and so on. Plant A might be 
surpassing plant B in terms of labour productivity, profitability and quality. Plant B is 
therefore put under pressure to match the standards of plant A. The coercive power of 
these comparisons lies in the fact that the survival of each plant depends on its 
comparative ranking with other plants (Greiner, 2006). The headquarters of a particular 
MNC can influence reorganisation of work in one of its off-shore plants using coercive 
comparisons. According to Greiner (2006:67), coercive comparisons ―provide MNCs 
with a powerful tool to neutralize the workplace as a site of resistance to their 
rationalization policies‖.  
 
In their ground-breaking study on restructuring of work in major multinational 
corporations in the white goods industry, Webster et al. (2008) discuss the strategies used 
by Electrolux in managing its processes on work restructuring. They indicate that 
Electrolux has developed an innovative strategy which involves ―shaping the new 
geography of production through constituting a new form of space competition within the 
corporation itself‖ (Webster et al., 2008:41). They describe this process as ―regime 
shopping‖ that entails the ability of the multinational corporation to make all the 
company‘s plants across the globe compete with each other on a number of issues, 
including productivity.  
 
The process of regime shopping is facilitated by the power of multinational corporations 
to use spatial fix as a tool to impose work restructuring at the local level. As a process, 
regime shopping involves multifaceted strategies aimed at countering possible resistance 
on the part of labour to its plan to restructure work. One of these is the ―whipsawing 
strategy‖, through which companies ―leverage restructuring agreements (intensify labour, 
downsize and casualise) by threatening closure and relocation to cheap labour zones‖ 
(Webster et al., 2008:41).  
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VW headquarters in Germany uses, through local management, both coercive 
comparisons and the whipsawing strategy to facilitate and justify imperial restructuring at 
its Uitenhage plant. The restructuring of the paint shop, body shop and assembly line 
were all done in the name of boosting competitiveness and matching the quality standards 
of other VW best-performing plants elsewhere. Bad performance and low productivity of 
the plant might result in plant closure and relocation to another country. This possibly 
explains shop stewards‘ acceptance of workplace changes, as they were worried about 
matching the good performance of other VW plants.  
 
Most shop stewards indicated that the introduction of new production systems and 
machinery, despite the fact that they were unilaterally installed by the VW headquarters, 
was necessary for securing the global competitiveness of the plant and meeting the high 
standards of other VW plants in Germany. These observations are similar to the findings 
of Grenier‘s (2006) and Webster et al.‘s (2008) studies. This report illustrates the power 
of coercive comparisons and the whipsawing strategy used by VW in neutralising 
workers‘ resistance to imperial restructuring.   
 
4.5 The global economic meltdown and labour  
4.5.1 The economic crisis and its impact on workplace restructuring  
This research was conducted during 2009, at the peak of global economic restructuring 
arising out of the economic recession that began in 2008. During the recession, the global 
automotive industry witnessed rationalisation, mergers and acquisitions as well as 
retrenchments, short time, layoffs and factory closures, particularly in the components 
sector. Most car manufacturing companies were battling to continue their operations 
owing to the financial strain. Car sales declined and some auto components 
manufacturers in South Africa closed down (Jurgens and Blocker, 2009). Both South 
African and German auto industries have drastically cut back on production, and this has 
negatively affected their backward and forward linkages in the supply chains.  
 
 112 
The president of South Africa‘s National Association of Automotive Component and 
Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM), Roger Pitot, described the crisis as ―very, very 
serious‖ (Cremer, 2009). VW headquarters in Germany indicated that the first five weeks 
of 2009 ―have shown that the crisis is fully weighing on us‖ (Cremer, 2009). On average, 
VW global production output had dropped by 20% in February 2009 compared to the 
December 2008 output (Jurgens and Blocker, 2009). In March 2009 the plant‘s 
management in Uitenhage was estimated to be producing 28 000 vehicles less than the 
92 000 production output in 2008. The decline in production is attributed largely to poor 
local and global demand owing to the global economic meltdown (Cremer, 2009). By 
June 2009, six component manufactures were liquated as a result of the decline in car 
sales in South Africa. One of the VWSA components suppliers, Schnellecke, issued a 
notice to NUMSA about its intention to retrench 700 workers as it feared liquidation if it 
continued operating with excess labour (Jim, 2009). 
 
These developments led NUMSA to painfully acknowledge that ―NUMSA is bleeding. 
Every day company notices of retrenchment or short time arrive on our fax machines. 
The reason is always the same ‗drop in orders‘‖ (NUMSA, 2009:7). The Kassel plant also 
experienced a dramatic decline in production output due the decline in local and global 
demand for cars. In 2008 the VW Kassel plant produced approximately 2.9 million 
gearboxes and 3.8 million exhaust systems, but this had dramatically declined by the end 
of August 2009. Most of the plants that depend on the VW Kassel plant to order their 
components were devastated by the decline in demand for cars.  
 
The German economy has been the most hard-hit by the global economic meltdown, 
primarily because of its reliance on the automotive industry (Jurgens and Blocker, 2009). 
Employment stability in the German auto industry remained fairly stable until June 2008. 
The auto manufacturing industry (and the associated components supplier industry) is 
among the leading industries in Germany, and one of the country‘s main employers. The 
German auto industry is of strategic importance to the national developmental 
imperatives.  
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According to Blocker and Jurgens (2009) ―the German automotive industry is among the 
global winners in the sector between 2006 and 2008‖, and that the German car brands had 
a 17.4 share in the global market in 2008. However, by mid 2009 the German auto 
industry was under distress, as Jurgens and Blocker (2009) indicate that ―Production by 
German cars makers fell by 31% and exports by 40% compared to 2008‖ (see Figure 
4.2).  
 
Figure.2 German car production, capacity utilisation and order bookings 2003-2009.  
Source: Jurgens and Blocker (2009:3) 
 
The 2008 global economic recession resulted more in the reorganisation of work than 
changes in production systems. This study could not establish any correlation between 
changes in production systems and the 2008 global economic meltdown. The two plants 
installed new technologies and machinery long before the pinch of the crisis was felt. 
Neither the Kassel nor the Uitenhage VW plants have introduced new production systems 
in response to the economic crisis. Instead, the crisis affected employment relations and 
patterns—that is, shifts and working time. The Uitenhage plant has dismissed 400 
workers through voluntary severance packages and introduced short time, whereas the 
Kassel plant workers have been placed on government-subsidised short time. In 2009 the 
Uitenhage plant was planning to retrench 2 000 workers on the grounds that they were 
contract workers (Jim, 2009). 
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Short time seems to be the dominant response adopted by the two plants. IG Mettal, 
through the Works Council, regards short time as the only feasible measure for saving 
jobs, while NUMSA is aggrieved that it was not properly consulted in the process of 
introducing short-time work. In Germany, Section 87 of the Industrial Constitution Act 
accords Works Councils co-determination rights on the introduction of short time, but at 
the same time it puts a legal responsibility on the Works Council to take into account 
employers‘ interests (Jurgens and Blocker, 2009). Management at the Kassel plant argue 
that it is only through short time that the company can avoid insolvency and 
redundancies. IG Mettal agreed to this.  
 
Most workers at Uitenhage plant were ―working four days every two weeks which is 
short time instead of their normal five days‖ (Jim, 2009:4). Other countries, such as 
Sweden, felt the pinch of the global economic meltdown to the extent that they thought of 
pulling out from the automotive industry altogether (Jurgens and Blocker, 2009). 
Workers in the Uitenhage plant were asked not to report to work from 23-27 February 
2009, and again for two weeks in April. Unlike their German counterparts, they were not 
compensated for the lost time. In Germany, the government‘s unemployment insurance 
can pay up to 67% of the lost work time depending on the number of dependents the 
individual worker has. 
 
Workers in other motor companies in South Africa such as Toyota, Ford, General Motors 
and Mercedes-Benz were also subjected to unpaid short time (Jim, 2009). South African 
employers who introduce short time and voluntary severance packages ―do this without 
consultation with the union, and they plead innocence that they are not retrenching‖ (Jim, 
2009:4). This is unlike in the Kassel plant, where management and the Works Council 
entered into an agreement on short time and that there should be no retrenchment until 
2011. 
 
4.5.2 NUMSA  
In South Africa the crisis has generally given rise to retrenchments, short time and 
temporary lay-offs in the auto industry. However, it is important to note that even before 
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the global economic meltdown workers ―lost jobs as a result of companies adopting lean 
and new management techniques in order to achieve international competitiveness of 
firms on continuous bases. In order to be competitive, companies‘ restructured 
production and displaced workers by new technology and machines‖ (Jim, 2009:4). The 
economic crisis has only worsened the job losses in the South African auto sector. 
NUMSA has responded by way of a National Job Security Conference held in March 
2009 (Jim, 2009), and a series of regional Job Security Conferences.  
 
NUMSA‘s General Secretary, Irvin Jim (2009:6), indicated that these conferences were 
convened because the global economic meltdown had plunged the South African 
economy into a crisis and that ―Every day jobs are being lost. NUMSA is of the view that 
this is a crisis and a job bloodbath‖. In just three months, from November 2008 until 
January 2009, 1 660 jobs were lost in the South African auto industry alone. An 
important outcome of the National Job Security Conference was the idea of training lay-
off schemes, a policy which has now been adopted by the South African government. The 
conference resolved to work together with the government in the fight for job security 
and job creation. It also emphasised the importance of providing shop stewards with 
training on workplace restructuring (Jim, 2009).  
 
4.5.3 IG Mettal 
In collaboration with the Hans Bockler Foundation, IG Mettal organised a conference 
under the theme Industrial Policy Tomorrow. The conference was aimed at developing 
IG Mettal‘s response to the global economic meltdown. One of the strategies that 
emerged from the conference was the “Working Together for a Good Life” (Gemeinsam 
für ein gutes Leben) campaign (Jurgens and Bockler, 2009). According to IG Mettal 
senior official, Michael Guggemos, this campaign entails three basic objectives, namely: 
job security, real worker participation in decision making in workplaces and social 
security (Hans Bockler Stiftung, 2009).  
 
An IG Mettal document titled ―Active Response to Crisis‖ (Aktiv aus der Krise) puts it 
fairly clearly that major decisions around relocation and major investment must be done 
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in consultation with works councils and the union (IG Mettal, 2009). It also categorically 
declares that there shall be ―no dismissals in 2009‖ (IG Mettal, 2009). The document 
commits the union to renew its demand for co-determination rights on workplace 
restructuring so as to ensure that workers have real influence in issues of work 
restructuring. It further states that it does not make sense for workers not to have a say in 
things that affect their daily lives in the workplace, such as relocation. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has made an attempt to report and discuss IG Metall and NUMSA‘s 
responses to workplace restructuring from 2000 to 2009. The study suggests that workers 
in the VW Kassel plant are more proactive and effective in their engagement with 
workplace restructuring than the shop stewards in the Uitenhage plant. This is attributed 
largely to the German industrial relations system based on institutionalised participation. 
The inability of workers at the Uitenhage plant to influence work restructuring processes 
is partly because VW headquarters in Germany introduces new production systems and 
restructures work without consulting workers in the plant—this I described as imperial 
restructuring.  
 
Most shop stewards at the VWSA plant are discouraged from participating in workplace 
restructuring in the plant because they feel that the company is not interested in their 
inputs on how work should be restructured and organised. Some strongly feel that it is 
unlikely that a foreign company will allow workers in another country to give strategic 
leadership on how things should be done; this includes strategic decisions on workplace 
restructuring. On the basis of this, the research report argued that it is difficult to have 
real worker participation in a foreign company 
 
It was also reported that both IG Mettal and NUMSA were inward looking and 
protectionist in their response to the 2008 global economic meltdown. Their common 
concern was primarily job security. In their seminal work, Grounding Globalisation: 
Labour in the Age of Insecurity, Webster et al. (2008) argue that when labour is 
confronted by insecurity they often turn inwards and demand national protectionism to 
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save jobs. These findings beg another important question regarding worker participation: 
under what conditions are workers keen on worker participation? From the evidence 
presented here, it is clear that workers are more interested in shaping work restructuring 
when job security is threatened.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion 
5.1 Job insecurity and the will to participate  
Under what conditions do workers desire greater participation in decision making? This 
question has not been adequately answered by previous theories on worker participation. 
Marxist analyses of worker participation (such as Crouch, Burawoy, Mandel and 
Ramsay) ignore that workers are more interested in participating in decision making 
when faced by uncertainty about their jobs, just as employers are interested in worker 
participation when their authority and legitimacy is threatened. Whereas Ramsay (1977) 
views worker participation as an employer-driven phenomenon, it has been supported by 
workers and unions ―on the basis that it has offered an opportunity to extend their 
influence and control‖ (Jackson, 1991). However, the experience has been that even 
though workers show interest in participation, they seldom exert any meaningful control 
or influence in the workplace (Ramsay, 1977).  
 
According to Sverke and Hellgren (2001:4), job security can be defined as ―the 
subjectively perceived likelihood of voluntary job losses‖, while Greenhalgh and 
Rosenblatt (1984:438) define it as ―a perceived powerlessness to maintain desired 
continuity in a threatened job situation‖. It is important to note the distinction between 
―job instability‖ and ―job security‖. The former refers to the objective risk of a job loss 
and the latter refers to a subjective perception of the risk (Sousa-Poza, 2004). A number 
of studies in the recent past clearly show that job insecurity has increased since the dawn 
of neo-liberal globalisation (Webster et al., 2008). In the automotive industry, job 
insecurity has increased under the devastating 2008 global economic meltdown. As it was 
indicated in Chapter Four of this report, workers in the VW plants in Kassel and 
Uitenhage experienced a sense of insecurity.  
 
It is quite evident that workers in both plants were willing to negotiate restructuring of 
work (introduction of short-time work) with their local management. Their desire to 
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participate in decision making on work reorganisation was mainly motivated by their fear 
for possible job losses owing to the global economic crisis. However, the will to 
participate at the Kassel plant predates the 2008 global economic crisis but their interest 
in participating has always been informed by a fear of possible job losses. The Works 
Council demanded participation in the restructuring of production at a time when 
management was convinced that the plant had to shut down because it had lost its 
competitive edge in the global automotive industry. The Works Council also resisted 
management‘s plan to close the press shop. During the 2008 global economic crisis, 
workers in the plant demanded greater participation in order to shape the structure and 
workings of the short-time work.  
 
Shop stewards at Uitenhage plant also demonstrated an interest in participating in 
workplace restructuring, particularly in light of massive temporary lay-offs, voluntary 
separation packages and short time caused by the 2008 global economic recession. 
Workers in both plants have shown equal commitment to protectionism as a tool to save 
their threatened jobs. In order to advance their common protectionist tendencies and 
protect their jobs, these workers desire greater participation in decision making at their 
plants. Traditional Marxist perspectives that views worker participation as a means 
through which capitalists seek to resolve the crisis of profitability and to manufacture 
consent cannot be generalised.  
 
Although the concept of ―job insecurity‖ has received sufficient intellectual attention, 
there is little knowledge on its relationship to workers‘ desire for greater worker 
participation in workplace restructuring. This study clearly suggests that job insecurity 
can at times propel workers‘ desire for participation in decision making. As to whether 
their engagement can be effective or not is secondary; the primary argument here is that 
workers at the two plants displayed the desire to participate in the restructuring of work. 
 
Other previous studies hint at this argument. De Witte‘s (2005) study focuses on the 
influence of job insecurity on member participation in unions. He argues that union 
members are more likely to participate in the activities of a union during times of crisis as 
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they see it as a tool to fight job losses or any other contentious issue. However, De 
Witte‘s study does not directly discuss possible influences on workers‘ interest or desire 
to participate in decision making over restructuring of work.  
 
5.2 The challenge for labour in the global South 
This research raises important questions about the need for labours‘ strategy to respond to 
the restructuring of work at the global level. As it was argued in the beginning, the 
automotive and the auto component industries are increasingly gaining presence the 
world over. The current neo-liberal globalisation thrives through hyper-capital mobility 
and continuous improvement of production strategies aimed at improving performance 
and quality.  
 
The optimism found in Harvey‘s (2000) seminal text, Spaces of Hope, and Herod‘s 
ground-breaking (2001) Labour Geographies is promising on the possibility of a strategy 
for labour to challenge the growing power of multinational corporations. Whereas Harvey 
and Herod are reticent on South-South labour international solidarity, one can borrow 
from their optimistic and powerful arguments to argue that labour in the global South 
must intensify the already-existing structures for global networks and use them to 
challenge international capital‘s logic, particularly on work restructuring. The 
overarching argument in Harvey (2000) and Herod (2001) is that labour can shape the 
landscape of capitalism and challenge the power of international capital. Karl Marx 
(1976) and Karl Polanyi (1944) argued that labour under capitalism is a ―fictitious 
commodity‖ and that any attempt to treat it like any other commodity would give rise to 
workers‘ resistance and opposition against employers.  
 
Harvey (2000) takes this argument further to support the emergence of a new labour 
internationalism (NLI) on the basis that it presents opportunities for challenging the 
exaggerated power of multinational corporations and global capital in general. Herod 
(2001:5) further challenges the pessimistic argument that views global capital as having 
terminally weakened labours‘ power; he argues that ―there is always opposition to power 
and domination, a fact that is seen every day in countless workplaces, fields, offices‖. 
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The hyper-mobility of capital in the current period has not only rolled back labour‘s hard-
won gains, particularly in the global South (Harrod and O‘Brein, 2002), but also 
intensified the debate ―as to strategies to confront the power of global corporations‖ 
(Webster et al., 2008:197). The rise of neo-liberal globalisation has created a dense 
cluster of organisational challenges for labour; among these challenges is the 
proliferation of atypical forms of employment (Harrod, 2002) and the unilateral 
imposition of new production systems without any genuine consultation. 
 
The global economic restructuring in the late twentieth century prompted labour to 
rethink and debate the best strategies for combating the ever-growing power of 
multinational capital (Webster et al., 2008). Scholars have identified and analysed what 
they term new labour internationalism or new global unionism. By new labour 
internationalism we are referring to a more decentralised, democratic and flexible global 
labour solidarity model (Webster et al., 2008). New labour internationalism presents an 
opportunity for labour in the global South to confront the power of multinational 
companies and ensure that restructuring of work does not compromise workers‘ well-
being and rights.  
 
In 1996, the World Congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) noted that ―the position of workers has changed as a result of globalisation of 
the economy and changes in the organisation of production‖ and emphasised the need to 
re-invigorate labour‘s international solidarity in opposition to global networked 
capitalism (Munck, 2002:13). Eder (2002) argues that the idea that labour is ―structurally 
defenceless against mobile and globally organised capital‖ is not true. This is a clear sign 
of labour‘s potential in the global South to challenge the unilateral restructuring of work 
in subsidiary plants of the multinational companies located in developing countries.  
 
Accordingly, imperial restructuring and ―whipsawing‖ can be combated or challenged 
through innovative campaigns by labour in the global South. Such campaigns must be 
aimed at taming the destructive power of multinational corporations. This would 
concretely involve building organisational and political strength of the already existing 
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structures for labour in the global South such as the Southern Initiative on Global Trade 
Union Rights (SIGTUR). According to Webster and Lambert (2002:342), the emphasis 
on ―southern‖ must be understood politically to mean the bringing together of ―the most 
exploited working classes all over the world, where union rights are negated or 
constrained, and political situations restricted‖. 
 
Future research can look into concrete and practical strategies which can be used by 
labour in the global South to respond to the restructuring of work. Such research must 
look into strategies of overcoming the already known challenges facing new labour 
internationalism such as the North-South divide, inward-looking tendencies of trade 
unions, and so on. As Webster et al. (2008:209) have shown, ―the most fundamental 
challenge to a new labour internationalism remains that of bridging the North-South 
divide‖.  
 
5.3 Overall summary of the main findings and arguments  
This research report has set out to comparatively investigate worker participation in 
workplace restructuring at the Volkswagen plants in Kassel and Uitenhage. It sought to 
answer the question: How has the Volkswagen workforce in South Africa and Germany 
engaged management on changes in production systems and work organisation? Using 
the Marxist labour process theory as its primary theoretical tool of analysis, the report 
argued that the automotive industry has generally experienced a transition from the 
Fordist labour process to the post-Fordist labour process characterised by flexible 
production methods.  
 
Some of the major characteristics of the Fordist labour process include mass production 
of standardised products, utilisation of inflexible technologies such as the assembly line, 
repetitive work for each worker and utilisation of standardised work routines. On the 
other hand, the post-Fordist labour process is characterised by Just-In-Time and Total 
Quality Management production strategies. These changes are also linked to the 
restructuring of work in the global automotive industry. Using Gerrefi‘s (1999) notion of 
commodity chains and Bonacich and Wilson‘s (2008) theory of the logistics revolution, 
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the report attempted to explain the emergence and intensification of the global supply 
chain in the automotive industry.  
 
The main finding of the research was that Volkswagen workers at the Kassel plant are 
more proactive and effective in their engagement with workplace restructuring than their 
Uitenhage counterparts. The report proposed two main factors to explain this variation. 
Firstly, the report contended that the co-determination law in Germany enables workers 
in the VW Kassel plant to influence and shape work restructuring through 
institutionalised participation. In South Africa, the industrial relations system remains 
confrontational and the lack of trust between employers and employees remains the order 
of the day.                                                                                                      
 
Secondly, the research report argued that the inability of Uitenhage workers to influence 
the restructuring of work is worsened by the fact that their plant is controlled by VW 
headquarters in Germany. In addition to effective institutionalised participation, Works 
Council members in the Kassel plant are further advantaged by the fact that Volkswagen 
is a German multinational corporation with a particular history and relationship with the 
domestic plants. The report developed the concept of imperial restructuring to explain 
how South Africa‘s position in the global political economy fosters unilateral 
restructuring of work in the VW Uitenhage plant. The role of multinational corporations 
in developing countries is normally viewed to be that of spilling-off technological 
innovations and increased performance.  
 
South Africa is among the developing countries which have designed and adopted neo-
liberal macro-economic policies in the quest for foreign direct investments from 
multinational corporations. Workers in some of these countries do not enjoy any real 
support from their own governments to secure participation in decision making on issues 
related to restructuring of work. Any resistance to the introduction of new production 
systems or methods on the part of labour is likely to be viewed as an obstruction to 
development and modernisation. As part of imperial restructuring, multinational 
corporations such as Volkswagen use what Grenier (2006) calls ―coercive power‖ and 
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what Webster et al. (2008) call the ―whipsawing‖ strategy to neutralise labour‘s 
opposition to their plans to restructure work. 
 
The 2008 global economic meltdown has affected the organisation of work in both the 
Kassel and Uitenhage plants. Many workers in the Uitenhage plant have either taken 
voluntary severance packages or have been placed on short-time work. In the Kassel 
plant almost all workers on the shop floor were subjected to short-time work at the peak 
of the crisis. The common worry for workers in both plants was their fear of losing jobs 
owing to the global economic crisis. This fear has in turn propelled worker interest to 
participate in processes of workplace restructuring.  
 
The research report therefore argued that workers are more interested in participating in 
decision making when faced with possible job losses as an outcome of a particular crisis. 
This argument has some implications for Marxist literature on worker participation. 
Without invalidating the revolutionary Marxist literature that views worker participation 
fundamentally as a capitalist strategy to quell industrial unrest and manufacture consent 
on the part of labour, this report argued that workers‘ interest in participating in 
workplace restructuring is heightened when job security is threatened. Therefore, it is not 
sustainable to always regard worker participation as a tool used by capital to resolve 
capitalist crises of profitability or legitimacy. Sometimes workers also see it as a tool to 
safe-guard their jobs.  
 
The revolutionary Marxist literature on worker participation disregards that workers are 
sometimes interested in shaping and influencing workplace restructuring when faced by 
uncertainty about job security. It is worth noting, however, that the interest and ability to 
influence workplace restructuring are not immediately reducible from each other. This 
means that interest in participating does not on its own imply that workers have the 
ability to influence work restructuring processes. Workers might have the ability to shape 
workplace changes but lack interest. Through active participation in decision making 
workers intend to take charge of the factory in the event that it collapses. 
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In his analysis of the impact of the 2008 global economic crisis on workers, Hattingh 
(2009) argues that factory occupations were spreading as labour sought protection against 
massive retrenchment of workers, particularly in the global automotive industry. In 2009, 
workers in the biggest car manufacturing company in South Korea, Ssangyong, 
responded to the management attempt to close down its Pyeongtaek plant by occupying 
the factory. These examples persuaded Hattingh (2009:1) to conclude that ―factory 
occupations—in some instances even self-management—seem to be creeping back onto 
the agenda of a growing number of workers‖. This shows that workers are interested in 
worker participation and that they see it as a means to occupy the factory in the event that 
management plans to retrench workers in mass or to shut down a plant.   
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I……………………………………………hereby consent to participate in the 
interview/group discussion for the research project conducted by a Wits University 
sociology student, Themba Masondo.  The purpose of the study has been explained to me 
and I understand that my participation is voluntary. I am aware that my responses will be 
kept confidential and that there will be no direct benefits or rewards for my participation 
in the study. 
 
 
Name of the participant…………………………………… 
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